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Executive summary 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this follow up study was to obtain up to date information on the 
national laws of the EU member states on the gathering and handling of 
evidence and to analyse that information in the light of recent developments in 
legislation governing cross-border transmission of evidence, in particular the 
European Evidence Warrant (EEW). In addition to these recent legislative 
developments, it was the intention of the Commission to initiate preparatory 
work on a legal instrument, which would expand the scope of application of the 
EEW in order to further replace the existing regime of mutual legal assistance 
(MLA) within the EU by the mutual recognition (MR) principle. The end result 
of the study was to reach a conclusion on whether or not there is a need to take 
action in order to improve cooperation on the gathering, obtaining and 
admissibility of evidence in criminal matters and, if so, to identify the preferred 
way to proceed. The main method for assessing the status questionis, needs and 
wishes of member states in the area of cross-border evidence issues, was a 
detailed questionnaire sent out to the member states and the Eurojust College.  
Considering the complexity of the current environment, the project team 
created a benchmarking framework to unravel some of the applicable regimes. 
The benchmarking framework does not only clarify the existing legal provisions, 
but is intended to support future policy making. Therefore, the project team 
engaged in an in depth analysis of the existing legal instruments to identify the 
explicitly regulated investigative measures and cluster them according to the 
regime applicable to them. Furthermore, considering the vast amount of 
investigative measures which are currently not explicitly regulated, an 
additional analysis was performed as to the likeliness member states would 
attach a sound pre-set and consistent regime to them. 
The architecture of the questionnaire reviewed the existing cooperation 
regimes and clustered the investigative measures according to the regime that is 
applicable to them. Besides a set of preliminary questions on evidence related 
issues and a set of questions on the institutional capacity in the member states, 
the bulk of questions was related to the functioning of MLA and potentially MR. 
The differences brought about by the different types of cooperation and 
investigative measures were the starting point for the architecture of the 
questionnaire. Analysing on the one hand the theoretical and legal framework 
surrounding cooperation and investigative measures and on the other hand the 
practical implications and attitudes towards those forms of cooperation and 
investigative measures, a set of six different clusters of cooperation types were 
identified. Whereas clusters 1 and 2 are linked to the MR regime in the EEW, 
clusters 3 and 4 are linked to the MLA regime applicable to a series of explicitly 
regulated investigative measures.  
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Cluster 1 reflects the EEW framework decision, which applies to objects, 
documents or data obtained under various procedural powers, including 
seizure, production or search powers. The EEW as such intends to facilitate the 
obtaining of available and well-identified objects, documents and data. To the 
extent necessary, (house)search or seizure are possible. However, such a 
distinction means not all forms of (house)search or seizure fall within the scope 
of the EEW regime. In the past there has never been a separate regime for the 
obtaining of existing objects, documents and data through (house)search or 
seizure on the on hand and documents, objects and data still to be collected via a 
more scouting (house)search or seizure on the other hand. Considering the 
implicit step forward made with regard to (house)search or seizure for available 
and well-identified objects, documents and data, it is only logical for member 
states to be willing to agree that a more scouting (house)search or seizure be 
brought under the same regime as the measure(s) falling under the scope of the 
EEW. Therefore cluster 2 only concerns two investigative measures, being 
(house)search or seizure (other than the forms included in the scope of the EEW 
and thus the scope of cluster 1). 
Whereas clusters 1 and 2 are linked to the MR regime in the EEW, clusters 3 
and 4 are linked to the MLA regime applicable to a series of explicitly regulated 
investigative measures. A scan of all MLA instruments was made in search of 
the conditions linked to the execution of investigative measures. As a result of 
this scan, explicitly regulated investigative measures were grouped according to 
the possibility for the requested member state to link conditions to the execution 
of the request. Cluster 3 deals with investigative measures for which the locus 
regit actum rule applies, either in full or to a certain degree. Cluster 4 deals with 
all investigative measures the execution of which the requested/executing 
member state may under the current legal framework not make dependent on 
conditions of double criminality, (double) minimum threshold or consistency 
with national law, and for which the forum regit actum  rule applies. 
Furthermore, a series of investigative measures currently not explicitly 
regulated, was listed and divided into two further categories (clusters 5 and 6), 
according to the likeliness member states would be inclined to either or not 
attach a locus or forum regit actum rule to them, and to require or abandon double 
criminality, double threshold or consistency tests. Cluster 5 consists of measures 
which are currently not explicitly regulated by any of the MLA legal instruments 
and for which, because of their intrusive character, it is deemed unlikely that 
requested member states will execute them unless execution will be in 
accordance with or in the manner provided for in its national law or under 
conditions of double criminality, double minimum threshold or consistency with 
its national law. Cluster 6 consist of measures for which, because of their non-
intrusive character, it is likely that requested member states will allow for them 
under the most lenient MLA regime, i.e. be willing to execute them in 
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compliance with the formalities and procedures expressly indicated by the 
requesting member state, provided that these are not contrary to the 
fundamental principles of its own law. 
Four main characteristics of MR were used as the backbone of the study and 
the backbone of the structure of the report.  
The first MR characteristic is the use of the 32 MR offences (to abandon the 
double criminality requirement).  
The second MR characteristic relates to the enhanced stringency in 
cooperation. Introducing MR into MLA raises questions as to the feasibility of 
limiting the grounds for refusal. Linked to those grounds for refusal are the 
grounds for postponement and the impact such grounds have on the speed with 
which recognition takes place and execution is commenced. 
The third MR characteristic relates to the shift from merely requesting to a 
regime in which orders are issued.  
The fourth MR characteristic relates to the horizontalisation of cooperation. 
Assessing the legal feasibility to base the entirety of mutual assistance on MR 
characteristics, requires an assessment of the compatibility of the MR 
characteristics with the philosophy of MLA. However, at the same time it is 
important to underline that not all forms of MLA can be replaced with an MR 
regime. The functioning and specific features of a joint investigation team for 
example are fully incompatible with the ordering and executing principles of 
MR. Furthermore, replacing the entirety of MLA with an MR regime runs the 
risk of losing the flexibility offered by the MLA obligation to afford each other 
the widest possible measure of assistance. In today’s reality, a significant number of 
highly intrusive investigative measures is not explicitly regulated. Hence the 
compilation of clusters 5 and 6.  Nevertheless, assistance for those investigative 
measures remains possible based on the obligation to afford each other the widest 
possible measure of assistance. Therefore, the importance of this article may not be 
underestimated. Future (MR-based) MLA instruments should either maintain 
this flexibility or regulate each and every possible investigative measure. 
 
Findings and recommendations  
The use of the 32 MR offences 
As far as the first MR characteristic, being the use of the 32 MR offences to 
abandon the double criminality requirement, is concerned, member states were 
asked to what extent either partial or general abandonment of the double 
criminality requirement is considered acceptable in MLA. Strikingly, only 10% of 
the member states indicated to attach great importance to a full fledged double 
criminality requirement. This means that no less than 90% of the member states 
are willing to cooperate even if the investigative measure relates to acts which 
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do not constitute an offence in their own national law. In current practice 60% of 
the member states do not even apply the double criminality requirement, even 
though they are allowed to do so. Abandoning the double criminality 
requirement most definitely constitutes a significant improvement in terms of 
efficient cooperation. Considering that an additional 30% accept abandonment 
as a future policy, double criminality can and should no longer be inserted into 
the future legal framework. 
Furthermore, the questionnaire aimed at assessing the feasibility to use the 32 
MR offences beyond the double criminality framework. 
First, the requirement to execute in consistency with the national law of the 
executing member state was put to the test. Because such a requirement might 
hinder efficient cooperation, it was worth looking into the willingness of 
member states to waive this right when execution is related to acts included in 
the 32 MR offences. The enquired situation concerned the execution for acts for 
which the requested measure cannot be taken/ordered in a national case 
according to the national law of the executing state. Analysis revealed that only 
20% would never allow execution. No less than 80% of member states are either 
now executing or willing to accept a policy to oblige execution if the acts 
concerned are included in the 32 MR offences. 
Second, the possibility to limit refusal and postponement grounds was put to 
the test. The MR philosophy requires refusal and postponement grounds to be 
limited as much as possible. The question again rises whether the introduction of 
the 32 MR offences would have an added value in this context. Analysis 
revealed that neither for operational, nor for financial capacity issues the 
preparedness of member states to limit refusal and postponement grounds is 
linked to the 32 MR offences. 
Third, the questionnaire aimed at assessing the added value of the 32 MR 
offences in the context of admissibility of evidence. Member states were asked 
whether they would consider it to be an acceptable future policy option that 
information lawfully obtained by a member or seconded member while part of a 
joint investigation team which is not otherwise available to the competent 
authorities of the member states would constitute per se admissible evidence 
under the national law of the member states concerned. Only 10% considered 
this not to be an option. The other 90% do not require that such admissibility is 
limited to the 32 MR offences.  
Fourth and final, member states were asked whether they would consider it 
to be an acceptable future policy option that competent authorities from other 
member states who are lawfully present on their territory while executing a 
request/order/warrant  draft official reports having the same probative value as 
if they had been drafted by their own competent authorities. 80% of the member 
states consider admissibility of “draft official reports having the same probative 
value as if they had been drafted by own competent authorities” to be an 
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acceptable future policy and do not require such admissibility to be limited to 
the 32 MR offences. 
It is safe to say that the introduction of the 32 MR offences in other areas than 
the abandonment of the double criminality requirement needs to be well 
considered. Whereas the introduction might seem a step forward, analysis 
clearly revealed that limiting such a step forward to the 32 MR offences, can 
actually hinder from taking an even bigger step forward. This view is shared by 
the Eurojust College. In its replies, it is clarified that in general, the taking of 
evidence should not be dependent on whether the underlying offence comes 
under the 32 MR offences set out in previous MR instruments. 
 
Enhanced stringency in cooperation 
Grounds for refusal or non-execution 
The MR concept must turn traditional judicial cooperation into a more 
reliable and faster mechanism. This implies more stringency for the requested 
member state or authority, in that traditional grounds for refusal are reduced 
and requests must be replied to and effectively executed within strict deadlines. 
First, the position of member states vis-à-vis the (revised) traditional grounds 
for refusal or non-execution was tested.  
As far as the ne bis in idem principle is concerned, the vast majority of 
member states indicate that execution on the basis of ne bis in idem would be 
refused, or that it should be possible to refuse execution on the basis of it. The 
overall recommendation therefore must be that the ne bis in idem principle 
should be enshrined throughout future (MR-based) MLA instruments between 
the member states as (at least an optional) ground for refusal or non-execution.  
Even though wholly new and introduced in the questionnaire as a suggested 
ground for refusal or non-execution, support among member states for refusal or 
non-execution for the situation where the proceedings in the issuing member 
state relate to a person who the executing member state has granted immunity 
from prosecution for the same facts as a benefit for his or her collaboration with 
justice, is strikingly high. It is therefore recommended to introduce this newly 
suggested (optional) ground for refusal or non-execution throughout future 
(MR-based) MLA instruments between the member states.  
Refusal or non-execution for reason of lack of double criminality, was also 
assessed. The granting of traditional MLA generically does not depend on the 
condition of double criminality, and the possibility of refusal on the basis of lack 
of double criminality is limited to a series of coercive or potentially intrusive 
investigative measures only. Therefore this refusal ground was only assessed for 
measures for which the refusal ground has not (yet) been prohibited. Only a 
small number of member states would not (insist to have the possibility to) 
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invoke lack of double criminality as a ground for non-execution. Hence, 
complete removal of double criminality as a refusal or non-execution ground is 
illusionary. However, the potential of introducing a prohibition to invoke it for 
the 32 MR offences in these cases is far more promising.  
Subsequently, “impossibility to execute” as a refusal ground was assessed. 
Art. 13, 1, c EEW stipulates that recognition or execution of an EEW may be 
refused in the executing member state if it is not possible to execute it by any of 
the measures available to the executing authority in the specific case in 
accordance with the provisions of the EEW. This non-execution ground is EEW-
specific, and is inexistent under current MLA instruments. Asked whether they 
would refuse execution of an EEW (or would want to be able to refuse it) if it is 
not possible to execute it by any of the measures which would be available to 
them in a similar domestic case the majority of member states answered 
affirmatively. Both for theoretical reasons and on the basis of the empirical 
research among member states, it is highly recommended to retain the ground 
for non-execution for measures related to the EEW (cluster 1), and stressing that 
it should obviously not be introduced for any other cluster, not even cluster 2. 
Thereupon, the refusal ground of immunity or privilege under the law of the 
executing member state was assessed. The introduction of this ground for 
refusal or non-execution is a step backwards, compared to traditional MLA. 
Surprisingly, when tested, there was significant support among member states 
for keeping or even introducing the ground for non-execution concerned. 
Notwithstanding this empirical result, the project team strongly suggests 
redeliberation on the issue, for objectively it would be a step backwards to keep 
or further introduce the ground for non-execution throughout future (MR based) 
MLA.  
The next refusal ground to be assessed was the extra-territoriality principle; 
this refusal ground was copied in the EEW from the EAW, which seems a 
regrettable mistake. The project team therefore opposes introduction of it in 
future (MR based) MLA instruments, and deletion of it in the EEW. This stance 
is supported by the assessments made with member states.  
As for the exception ground of ordre public, and notwithstanding the 
empirical results, the project team sees no reason for keeping the traditional ordre 
public exception in place. Traditionally, assistance may be refused if the 
requested party considers that execution of the request is likely to prejudice the 
sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests of its country. 
However, in the EEW the exclusion ground has been significantly reduced in 
that it may only be invoked where, and to the extent that, the objects, documents 
or data would for those reasons neither be used as evidence in a similar 
domestic case. Through the latter interpretation, the traditional ordre public 
exception has lost the traditional inter-state dimension it has always had in 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The project team recommends a middle 
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course, as was introduced in the Wittem Convention of 1979, and allow to 
impose conditions to execution if this can avoid affecting the interests of the 
requested state. Furthermore, the possibility to refuse cooperation referring to 
the political offence exception, was assessed. It has for long held an important 
position in cooperation instruments. Today this position cannot be maintained 
any longer for two main raisons. First, for reasons of internal consistency in the 
legislative framework it is advised to ban the political offence exception 
altogether. Second it should be noted that calling upon the political offence 
exception is a clear sign of distrust with regard to the requesting member state, 
which is odd having explicitly expressed confidence in the structure and 
operation of the legal systems of the other member states and confidence in the 
capacity of all the member states to ensure just legal procedures in the preamble 
to the TEU.  
Also, the fiscal offence exception, which has already been drastically reduced 
in scope in the 2001 EU MLA Protocol has no real future any more. At least, its 
reduction along the lines of the EEW can be recommended throughout future 
(MR based) MLA between the member states.  
The potential implications in terms of operational or financial capacity for the 
executing member state in executing under a stringent MR regime investigative 
measures that currently lack an explicit regulation may be very substantial. The 
project team has therefore chosen to not only test the position of member states 
vis-à-vis the (revised) traditional grounds for refusal or non-execution but also to 
check the preparedness of member states to accept semi-mandatory execution of 
the measures under clusters 5 en 6 irrespective of their potential financial and 
operational capacity impact. For the interception of telecommunications and the 
video conference hearing, there is a reverse financial cost regulation in place, 
which is why the project team has chosen to assess whether member states in the 
mean time would be willing to step away from the reverse financial cost 
regulation, or – alternatively – would be in for a new financial regulation for 
considerable-cost measures.  
As for refusal for reasons of lack of financial capacity, none of the current 
MLA instruments explicitly provides for such a general refusal ground. Member 
states were asked if they felt that requests for investigative measures were often 
refused or should be able to be refused when it is felt that the implications of 
their execution in terms of financial capacity or resources is or would be 
substantial or extraordinary. Half of the member states did consider this an 
option. Also, member states were asked if they would be willing to execute the 
request anyway if a fair share, for example at a 50/50 rate, would be borne by the 
requesting/issuing member state. The results of the answers provided were 
spectacularly positive to say the least. The results are significant for the debate 
on a possible future policy option to introduce a 50/50 sharing of costs made in 
the execution of (MR based) MLA requests or orders, as an agreed fall-back 
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position in case where the financial consequences of executing a request or order 
would be substantial or extraordinary, in that the cost involved would surpass 
an amount of e.g. 10.000 EUR (which the project team suggests to copy from the 
2006 MR of confiscations framework decision, thus introducing a consistent 
mirroring regime in the sphere of (MR based) future MLA between the member 
states).  
Concerning refusing execution for reasons of lack operational capacity, the 
large majority of member states indicated that irrespective of the cluster, lack of 
operational capacity would and should not count as a refusal or non-execution 
ground 
 
Strict reply and execution deadlines 
Of vital importance for the safeguarding of evidence, be it under traditional 
MLA or under MR, is that requests or orders are replied to in a timely fashion 
and swiftly executed.  
The project team has chosen not to ask member states what deadlines they 
thought would be appropriate for replying to a request or order. On the basis of 
the EEW and other MR based instruments it could easily be set at e.g. 30 days, 
being the time limit then for agreeing to execution, refusing it or asking for 
postponement of effective execution of the request or order.  
Questioned about deadlines relating to effective execution of requests, 
irrespective of the clusters, approximately half of the member states require the 
requested/executing member state to execute the measure concerned within a 
provided deadline. The project team here inclines to share the standpoint taken 
by the Eurojust College, i.e that, whilst recognising that it may be difficult to set 
a general deadline for the execution of requests for the taking of evidence, such 
requests should be executed as quickly as possible, and preferably within a 60 
day term, with a possible extension for another 30 days in case postponement 
would be requested.  
The importance of postponement possibilities was tested separately. 
Interestingly however, a lot of the member states indicate they would not 
postpone execution, even if such execution would have a significant impact on 
routine domestic workload or other domestic priorities and even if such 
execution entails the risk of hampering the fluent functioning of their own 
criminal justice system. It is particularly encouraging to see that member states 
show this kind of willingness to cooperate. Member states that did indicate to 
use the possibility to postpone execution of a foreign order/request/warrant 
indicate that they are still willing to start execution within a reasonable deadline 
provided by the issuing/requesting member state, which is set at 45 to 60 days, 
which is only slightly longer than the Eurojust position which allows for a 
possible extension of 30 days in case postponement would be requested. 
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Based upon this analysis, the project team recommends that the time limit for 
agreeing to execution, refusing it or asking for postponement of effective 
execution of the request or order, be set at 30 days. Requests should be executed 
within a 60 day term, with a possible extension of 45 days in case postponement 
would be requested. 
 
Accepting and executing orders 
This section dealt with the general willingness of member states to step away 
from the traditional MR locus regit actum regime and the position of member 
states with respect to consistency problems. Furthermore, compliance with 
expressly indicated formalities was put to the test. 
 
Accepting the validity of domestic judicial decisions taken in the issuing 
member state 
All MR-based instruments that so far have been designed, prevent a decision 
or measure to be executed abroad unless it has first been taken or ordered 
domestically or – mutatis mutandis – could have been taken or ordered in a 
similar or comparable domestic case, in due conformity with the national law 
and procedures of the issuing member state. Given that the very essence of the 
MR principle lays precisely in the expectation that member states will trust one 
another sufficiently to mutually recognise each other’s judicial decisions in 
criminal matters, as if it were their own, this is no more than logical. 
Consequently, the question at hand when considering to base the entirety of 
MLA between the EU member states as much as possible on a MR-based footing, 
is not whether that should be via a warrant-like or a domestic order & certificate-
like instrument. The only and real question is whether the EEW – which 
apparently is the only MR instrument under which the actual taking or existence 
of a domestic decision in the issuing member state must not be evidenced vis-à-
vis the executing member state as a precondition for its execution by the latter – 
can or must serve as a model for reorienting MLA towards MR, if that were to be 
decided. The answer is negative, for the EEW (cluster 1) is extremely atypical in 
what it envisages, compared to traditional MLA requests (clusters 2-5). Whereas 
MLA essentially is a vehicle for requesting investigative measures or the transfer 
of precise objects, documents or data, the issuing of an EEW envisages a result, 
i.e. obtaining certain objects, documents or data, leaving it to the executing 
member state to take any investigative measures that it domestically may need 
to deploy (including, if necessary, search of premises and seizure) to that end. 
For it is not clear which investigative measures the executing member state will 
need to deploy in order to obtain the evidence sought, the EEW – even if 
categorized as a typical MR instrument – actually is no such instrument stricto 
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sensu. For the bunch of MLA not covered by the EEW (comprised in clusters 2-5) 
the situation is different, in that it truly relates to the taking of investigative 
measures or to the transfer of objects, documents or data. It is hardly imaginable 
that a future EU MR-based system would envisage altering this situation, by 
allowing the issuing of e.g. ‘find the truth’ warrants, ‘get incriminating 
testimony’ warrants or the like by the issuing member state, instead of the latter 
spelling out which concrete measures or procedural steps it seeks the execution 
of in the executing member state. Consequently, only a single question remains: 
should it be required from the issuing member state to always first order these 
measures or take these steps in accordance with its domestic law and 
procedures. The answer is obviously no. For a vast majority of measures or 
procedural steps, it would not even be possible to have them formally decided 
or ordered, especially in the phase of preliminary (police) investigations. Even 
where the measures concerned would require a formal domestic decision if they 
would need to be taken on the territory of the issuing member state itself, it 
would largely undo the flexibility that characterizes current MLA if each time 
the taking of the measures concerned would need to be formally decided 
domestically – and embedded in a formalised decision eligible for recognition by 
the executing member state as if it were its own decision.  Only to the extent that 
member states do not have sufficient trust in one another to suffice with self 
declared observance potentialis by the issuing member state of its domestic law 
and procedures in issuing investigation orders or warrants, it seems acceptable 
to require the issuing member state to actually deliver proof of the taking of a 
domestic decision or the issuing of a domestic order or warrant to the envisaged 
effect. Whether, even for far-reaching coercive or intrusive measures included in 
cluster 3 and – a fortiori – under cluster 5 – such distrust level is to be 
maintained when a roll-out of MR is envisaged, seems to be the only real 
question left. Therefore, member states have been asked for their position on the 
matter. The empirical results of the questionnaire are inconclusive, in that the 
position of member states varies greatly. The project team recommends to suffice 
with requiring the issuing member state to confirm or declare that the measure 
the execution of which is envisaged could be taken in a similar or comparable 
national case to promote full trust and hence allow for its execution without 
prior evidence of any formal domestic decision, order or warrant to the same 
effect in the issuing member state. 
 
Executing judicial decisions in the executing member state 
Member states were asked which position their own national law occupies 
with respect to the execution of a request/order warrant. For clusters 3 and 5, 
only 20% of the member states indicated that their own national role plays an 
essential role and that execution is only possible where fully in accordance 
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with/in the manner provided for in their national law (and procedures). For 
cluster 6 none of the member states indicated this strict locus regit actum 
requirement. 10% of the member states give their own national law a 
complementary role in that execution can only take place under specific 
condition(s) which would have to be observed in a similar national case (e.g. 
compliance with certain formalities and procedures, purpose or use limitations 
etc). This 10% does not vary over the different clusters. 
Considering the importance of admissibility of the gathered information/ 
evidence in the course of criminal proceedings in the requesting/issuing member 
state, several instruments foresee the possibility to expressly indicate that the 
requested/ordered member state in the execution of the measure, should comply 
with certain formalities and procedures (e.g. compliance with certain formalities 
and procedures, purpose or use limitations etc). Interestingly, 60% (cluster 3 and 
5) upto 70% (cluster 6) of the member states indicate to be willing to accept a 
forum regit actum regime.  
Additionally, member states could indicate what the current position of the 
persons concerned by the execution of the measure is. Three scenarios were put 
to the test: first, the possibility to grant a person the national guarantees of the 
executing member state; second, the possibility to grant a person the best of both 
worlds, being the guarantees of either the executing or the requested member 
state; third, the possibility to introduce a set of commonly agreed upon 
minimum standards. The results of the current practice with regard to these 
three scenarios is contrasted by a larger support of either of them as a future 
policy. Between 70 and 80% of the member states (depending on the clusters and 
on the scope of the rights that would be granted to the persons concerned) 
consider either of these three scenarios to be an acceptable future policy. When 
going into detail on the elaboration of common minimum rules, 90% of the 
member states should based on/derived from the ECHR/other common 
fundamental rights texts and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to the extent available. 
Secondly it was assessed to what extend member states are willing to go 
beyond the limits of their own legal system. This section of the questionnaire 
linked in with the possibility to require that the (execution of the) investigative 
measure is consistent with the law of the requested member state. Analysis 
revealed that member states are very reluctant to proceed with the execution of 
an investigative measure if it surpasses the national scope ratione personae. 70% 
indicated that execution would not be possible in such cases. Only 30% is 
prepared to go ahead with this investigative measure albeit this percentage 
increases with 10% in cluster 5. Member states are not willing to execute if the 
order/warrant/request relates to acts which do not constitute offences in the 
national law of the executing member state. Having anticipated this outcome, 
the questionnaire made a distinction between a general ratione materiae issue and 
an issue linked to the 32 MR offences featuring in mutual recognition 
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instruments. As this list embodies the abandonment of the double criminality 
test, it is only logical for member states to be willing to cooperate if the acts 
concerned are included in 32 MR offences, regardless of criminalisation under 
the own national law. This hypothesis was confirmed by the results of the study 
in that 50% of the member states currently already applies this rule and an 
additional 30% considers it a valid future policy option to abandon the 
possibility to make execution dependant on double criminality. The project team 
anticipates similar results when the 32 MR offences are attempted to be used to 
avoid lack of execution for other types of inconsistency with the national law of 
the execution member state. 
Furthermore, requested member states are not only obliged to answer to the 
request, but equally have to respect additional formal or procedural 
requirements attached by the requesting state provided that the requirements 
are not contrary to the requested member states’ fundamental principles of law. 
Considering the importance for the admissibility of evidence, it is interesting 
to note that not all member states use the possibility to request additional formal 
or procedural requirements. The percentage ranges from 50% in cluster 1 to 80% 
in cluster 6. This might indicate a great deal of trust in the legal systems of the 
executing member states. The end goal of mutual assistance is the obtaining of 
information/evidence to be used in the course of criminal proceedings in the 
issuing/requesting member state. Not complying with the formalities expressly 
indicated constitutes an important risk. The information/evidence gathered runs 
the risk of being inadmissible in the requesting/issuing member state. Therefore 
compliance with expressly indicated formalities is of utmost importance. 
 
Horizontalisation of cooperation 
The fourth MR characteristic relates to the horizontalisation of cooperation. 
MR typically takes place between the authorities of the member states. 
Derogation from this general rule is possible in special cases, without further 
clarifying what constitutes a special case. The project team considers it advisable 
to eliminate such possibility to derogate from the general rule, and only 
maintain one single exception for the transfer of persons held in custody. The 
only other exception currently generally used is the exchange of criminal records 
data, which will be replaced by the ECRIS system and therefore no longer needs 
to be an exception to the direct communication rule.  
Direct communication and thus further horizontalisation of the cooperation 
environment impacts on the importance of institutional capacity at all authority 
levels within the member states. Further investment is vital to ensure that MLA 
becomes a well oiled machine. A reference to this discussion explains why 
questions related to institutional capacity were included in the questionnaire. 
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Acceptance of requests issued in a foreign language and technical capacity issues 
judicial authorities are confronted with, were assessed.  
In a Union which counts 27 members and 23 different languages, MLA and 
MR become empty concepts when member states do not have the institutional 
capacity to make sure that all requests are understandable for all parties 
involved. Linguistic and translation facilities and staff are of undeniable 
importance. Member states were asked to what extent they had translations in 
English, French or German of their criminal code, their code of criminal 
procedure or (other) MLA and MR legislation available. The relevance of the 
previously mentioned question lies in the fact that most request for MLA are 
accompanied by the corresponding extracts from the relevant legislation, 
applying to the circumstances of the case. Analysis revealed that as far as 
complete translated versions of relevant legislation are concerned, the general 
situation is that they are more available in member states in English than they 
are in French and German. In future (MR based) MLA it should be an obligation 
to accept requests/orders in English. Therefore, it is highly recommendable that 
all member states invest time, effort and resources in having at least partial 
translations of the most relevant passages of their criminal codes, their codes of 
criminal procedure or (other) MLA and MR legislation into English available.  
Going further when examining language-related issues in relation to MLA, 
the questionnaire assessed member states’ general willingness to accept requests 
and orders they receive from other member states, written in one of three 
aforementioned languages. The results of this assessment are clear; most 
requests and orders in English are accepted while requests and orders in French 
and German are not accepted by the large majority of the responding member 
states. This conclusion strengthens the position to make acceptance of incoming 
requests/orders in English an obligation. 
The questionnaire also asked member states if proper translation and 
interpretation facilities were available to translate and interpret requests and 
orders from and into English, French, and/or German. English interpretation and 
translation facilities were most available in the responding member states, 
followed by German facilities and French facilities were in place the least. 
Other non-legislative measures which could facilitate cross-border 
cooperation and which deserve analysis can be put under the term “technical 
capacity issues”. Just as difficulties arise when member states receive requests or 
orders for assistance in a language they do not understand, answering to 
requests or orders without having the technical capacity to do so is problematic. 
Even though technical issues do not have any sort of legal framework in MLA 
nor MR-instruments, the project team recognized the importance of the issue 
and included questions about technical issues in the questionnaire. The 
importance of all the assessed issues is that member states might refuse to 
comply with or answer to certain orders or request for measures to be taken, 
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because they are technically not capable of doing so. The implicit legal basis for 
such refusals is the overarching Art. 1 ECMA states that member states are 
obliged to grant each other the widest measure possible of mutual assistance. If 
member states do not have the capacity to answer to requests or orders, it is 
obviously not possible for them to grant assistance and cross-border cooperation 
fails. The importance of measures for the future in this respect, should not be 
underestimated. 
To investigate the status questionis of technical capacity of member states to 
effectively process requests for MLA, a number of relevant questions there-to 
were asked in the questionnaire. More specifically, the extent to which certain 
technical and other facilitators for the fluent and speedy processing of requests 
and orders were available in responding member states was assessed.  
First, ICT equipment such as telephones, faxes, modem lines, e-mail, fast 
internet connectivity, etc. are either of high or medium-level availability to the 
responding member states. None of the member states claimed to have a low 
availability of such ICT-facilitators. When asked about the availability of 
technical means for video or telephone conferences including available measures 
for protection in such a context (such as audio/video distortion), there were as 
many member states claiming a high availability thereof as member states 
claiming a low availability of such means. When asked for the level of 
availability and quality of technical means required for special investigative 
measures such as interception, audio or video monitoring, etc. the large majority 
of member states reported only medium-level availability there-of. The 
importance of having the technical capacity to execute these kinds of measures is 
however is however not to be underestimated. In the last decade 
telecommunications technology has undergone considerable development, 
particularly in the field of mobile telecommunications. These are very widely 
used by offenders in the context of their criminal activities, especially in the field 
of cross-border crime. Furthermore, member states were asked about availability 
of and access to travel budgets for certain authorities to for example participate 
in joint investigation teams or to assist in the execution of requests abroad. Only 
a very small number of member states claimed that such budgets were available, 
most member states responded that such budgets were only available to a low 
extent. An important recommendation in this respect, especially considering the 
importance of successful JIT-cooperation and the need for extra impulses to 
engage in such cooperation, is that more budgets should urgently be made 
available. As a more general question, member states were asked about the 
availability and quality of off-line (paper and electronic versions) relevant legal 
documentation. Most member states claimed a high availability and quality of 
such documentation and none if the member states reported a low availability 
and quality. As a very last question, member states were asked if the executions 
of requests were monitored for quality and speed. Again results were satisfying, 
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as most member states reported that such a monitoring mechanism was indeed 
in place. 
 
Free movement of evidence 
 The project team wanted to assess the possibility of a future implementation 
of a system of mutual admissibility of evidence across the EU. The entire 
question of MLA in obtaining evidence becomes completely useless if in the end, 
the obtained evidence will not serve any purpose in trial due to inadmissibility. 
It is now 100% unclear what will happen with the evidence, gathered or 
obtained on the basis of cross-border cooperation.  
As a first point of focus, the status of rules on unlawfully obtained evidence 
in domestic cases was assessed.  The exact same set of questions was asked for 
the scenario in which unlawfully obtained evidence is transferred to a member 
state, after it was collected there or it was in another way already available in 
that member state. Thirdly, the set of questions was asked for the scenario in 
which a member state requests or orders information or evidence to another 
member state, and where the requested member state obtains this information or 
evidence in an unlawful or irregular manner. The overall conclusion after the 
analysis of rules and their consequences and character for unlawfully obtained 
evidence both domestically and abroad is first that a multitude of scenario’s are 
possible. Secondly, in most member states all of these rules are governed by 
statutory law, only a small fraction of these rules imbedded are constitutionally 
embedded. This could mean that the future harmonization of rules for mutual 
admissibility of evidence would not necessarily pose major legal problems for 
the large majority of member states. The greatest variety exists in member states 
when it comes to the value that they attribute to unlawfully obtained evidence in 
further stages of the criminal justice process. Not only is there a great variety 
among member states as to the use of unlawfully obtained evidence in a merely 
national context as steering or supportive evidence or the complete exclusion 
thereof, some variation also exists as to the value that member states attribute to 
this evidence in a national context on the one hand, and to this evidence when it 
is obtained abroad on the other hand. While some member states attribute the 
exact same value to unlawfully obtained evidence in a national context and 
when it comes from another member state, others do show some difference in 
the validation of foreign evidence. Some member states are more strict in the 
validation of unlawfully obtained evidence in another member state, and 
surprisingly, sometimes more leniency is shown in this validation of foreign 
evidence. The fact that a significant amount of member states already does not 
make any difference in the validation of unlawfully obtained evidence as to 
where it was obtained, is certainly a sign of the possibility of future complete 
mutual admissibility of evidence, and attributing the same value to any kind of 
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evidence, no matter where in the EU it was obtained. Furthermore, as nearly all 
member states have existing sets of rules of their own for attributing a certain 
value to unlawfully obtained evidence, the previously made remark of the law 
that must be respected if evidence is not to be excluded is first and foremost the 
national law of the place where the evidence is situated, poses no problems. As 
member states have sufficient rules in place to qualify the value of certain 
evidence, member states that request the obtainment and transfer of evidence 
should trust that these rules are of a high enough standard to mutually 
recognize the value that the requested member state has attributed to evidence 
that has moved across their borders. The rules governing exclusion can and 
should be those of the member state in which the evidence was obtained. This is 
an important recommendation for the future of mutual admissibility of 
evidence, and more generally for the future of mutual recognition. 
Furthermore, four types of techniques and the evidence they bring with them 
have been assessed in the questionnaire. The reason for the selection of these 
particular our, is that they are under heavy discussion and the most differences 
across member states as to their admissibility can be expected. These large 
differences can be problematic if one wants to move in the direction of complete 
mutual admissibility of evidence and mutual recognition in general. The EEW 
entails some important minimum safeguards to help protect fundamental rights. 
More specifically, Art. 6 ensures that the EEW will be issued only when the 
issuing authority is satisfied that the following conditions have been met: that 
the objects, documents and data are likely to be admissible in the proceedings 
for which it is sought. This prevents the EEW from being used to circumvent 
protections in the national law of the issuing  state on admissibility of evidence, 
particularly if further action is taken in the future on the mutual admissibility of 
evidence obtained pursuant to the EEW. This article is important, especially 
since a lot of differences exist among member states as to the admissibility of 
certain investigation techniques. The four techniques analysed are the use of a lie 
detection test, the use of statements of anonymous witnesses taken in the 
requested/executing member state not covered in the EU MLA Convention, the 
technique of provocation/entrapment and the use of hearsay evidence. The 
questionnaire has addressed just how big the differences in admissibility are 
across member states, and how willing member states are to accept evidence that 
these techniques bring forth, when having been conducted abroad. The overall 
conclusion of this assessment is that most of the time, the same value is 
attributed to these techniques and the evidence that they bring forth, whether it 
comes from another member state or is domestically obtained. This is a very 
positive outcome for the principle of MR. Even more, sometimes more leniency 
is shown for foreign evidence in comparison with domestically obtained 
evidence, which is a surprising outcome to say the least. This however does not 
violate Art. 6 EEW per se, for the reason explained above. When however 
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comparing the admissibility and value of the techniques on a domestic level, as 
predicted, large differences exist. This could be problematic for the discussion of 
harmonization of procedural criminal law in the EU. 
Finally, member states’ views and current situations of mutual admissibility 
of lawfully obtained evidence was assessed.  
Finally, member states’ views and current situations of mutual admissibility 
of lawfully obtained evidence was assessed. More specifically, experts in 
member states were asked in the questionnaire to what extent they felt that, 
according to their experience, information/evidence which has been collected in 
another member state in accordance with its domestic law and procedures, being 
eligible for use as evidence under its domestic law, was often considered 
inadmissible or of a reduced probative value because of the manner in which it 
has been gathered? Most member states claimed that they did not feel this was 
often the case, which is a positive outcome for the future of MR. A smaller 
fraction of member states did however claim that this was often the case. These 
member states were asked what, in their experience, would often be the 
underlying reason for this inadmissibility or reduced probative value. 
Two very specific questions were asked in this respect. First, member states 
were asked if they would consider it an acceptable EU future policy option that 
information lawfully obtained by a member or seconded member while part of a 
joint investigation team which is not otherwise available to the competent 
authorities of the member states would constitute per se admissible evidence 
under the national law of the member states concerned? 90% of the member 
states would indeed consider this to be a good policy option. Secondly, member 
states were asked to what extent they currently accepted that competent 
authorities from other member states who are lawfully present on their territory 
in while executing a request/order/warrant (e.g. when seconded member of a 
joint investigation team operating on their territory, when present during a 
hearing or house search etc) draft official reports having the same probative 
value under their national law as if they had been drafted by their own 
competent authorities; Almost all member states currently accept this. Half of 
the ones that do not, consider this to be a good future policy option. Only one 
member states would not be willing to accept this. 
In globo, as a conclusion of this assessment of the status quo in member 
states of mutual admissibility of evidence, the outcome is very positive and no 
significant issues would have to be faced if the system of per se admissibility of 
evidence were to be installed in the EU. The Eurojust College also comes to this 
conclusion and considers that in principle, evidence taken abroad in an EU 
member state in conformity with the law of that state, should be admissible 
evidence in other member states, unless the way the evidence was obtained is 
contrary to their fundamental principles. 
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1 Introduction: Background and vision 
1.1 Background to the study 
A specific program on ‘Criminal Justice’ was set out as part of the General 
Program on Fundamental Rights and Justice, by the European Council Decision 
of 12 February 2007.1 The concrete objectives of the program include the 
promotion of the principle of mutual recognition (MR) and mutual trust, 
eliminating obstacles created by disparities between member states judicial 
systems and improving knowledge of member states legal and judicial systems 
in criminal matters and the exchange and dissemination of good practice. As 
part of this program, the Commission awarded a contract to the Institute of 
International Research on Criminal Policy to perform a follow up to a study on 
the laws of evidence in criminal proceedings throughout the EU, carried out in 
2004 by the British Law Society.2 This previous study was an analysis of data 
gathered from the bar associations of each member state by a questionnaire 
concerning the national laws on gathering and handling of evidence. 3 
Initially, the aim of this follow up study was to obtain up to date information 
on the same subject matter from all member states and to analyse that 
information in the light of recent developments in legislation governing cross-
border transmission of evidence. Two recent developments are crucial for this 
project’s subject matter. First, in 2005, the EU Convention on mutual assistance 
in criminal matters (EU MLA) entered into force4. The EU MLA Convention 
covers MLA in general and supplements the existing conventions in this field. 
Second, in 2008, the Council agreed on a general approach to the framework 
decision on the European Evidence Warrant (EEW).5 This framework decision 
applies the MR principle to judicial decisions for the purpose of obtaining 
evidence for use in criminal proceedings.  
In addition to this, it was the intention of the Commission to initiate 
preparatory work on a legal instrument, which would expand the scope of 
application of the EEW in order to further replace the existing regime of mutual 
                                                             
1 Council of the European Union (2007). "Decision of 12 February 2007 establishing for the 
period 2007 to 2013, as part of the General Programme on Fundamental Rights and Justice, the 
Specific Programme ‘Criminal Justice’." OJ L 58 of 24.2.2007. 
2 European Commission (2008). "Call for Tender of 8 December 2008: Study on the laws of 
evidence in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union." JLS/2008/E4/006. 
3 The British Law Society (2004). Study of the laws of evidence in criminal proceedings 
throughout the European Union. Brussels, European Commission DG Justice and Home Affairs. 
4 Council of the European Union (2000). "Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union." OJ C 197 of 12.7.2000. 
5 Council of the European Union (2008). "Framework decision of 18 December 2008 on the 
European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in 
proceedings in criminal matters " OJ L 350 of 30.12.2008. 
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legal assistance (MLA) within the EU by the MR principle.6 Thereafter, this study 
will assess whether or not there is a need to take action in order to improve 
cooperation on gathering, obtaining and admissibility of evidence in criminal 
matters and, if so, identify the preferred way to proceed. This study deals with 
the question whether or not an MR-based MLA is desirable and feasible. 
In recent years, MR gained more importance. The 1999 Tampere 
Conclusions7 identified MR as the cornerstone of judicial co-operation. The 2001 
Program of measures8 to implement the MR principle states that the aim in this 
context is threefold: first to ensure that the evidence is admissible, second to 
prevent its disappearance and third to facilitate the enforcement of search and 
seizure orders, so that evidence can be quickly secured in a criminal case. 
Through MR, requests gain a mandatory character as both refusal grounds and 
the double criminality tests are largely abandoned. Initial but significant steps 
have been taken by means of adopting the freezing order9 and the EEW10. 
However, today the bulk of cross-border cooperation on obtaining evidence is 
still centered around MLA techniques. 
A possible next step is the introduction of the MR principle in the remaining 
MLA field. The European Commission committed itself to assessing the 
possibility to reform the cross-border cooperation on obtaining evidence in its 
entirety and to introduce the MR concept for evidence obtained in the context of 
international judicial cooperation. A perfect exteriorization of this commitment 
is the publication of the 2009 Green Paper on obtaining evidence in criminal matters 
                                                             
6 For analyses on the topic of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters see Vermeulen, G. 
(1999). Wederzijdse rechtshulp in strafzaken in de Europese Unie: naar een volwaardige eigen 
rechtshulpruimte voor de Lid-Staten? Antwerp-Apeldoorn, Maklu..;VERMEULEN, G. (2002). 
New Developments in EU Criminal Policy with regard to Cross-Border Crime. in VAN DUYNE, 
P., VON LAMPE, K. and PASSAS, N. Upperworld and Underworld in Cross-Border Crime. Nijmegen, 
Wolf Legal Publishers: 115-140.;VERMEULEN, G. (2001). New trends in international co-operation 
in criminal matters in the European Union' in BREUR, C., KOMMER, M., NIJBOER, J. and REYNTJES, 
J. New Trends in Criminal Investigation and Evidence. Antwerp-Groningen-Oxford, Intersentia. 2: 
683-698.; VERMEULEN, G. (2000). The European Union Convention on mutual assistance in 
criminal matters. in DE KERCKHOVE, G. and WEYEMBERGH, A. Vers un espace judiciaire pénal 
européen - Towards a European Judicial Criminal Area. Brussels, Editions de l’Université de 
Bruxelles: 181-194  
7 European Council (15-16 October 1999). "Conclusions of the Presidency." SN 200/1/99 REV 1. 
8 Council of the European Union (2001). "Programme of Measures of 30 November 2000 to 
implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters." OJ C 12 of 
15.1.2001. 
9 Council of the European Union (2003). "Framework Decision of 22 July 2003 on the execution 
in the EU of orders freezing property or evidence." OJ L 196 of  2.8.2003. 
10 Council of the European Union (2008). "Framework decision of 18 December 2008 on the 
European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in 
proceedings in criminal matters " OJ L 350 of 30.12.2008. 
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from one Member state to another and securing its admissibility.11 The opinions and 
statements made in this Green Paper were implicitly assessed throughout the 
study in the form of a questionnaire, serving as the main method for assessing 
the status questionis, needs and wishes of member states in the area of cross-
border evidence issues.  
 
1.2 Vision 
The visions of the project team with regard to the subject matter can be 
summarized into three central considerations. 
The first consideration acknowledges the overcomplexity of the current 
environment. The second consideration stresses the challenges and pitfalls that 
come into play when trying to incorporate the MR philosophy into the MLA 
environment. The third consideration relates to the feasibility of introducing free 
movement of evidence. 
 
1.2.1 Overcomplexity of the current environment 
As briefly touched upon above, the existing rules on obtaining evidence in 
criminal matters in the EU are of two different kinds. On the one hand, there are 
instruments based on the MLA principle. These most notably include the 
European Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters (ECMA)12, 
supplemented by the Schengen Agreement (SIC)13 and the Convention on 
mutual assistance in criminal matters (EU MLA)14 and its Protocol (EU MLA 
Protocol)15. On the other hand, there are instruments based on the MR principle, 
of which the EEW is the best known. A series of investigative measures is 
explicitly regulated in one or more of those MLA/MR instruments, each of them 
having an individual regime. Besides those explicitly regulated investigative 
measures, a significant amount of investigative measures is currently not 
regulated what can make their application complex and cumbersome. 
                                                             
11 European Commission (2009). "Green Paper on obtaining evidence in criminal matters from 
one Member State to another and securing its admissibility." COM(2009) 624 final of 11.11.2009. 
12 Council of Europe (1959). "European Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters " 
ETS n°30 of 20.4.1959. 
13 "Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the 
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders." OJ L 239 
of 22.09.2000  
14 Council of the European Union (2000). "Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union." OJ C 197 of 12.7.2000. 
15 Council of the European Union (2001). "Protocol to the Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union established by the Council 
in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union." OJ C 326 of 21.11.2001. 
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Considering the complexity of the current environment, a benchmarking 
framework to unravel some of the applicable regimes was developed. It does not 
only clarify the existing legal provisions, but also support future policy making. 
To create this benchmarking framework, the project team engaged in an in depth 
analysis of the existing legal instruments to identify the explicitly regulated 
investigative measures and cluster them according to the regime applicable to 
them. Furthermore, considering the vast amount of investigative measures 
which are currently not explicitly regulated, an additional analysis was 
performed as to the likeliness member states would attach a certain regime to 
them. This exercise has led to a set of six clusters, as shown on the figure below. 
These clusters form the backbone of the questionnaire and will be further 
elaborated on in the methodology section of this report. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. High level overview of the clustered investigative measures 
 
 
1.2.2 Pitfalls and challenges when combining MR with MLA 
In this second consideration the project team stresses the pitfalls and 
challeges that come into play when trying to incorporate the MR philosophy into 
the MLA environment. Assessing the legal feasibility to base the entirety of MLA 
on MR characteristics, requires an assessment of the compatibility of the MR 
characteristics with the philosophy of MLA. 
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Two important pitfalls need to be pointed to. First, it is important to 
underline that not all forms of MLA can be replaced with an MR regime. The 
functioning and specific features of a joint investigation team for example are 
fully incompatible with the ordering and executing principles of MR. Second, 
replacing the entirety of MLA with an MR-based regime runs the risk of losing 
the flexibility offered by the MLA obligation to afford each other the widest 
possible measure of assistance.16 In today’s reality, a significant number of highly 
intrusive investigative measures is not explicitly regulated. Hence the 
compilation of clusters 5 and 6.  Nevertheless, assistance for those investigative 
measures remains possible based on the obligation to afford each other the widest 
possible measure of assistance. Therefore, the importance of this article may not be 
underestimated. Future (MR-based) MLA instruments should either maintain 
this flexibility or regulate each and every possible investigative measure.  
The main challenge of assessing the legal feasibility to replace the current 
MLA with a more MR-based MLA, lies in the operationalisation of MR itself. 
Four main MR characteristics are singled out as the backbone of the study and 
the backbone of the structure of this report. 
The first MR characteristic is the use of the 32 MR offences17 to abandon the 
double criminality requirement. Underneath this heading, the importance and 
erosion of the double criminality requirement will be pointed to, before 
engaging in an analysis of the possible alternative uses of the 32 MR offences, 
which lie at the basis of the erosion of the double criminality requirement. 
The second MR characteristic relates to the enhanced stringency in 
cooperation. Introducing MR into MLA raises questions as to the feasibility of 
limiting the grounds for refusal. Linked to those grounds for refusal are the 
grounds for postponement and the impact such grounds have on the speed with 
which recognition takes place and execution is commenced. 
The third MR characteristic relates to the shift from merely requesting to a 
regime in which orders are issued. Such a shift raises questions not only as to the 
compatibility of the precondition of having a domestic decision, order or 
warrant before its execution is possible, but also as to the position of the national 
law of the executing member state in MR. In traditional MR cases, the basic 
principles are the accepting of the foreign decision and executing it as if if was 
their own decision. That latter philosophy links in with the locus regit actum (LRA) 
                                                             
16 Art 1, Council of Europe (1959). "European Convention on mutual assistance in criminal 
matters " ETS n°30 of 20.4.1959. 
17 See also, DE BONDT, W. and VERMEULEN, G. (2009). "Justitiële samenwerking en harmonisatie. 
Over het hoe en het waarom van een optimalisering in het gebruik van  verwezenlijkingen op 
vlak van harmonisatie bij de uitbouw van justitiële samenwerking." Panopticon 6: 47, DE BONDT, 
W. and VERMEULEN, G. (2010). Appreciating Approximation. Using common offence concepts 
to facilitate police and judicial cooperation in the EU. in COOLS, M. Readings On Criminal Justice, 
Criminal Law & Policing. Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland, Maklu. 4: 15-40. 
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theory, in which execution takes place in compliance with the provisions of the 
national law of the executing member state. However, this philosophy 
significantly differs from MLA practice, where the actions of the executing 
member state are meant to have an effect in the requesting/issuing member state. 
Because MLA aims at obtaining information/evidence that can be used in the 
course of criminal proceedings in the requesting/issuing member state, it 
becomes vital that information/evidence is obtained in such a way that it is 
admissible there. This is the rationale underlying the forum regit actum (FRA) 
theory. Because of the tension between these two regimes, the compliance with 
explicitly mentioned formatlities, will be discussed together with the general 
position of the national law of the executing member state and the possibility to 
require execution in compliance with the national law of the executing member 
state. 
The fourth and final MR characteristic relates to the horizontalisation of 
cooperation. MR typically takes place between the authorities of the member 
states. This characteristic can also be found in MLA ever since the introduction 
of Art. 6,1 EU MLA Convention. In general communication via central 
authorities will only take place for transfer of persons held in custody and for 
the exchange of criminal records information. Besides these explicit exceptions, 
the option to derogate from the rule to communicate amongst decentralized 
authorities is foreseen in Art. 6, 2 EU MLA Convention. This article allows for a 
derogation of the general rule in special cases, without further clarifying what 
constitutes a special case. The project team considers it advisable to eliminate the 
possiblity to derogate from the general rule, and only maintain the exception for 
the transfer of persons held in custody.18 However, direct communication and 
thus further horizontalisation of the cooperation environment impacts on the 
importance of institutional capacity at all authority levels within the member 
states. Regardless of the investments in EU support mechanisms in the past 
(EJN, Eurojust, fiches belges, judicial atlas, etc), further investment is vital to 
ensure that MLA continues to be and becomes an even better oiled machine. A 
reference to this discussion explains why questions related to institutional 
capacity were included in the questionnaire. 
 
                                                             
18 It should be noted that the exchange of criminal records information is now regulated via the 
ECRIS system – which will replace the exchange of criminal records information via central 
authorities 
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1.2.3 Free movement of evidence 
The third consideration with regard to cross-border use of evidence relates to 
the feasibility to introduce the concept of free movement of evidence. This topic 
is often neglected in cooperation instruments because admissibility of 
information/evidence as such is not a cooperation issue. Even though mutual 
admissibility was addressed in the European Commission’s Green Paper on the 
European Public Prosecutor19, it is safe to say that the topic has been largely 
neglected. The EEW does not explicitly address the issue of mutual admissibility 
of evidence, nor do other MR or MLA instruments. Nevertheless, considering 
that the purpose of MLA is to conduct investigative measures to obtain 
information/evidence for use in the requesting member state, the importance of 
free movement of evidence may not be underestimated. A reference to this issue 
clarifies why general evidence related questions were included in the 
questionnaire 
 
1.3 Structure of the report 
The vision with regard to the subject matter has been thouroughly discussed 
with the European Commission at the onset of the study, and is also reflected in 
the structure of the report. However, before reporting on the comprehensive 
analysis conducted, key components of the project methodology are explained.  
Besides the use of an online questionnaire, attention is drawn to the 
clustering of the investigative measures and how these clusters relate to the 
recurring patterns of the questions in the online questionnaire. 
Thereafter the report consists of two main chapters, being the mutual 
recognition of investigative measures and the free movement of evidence. 
The structure of the chapter on mutual recognition of investigative measures 
reflects the main characteristics of MR, being the 32 MR offences, the enhanced 
stringency of cooperation, accepting and executing orders and the 
horizontalisation of cooperation.  
The structure of the chapter on free movement of evidence is centered 
around three topics. First it is assessed how unlawfully obtained evidence is 
dealth with and what the influence is of being unlawfully obtained in a mere 
domestic situation, in a more abroad situation or in a situation where evidence 
has been unlawfully obtained abroad upon a domestic request. Second, four 
investigative measures are analysed, being the lie detection test, 
provocation/entrapment, anonymous witnesses and hear say evidence. Finally 
                                                             
19 European Commission (2001). "Green Paper on criminal-law protection of the financial 
interests of the Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor." COM (2001) 715 
final of 11.12.2001. 
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this chapter deals with the admissibility and value of lawfully obtained foreign 
evidence. 
The project team concludes with an overview of the findings and 
recommendations. 
  
37 
 
2 Methodology: Online questionnaire 
2.1 Distribution via Single Point of Contact 
Following the Eurojust College Decision of 17 July 2009, the Eurojust national 
members were appointed the single points of contact for the questionnaire. It is 
important to note that the national members were not to fill out the 
questionnaire on an individual basis. Being the project team’s single point of 
contact, meant they were responsible for bringing together an expert group with 
the necessary qualifications and diverse backgrounds encompassing 
representatives from all competent centralized authorities relevant for this 
study, to ensure the answers are representative for the concerned member state 
as a whole. 
An instruction letter clarified that ideally the expert group would consist of 
both legal experts and practitioners (prosecution, investigating judges, 
judges,...). Considering the nature of some of the questions, it was advised to 
also involve policy makers representing for example the views of the Ministry of 
Justice or the Ministry of Interior. Finally, it was strongly recommended to also 
bring EJN contact persons to the expert group. 
The project team challenged the national expert groups with a very complex 
questionnaire which required extensive reflection on the entirety of cross-border 
investigative measures and the international status of evidence. The 
questionnaire is annexed to this report. Considering the complexity of the 
subject matter and the limited time span in which replies had to be provided20, 
the project team highly appreciates the feedback received from 10 member states 
(Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Malta, 
Poland and the United Kingdom) and Eurojust. Because of the sensitive nature 
of some of the questions and the ongoing political debate on this matter, the 
project team will not disclose which answers were given by whom.  
Furthermore, the Eurojust College’s expertise in these matters was used to 
the advantage of the study, as a separate but similar questionnaire was sent to 
the College. The questionnaire was answered in an analytical and detailed 
manner, especially in the light of EU future policy-assessments. 
Not having the opinion of each of the 27 member states does not negatively 
impact on the representative value of the study. The main idea was to map the 
existing legal framework and assess possible support for the introduction of MR 
characteristics in the current MLA regime. In this respect, it is important to recall 
the changes to the voting regime agreed in and introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. 
Whereas before decisions in the area police and judicial cooperation required 
unanimous support, the new qualified majority voting regime allows member 
                                                             
20 Some member states provided us with the feedback that it was impossible for them to 
compose an expert group that could reply to such complex questions in the given time span. 
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states to move ahead even where a minority of member states is not prepared to 
take that next step. Furthermore, the findings of the study were validated on 9 
February 2010 at an Commission meeting of experts on evidence, at which a 
discussion was held with representatives of the member states. 
 
2.2 Terminology and phrasing of the questions 
The questions and propositions in the questionnaire are all linked to the main 
MR characteristics as opposed to MLA. In order to formulate the questions in a 
system-neutral fashion, the project team payed significant attention to the 
phrasing of the questions and the terminology used. Whereas MLA uses 
‘requesting’ and ‘requested’ member states, MR uses ‘issuing’ and ‘executing’ 
member state. Similarly, whereas MLA refers to ‘requests’, MR refers to 
‘warrants’ or ‘orders’. 
In order to combine both regimes into one set of questions, both terminology 
sets were combined. This explains why questions are phrased as follows: “Can a 
request/order/warrant to take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) in another member 
state be made?”  
Furthermore, the project team opted to rely on the authentic phrasing in the 
various legal instruments. In doing so, it is more clear where the regime for the 
investigative measures has its origin. Even though this approach obviously 
makes the phrasing of the questions complex and sometimes hard to read, it was 
preferred over trying to simplify the terminology which would inevitably have 
led to a loss of subtlety. 
 
2.3 Clustering investigation measures 
As explained above when elaborating on the project team’s vision with 
regard to the complexity of the current environment, there are various regimes 
in place for a variety of investigative measures. The elaboration of the applicable 
regime is done in an ad hoc fashion, without a general reference framework. The 
architecture of the questionnaire reviews the existing cooperation regimes and 
clusters the investigative measures according to the regime that is applicable to 
them. In doing so, the project team intents so assess the feasibility to create an 
overarching reference framework. 
Therefore, besides a set of preliminary questions on evidence related issues 
and a set of questions on the institutional capacity in the member states, the bulk 
of questions were related to the functioning of MLA and MR. 
It is clear that the functioning of MLA and MR are dependent on the 
cooperation type and the kind of investigative measure. The more invasive the 
requested investigative measure is, the more likely it becomes that member 
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states will attach requirements and conditions to cooperation. The differences 
brought about by the different types of cooperation and investigative measures 
were the starting point for the architecture of the questionnaire. Analysing on 
the one hand the theoretical and legal framework surrounding cooperation and 
investigative measures and on the other hand the practical implications and 
attitudes towards those forms of cooperation and investigative measures, a set of 
six different clusters of cooperation types were identified. The underlying goal 
of the questionnaire was to first assess the feasibility to graft further elaboration 
on investigative measures onto the six-cluster reference framework and second, 
whether currently there is sufficient support to introduce more MR 
characteristics for certain investigative measures. 
The first goal was already touched upon when elaborating the vision and is 
deemed of utmost importance because the introduction of a reference 
framework and consistently working with a number of identified clusters has 
the potential to clarify the current cooperation regimes and significantly 
improve coherence and understanding. The second goal is deemed important 
because the hypothesis developed by the project team hints that for certain 
investigative measures it would only be logical for member states to agree on a 
more MR like regime considering what has already been unanimously agreed 
upon before. 
 
 
Figure 2. High level overview of the clustered investigative measures 
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To make this approach more tangible, the following paragraphs will 
elaborate on the architecture (and its rationale) of the six clusters. 
 
2.3.1 Influence of the European Evidence Warrant 
Both clusters 1 and 2 are linked to the European Evidence Warrant (EEW).21 
Therefore it is useful to briefly recall the history underlying the adoption and the 
EEW and its main features. 
The background to the EEW proposal and subsequent Framework Decision 
constitutes of a complex set of treaties at Council of Europe level (comprising all 
47 member states of the Council of Europe), supplemented by pre-existing EU 
measures.  
The core background text is the 1959 Council of Europe Convention on 
mutual assistance (ECMA)22, which has been ratified by all of the EU member 
states. It sets out the basic rules for the gathering and transfer of evidence in 
criminal proceedings where more than one state is involved. It has been 
supplemented by a First Protocol of 197823, which has also been ratified by all 
member states.  
It was felt that at EU level, member states needed to move ahead in the 
sphere of MLA, to shape an area of freedom security and justice, in which police 
and judicial cooperation are facilitated as much as possible. After long 
negotiations, the EU member states then signed the EU Mutual Assistance 
Convention (EU MLA Convention) in 2000 in order to supplement the existing 
Council of Europe and Schengen rules. 
However, few years later things started to move again because MR – 
introduced as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation – obtained a more 
prominent position. In 2008 the EEW was adopted. A EEW is an order issued by 
a competent authority in one member state, which under the principle of mutual 
recognition must be executed in another member state. According to the 
framework decision it may be deployed for the purpose of obtaining objects, 
documents and data for use in criminal proceedings. 
As of its entry into force, the EEW will co-exist with all Council of Europe 
and EU measures now in force with regards to the gathering of the types of 
evidence, that fall under its scope. These types of evidence have been clustered 
for the purpose of this report as belonging to the first cluster of measures.  
                                                             
21 Council of the European Union (2008). "Framework decision of 18 December 2008 on the 
European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in 
proceedings in criminal matters " OJ L 350 of 30.12.2008. 
22 Council of Europe (1959). "European Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters " 
ETS n°30 of 20.4.1959.  
23 Council of Europe (1978). "Additional Protocol to the European Convention in Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters." ETS n°99 of 17.3.1978. 
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   The EEW supplements the freezing order24 by applying the MR principle to 
orders with the specific objective of obtaining objects, documents and data for 
use in proceedings in criminal matters. Under the freezing order, MR is required 
for orders issued for the purpose of freezing evidence with a view to its eventual 
transfer to the requesting state, or for the purpose of freezing property with a 
view to its eventual confiscation. The EEW will provide a single, fast and 
effective mechanism for obtaining evidence and transferring it to the requesting 
state. It will not be necessary for a prior freezing order to have been issued.  
 Although the EEW does not cover obtaining all types of evidence, the 
European Commission has expressed to consider this to be the first step towards 
replacing the existing regime of MLA within the European Union by a single EU 
body of law based on MR and subject to minimum safeguards. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Clarifying clusters 1 and 2 
 
Cluster 1 
Cluster 1 encompasses the investigative measures included in the EEW. The 
EEW applies to objects, documents or data obtained under various procedural 
powers, including seizure, production or search powers. However, the EEW is 
not intended to be used to initiate the interviewing of suspects, taking 
statements, or hearing of witnesses and victims. Taking bodily evidence from a 
person, in particular DNA samples, is also excluded from the scope of the EEW. 
Furthermore, the EEW is not intended to be used to initiate procedural 
investigative measures which involve obtaining evidence in real-time such as 
interception of communications and monitoring of bank accounts. A specific 
regime for cooperation on interception of communications has been established 
                                                             
24 Council of the European Union (2003). "Framework Decision of 22 July 2003 on the execution 
in the EU of orders freezing property or evidence." OJ L 196 of  2.8.2003. 
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in the EU MLA Convention, and a regime for cooperation with respect to 
monitoring bank accounts has been established by Art. 3 EU MLA Protocol. 
The EEW is equally not intended to be used to obtain evidence that can only 
result from further investigation or analysis. Therefore, it can for example not be 
used to require the commissioning of an expert’s report. It should be noted that 
EEW’s should conversely be used where the evidence is directly available in the 
executing state for example by extracting the relevant information from a 
register. It should also be used for requesting data on the existence of bank 
accounts where such data is available in the requested state. The EEW may 
equally be used for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents or data falling 
within the excluded categories provided that they had already been gathered 
prior to the requesting of the warrant. In these circumstances, it will be possible 
to obtain existing records of intercepted communications, surveillance, 
interviews with suspects, statements from witnesses and the results of DNA 
tests. 
 
Cluster 2 
Cluster 2 encompasses measures linked to the EEW. The EEW as such 
intends to facilitate the obtaining of available and well-identified objects, 
documents and data. To the extent necessary, (house)search or seizure are 
possible. It should be noted that, such a distinction means not all forms of 
(house)search or seizure fall within the scope of the EEW regime.  
However, there is no valid reason to distinguish between and thus categorise 
forms of (house)search or seizure. In the past there has never been a separate 
regime for the obtaining of existing objects, documents and data through 
(house)search or seizure on the on hand and documents, objects and data still to 
be collected via a more scouting (house)search or seizure on the other hand. 
Considering the implicit step forward made with regard to (house)search or 
seizure for available and well-identified objects, documents and data, it is only 
logical for member states to be willing to agree that a more scouting 
(house)search or seizure be brought under the same regime as the measure(s) 
falling under the scope of the EEW. Therefore this cluster only concerns two 
investigative measures, being (house)search or seizure (other than the forms 
included in the scope of the EEW and thus the scope of cluster 1).  
The legal framework for the choice for these two investigative measures can 
be found in the ECMA, read together with the Schengen Implementation 
Convention (SIC). Reading the provisions in those instruments further explaines 
why the project team added that those (house)search and seizure may not be 
made dependent on the condition(s) of dual criminality, (dual) minimum 
threshold or consistency with its national law. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that Art. 5 ECMA stipulates that the execution of 
letters rogatory for search or seizure may be made dependant on three 
conditions (i.e.: 
- that the offence is punishable under both the law of the requesting as of the 
requested party; 
- that the offence is an extraditable offence in the requested party; 
- that the execution is consistent with the law of the requested party;) 
Art. 51 SIC limits the possibility to impose conditions in that it stipulates that the 
Contracting parties may not make the admissibility of letters rogatory for search 
and seizure dependent on conditions other than dual criminality, dual minimum 
threshold or consistency with its national law. 
 
Those two articles combined with the argumentation above, clarifies why in 
the questionnaire, these two investigative measures were technically 
characterised as “Investigative measures/measures of assistance (other than the 
aforementioned measures in cluster 1) which have been explicitly regulated in MLA legal 
instruments applicable between the EU member states and the taking/execution of which 
the requested/executing member state/member state on the territory of which the measure 
is to be taken/executed may currently make dependent on the condition(s) of dual 
criminality, (dual) minimum threshold or consistency with its national law.” 
 
2.3.2 Measures explicitly regulated in MLA  instruments 
Whereas clusters 1 and 2 are linked to the MR regime in the EEW, clusters 3 
and 4 are linked to the MLA regime applicable to a series of explicitly regulated 
investigative measures.  
Even though briefly touched upon when clarifying the background 
documents to the EEW, it remains interesting to recall the basic principles of 
MLA. In international judicial cooperation in criminal matters, MLA is a well-
established principle. It is relied on when a state is unable to continue with an 
investigation or procedure on its own and requires another state's help, such as 
to hear witnesses or carry out surveillance on persons located on the other state's 
territory. 
A number of agreements have been adopted by international organisations 
such as the ECMA and its 1978 ECMA Protocol, the Benelux Treaty of 1962 and 
the 1990 SIC. 
The next step in the area of MLA in criminal matters was the EU MLA 
Convention between the Member states of the European Union, which should 
complete the other agreements by facilitating the proceedings and by fitting it on 
technological changes.  
The purpose of the EU MLA Convention is to encourage and modernise 
cooperation between judicial, police and customs authorities by supplementing 
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the provisions and facilitating the application of the 1959 ECMA, and its 1978 
ECMA Protocol, the 1990 SIC and the Benelux Treaty of 1962. As a result to 
differences between national procedures, sometimes information gathered in 
one country could not be used in the other country because the way the 
information was obtained did not fit with the national procedural requirements. 
Therefore the EU MLA Convention provides that the requesting state can ask the 
receiving state to comply with some formalities or procedural requirements 
which are essential under its national legislation. The state receiving a request 
for mutual assistance must in principle comply with the formalities and 
procedures indicated by the requesting state. 
A scan of all MLA instruments was made in search of the conditions linked 
to the execution of investigative measures. As a result of this scan, explicitly 
regulated investigative measures were grouped according to the possibility for 
the requested member state to link conditions to the execution of the request.  
 
 
Figure 4. Clarifying clusters 3 and 4 
 
Cluster 3 
Cluster 3 deals with investigative measures for which the locus regit actum 
rule applies, either in full or to a certain degree. It brings together all the 
explicitly regulated investigative measures for which the requested/executing 
member state has the possibility to make authorization or execution dependent 
on execution:  
- in accordance with or in the manner provided for in its national law or  
- under (certain of) the condition(s) which would have to be observed in a 
similar national case.  
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The investigative measures have been listed in an exhaustive fashion: 
 
- cross-border observation – this investigative measure is regulated in Art. 40, 
1 SIC and 21, 1 Napels II25, equally clarifying that ‘conditions may be attached 
to the authorisation’; 
- observation on the territory of the requested/executing member state by its 
own authorities – this investigative measure is covered in Art. 40, 1, 2nd 
paragraph SIC and 21, 1, 2nd paragraph Naples II; mutatis mutandis paragraph 
1 of the same articles, outlining that ‘conditions may be attached’, applies; 
- cross-border hot pursuit – this investigative measure is regulated in Art. 41, 
5, a) SIC and 20, 4, a) Napels II, equally clarifying that pursuing officers ‘must 
comply with the law of the member state in whose territory they are 
operating [and] obey the instructions of the competent authorities of the said 
member state’; 
- covert investigations (by officials) – this investigative measure is regulated 
in Art. 23, 3 Napels II and 14, 2-3 EU MLA Convention, stipulating 
respectively that both the conditions under which a covert investigation is 
allowed and under which it is carried out ‘shall be determined by the 
requested authority in accordance with its national law’, and that the 
decision on a request for assistance in the conduct of covert investigations is 
taken by the competent authorities of the requested member state ‘with due 
regard to its national law and procedures’, the covert investigations 
themselves having to ‘take place in accordance with the national law and 
procedures’ of the member state on the territory of which they take place; 
- controlled delivery in the territory of the requested/executing member state 
(i.e. being the territory of destination of the delivery or where intervention is 
envisaged) – this investigative measure is regulated in Art. 22, 2-3 Napels II 
and 12, 2-3 EU MLA Convention, equally stipulating that the decision to 
carry out controlled deliveries shall be taken by the competent authorities of 
the requested member state ‘with due reguard for the national law of that 
member state’ ad that controlled deliveries ‘shall take place in accordance 
with the procedures of the requested member state’, ‘the [right or 
competence] to act and to direct [and control] operations [lying] with the 
competent authorities of that member state’; 
- interception of telecommunications if the subject of the interception is 
present in the requested/executing member state and his or her 
communications can be intercepted in that member state, with immediate 
transmission – this investigative measure is regulated in Art. 18, 1, a) in 
conjunction with 18, 2, b) and 18, 5, b) EU MLA Convention, the latter 
                                                             
25 "Convention of 18 December 1997 on Mutual Assistance and Co-operation between customs 
administrations (Naples II-Convention)." OJ C 24 of 23.01.1998. 
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paragraph stipulating that the requested member state shall undertake to 
comply with an interception request ‘where the requested measure would be 
taken by it in a similar national case’, being allowed moreover to ‘make its 
consent subject to any conditions which would have to be observed in a 
similar national case’.;  
- interception of telecommunications requiring the technical assistance of the 
requested member state (irrespective of whether the subject of the 
interception is present in the territory of the requesting, requested or a third 
member state), without transmission and without transcription of the 
recordings – this investigative measure is regulated in Art. 18, 1, b) in 
conjunction with 18, 2, a), b) or c) and 18, 6 EU MLA Convention, the latter 
paragraph stipulating that the requested member state shall undertake to 
comply with an interception request ‘where the requested measure would be 
taken by it in a similar national case’, being allowed moreover to ‘make its 
consent subject to any conditions which would have to be observed in a 
similar national case’; interception of telecommunications requiring the 
technical assistance of the requested member state (irrespective of whether 
the subject of the interception is present in the territory of the requesting, 
requested or a third member state), without transmission and with 
transcription of the recordings – this investigative measure is regulated in 
Art. 18, 1, b) in conjunction with 18, 2, a), b) or c), 18, 6 and 18, 7 EU MLA 
Convention, the latter two paragraphs stipulating that the requested member 
state shall undertake to comply with an interception request ‘where the 
requested measure would be taken by it in a similar national case’, being 
allowed moreover to ‘make its consent subject to any conditions which 
would have to be observed in a similar national case’, and that it will 
consider the request for a transcription of the recording ‘in accordance with 
its national law and procedures’; 
- allowing an interception of telecommunications to be carried out or 
continued if the telecommunication address of the subject of the interception 
is being used on the territory of the requested/executing member state 
(‘notified’ member state) in case where no technical assistance from the 
latter is needed to carry out the interception – this investigative measure is 
regulated in Art. 20, 2 in conjunction with 20, 4, a) EU MLA Convention, the 
latter paragraph stipulating under i)-iv) that the notified member state ‘may 
make its consent subject to any conditions which would have to be observed 
in a similar national case’, may require the interception not to be carried out 
or to be terminated ‘where [it] would not be permissible pursuant to [its] 
national law’, may in such cases require that any material already intercepted 
may not be used, or ‘may only be used under conditions which it shall 
specify’, or may require a short extension ‘in order to carry out internal 
procedures under its national law’; 
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- monitoring of banking transactions – this investigative measure is regulated 
in Art. 3 EU MLA Protocol, clarifying that the decision to monitor ‘shall be 
taken […] by the competent authorities of the requested member state, with 
due regard for the national law of that member state’; 
- collecting and examining cellular material and supplying the DNA profile 
obtained – this form of legal assistance is regulated in Art. 7 Prüm, 
stipulating under (3) that it can only be provided if, inter alia, ‘under the 
requested contracting party’s law, the requirements for collecting and 
examining cellular material and for supplying the DNA profile obtained are 
fulfilled’; 
 
This reading of the articles clarifies why the investigative measures in this 
cluster were technically characterised as “Investigative measures/measures of 
assistance (other than the aforementioned measures) which have been explicitly regulated 
in MLA legal instruments applicable between the EU member states and which 
currently would only be taken/executed in accordance with/in the manner provided for 
in the national law (and procedures) of the requested/executing member state/member 
state on the territory of which the measure is to be taken/executed or under the 
condition(s) which would have to be observed in a similar national case in the latter 
member state”. 
 
Cluster 4 
Cluster 4 deals with all investigative measures of which the 
requested/executing member state may under the current legal framework not 
make execution dependent on conditions of dual criminality, (dual) minimum 
threshold or consistency with national law, and for which the forum regit actum 
(FRA) rule applies. 
 
Again, the investigative measures have been listed in an exhaustive fashion. 
 
- interception of telecommunications where the technical assistance of the 
requested/executing member state is needed to intercept the 
telecommunications of the subject of the interception (irrespective of 
whether the latter is present in the territory of the requesting/issuing member 
state or of a third member state) with immediate transmission – this 
investigative measure is regulated in Art. 18, 1, a) in conjunction with 18, 2, a) 
or c) and 18, 5, a) EU MLA Convention, the latter paragraph stipulating that 
‘the requested member state may allow the interception to proceed without 
further formality’; 
- transfer of detainees from the requested/executing to the requesting/issuing 
member state (provided the requested/executing member state may make 
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such transfer dependent on the consent of the person concerned) – this 
investigative measure is regulated in Article 11 ECMA, which does not allow 
for refusal of transfer referring to national law; 
- transfer of detainees from the requesting/issuing to the requested/executing 
member state (provided the requested/executing member state may make 
such transfer dependent on the consent of the person concerned) – this 
investigative measure is regulated in Art. 9 EU MLA Convention, which 
neither foresees possible refusal of transfer referring to national law nor 
allows for entering reservations, to be read in conjunction with Article 25 of 
the samed Convention, according to which member states may not enter 
reservations in respect of the Convention, other than those for which it makes 
express provision; 
- hearing under oath (of witnesses and experts) – this investigative measure is 
regulated in Art. 12 ECMA, prescribing mandatory compliance by the 
requested party with such request unless its law prohibits it; 
- hearing by videoconference – this investigative measure is regulated in Art. 
10, 2 EU MLA Convention, pointing out that the requested member state 
shall agree to the hearing where this is not contrary to the fundamental 
principles of its law and on the condition that it has the technical means to 
carry out the hearing; 
- hearing by telephone conference (of witnesses or experts, only if these agree 
that the hearing takes place by that method) – this investigative measure is 
regulated in Art. 11, 3 EU MLA Convention, poiting out that the requested 
member state shall agree to the hearing where this is not contrary to 
fundamental principles of its law. 
 
This reading of the articles clarifies why the investigative measures in this 
cluster have been technically characterised as “Investigative measures/measures of 
assistance (other than the aforementioned measures) which have been explicitly regulated 
in MLA legal instruments applicable between the EU member states and the 
taking/execution of which the requested/executing member state/member state on the 
territory of which the measure is to be taken/executed may currently not make dependent 
on any condition of dual criminality, (dual) minimum threshold or consistency with its 
national law.” 
 
2.3.3 Analogy for measures currently not explicitly regulated  
Besides the investigative measures that are explicitly regulated in any of the 
MLA legal instruments, there are a series of other measures which have 
currently not been explicitly regulated. Nevertheless, MLA requests for those 
measures are still possible, because member states have agreed in Art. 1 ECMA 
to afford each other the widest possible measure of mutual assistance. In today’s 
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reality, a significant number of highly intrusive investigative measures is not 
explicitly regulated. Therefore, the importance of this article may not be 
underestimated.  
Hence, it is important to once more highlight the consequences of replacing 
the MLA legal framework with a system of MR for explicitly regulated 
investigative measures only. The current practice of creating MR instruments is 
essentially one of repealing and thus replacing other instruments. Art. 31 EAW 
for instance, stipulates that without prejudice to their application in relations 
between member states and third states, the EAW shall replace the 
corresponding provisions of the listed convestions applicable in the field of 
extradition in relations between the member states. Amongst others, the 
Convention of 27 september 1996 relating to extradition between the member 
states of the EU26 is listed. When the same approach would be applied to the 
domain of MLA, the flexibility of the “widest possible measure” refered to in Art. 1 
ECMA would be lost. 
Considering the amount of investigative measures that are currently not 
regulated it is clear that replacing the entirety of the current MLA regime with 
MR instruments must take into account the current practice of requesting 
investigative measures currently not regulated in any of the instruments. Losing 
the flexibility offered by Art. 1 ECMA would constitute an undesirable effect.  
Because member states use the possibility enshrined in Art. 1 ECMA and 
request MLA for investigative measures not explicitly regulated and considering 
the risk of losing the flexibility of the MA system, it becomes very important to 
test whether these investigative measures could also be clustered and placed 
under a similar regime. Therefore, a series of investigative measures currently 
not explicitly regulated, was listed and divided into two categories, according to 
the likeliness member states would be inclined to attach a locus or forum regit 
actum rule to them, require or abandon the dual criminality, (dual) minimum 
threshold and consistency test.  
  
 
                                                             
26 "Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, of 27 
September 1996 relating to Extradition between the Member States of the European Union." OJ 
C 313 of 23.10.1996. 
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Figure 5. Clarifying clusters 5 and 6 
 
Cluster 5 
Cluster 5 encompasses a (non-limitative) series of intrusive investigative 
measures which are currently not explicitly regulated by any of the MLA legal 
instruments. Because of their intrusive character, it is deemed unlikely that 
requested member states will execute them unless execution will be in 
accordance with or in the manner provided for in its national law or under 
conditions of double criminality, double minimum threshold or consistency with 
its national law. 
In the questionnaire a non-limitative list of potential measures falling in the 
scope of this cluster were listed: 
 
- registration of incoming and outgoing telecommunication numbers 
- interception of so-called direct communications 
- obtaining communications data retained by providers of a publicly available 
electronic communications service or a public communications network 
- withholding/intercepting of mail (and reading it) 
- cooperation with regard to electronic communications (other than 
telecommunications) (registration of incoming and outgoing 
communications, interception etc) 
- controlled delivery through the territory of the requested/executing member 
state (i.e. across its territory, the territory of destination of the delivery or 
where intervention is envisaged being another member state or a third state) 
– The inclusion of this investigative measure in this cluster might not be self-
explanatory, as it may seem that it is regulated in the EU MLA Convention. 
Unlike in the corresponding provision of the 1997 Naples II Convention, 
however, the provision relating to controlled deliveries in the EU MLA 
Convention doe not relate to transit controlled deliveries also, and is limited 
to controlled deliveries ‘on’ the territory of the requested member state.  
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- (cross-border) use of (police) informers and civilian infiltrators 
- (cross-border) use of technical devices (camera, electronic/GPS tracking) for 
the purposes of observation 
- entry of premises without consent in view of discrete visual control or search 
- confidence buy (either or not including flash-roll) 
- establishing front business 
- (discrete) photo and video registration 
- assistance in non-procedural protection of protected witnesses and their 
family members (direct and physical protection; placement of a detainee in a 
specialised and protected section of the prison; relocation for a short period; 
relocation for a longer or indefinite period; change of identity, including the 
concealment of certain personal data by the administrative authorities; lesser 
measures, techno-preventative in nature) 
- carrying out bodily examinations or obtaining bodily material or biometric 
data directly from the body of any person, including the taking of 
fingerprints (other than collecting and examining cellular material and 
supplying the DNA profile obtained: supra) 
- exhumation and transfer of the corpse 
- (exhumation and) forensic anatomist investigation 
- lie detection test (of a non-consenting witness or suspect) 
- line-up (including of a suspect, not consenting to appear) 
 
 
Cluster 6 
Cluster 6 encompasses a (non-limitative) series of intrusive investigative 
measures which are currently not explicitly regulated by any of the MLA legal 
instruments. Because of their non-intrusive character, it is likely that requested 
member states will allow for them under the most lenient MLA regime, i.e. be 
willing to execute them in compliance with the formalities and procedures 
expressly indicated by the requesting member state, provided that these are not 
contrary to the fundamental principles of its own law. 
 
In the questionnaire a non-limitative list of potential measures falling in the 
scope of this cluster were listed: 
 
- conducting analysis of existing objects, documents or data 
- conducting interviews or taking statements (other than from persons present 
during the execution of a European Evidence Warrant (EEW) and directly 
related to the subject thereof, in which case the relevant rules of the executing 
state applicable to national cases shall also be applicable in respect of the 
taking of such statements) or initiating other types of hearings involving 
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suspects, witnesses, experts or any other party, other than under oath or by 
video or telephone conference (supra) 
- reconstruction 
- making of video or audio recordings of statements delivered in the 
requested/executing member state 
- video conference hearing of accused persons 
- video conference hearing of suspects 
 
2.4 Recurring patterns  
Having clustered the investigative measures into six clusters, the questions 
were linked to them. 
The questions are all related either the MR of investigative measures or the 
free movement of evidence. Because the answers are likely to differ for each of 
the clusters, a recurring pattern was attached to the questions, as a result of 
which questions appear more than once in the questionnaire, be it for different 
clusters.  
However, not all questions appear in each cluster. Considering that the aim 
of the study is to assess the feasibility to introduce MR characteristics in MLA to 
improve efficiency, the overall intention is not to make MLA more strict. This 
explains why not all questions appear in all clusters as they are meaningless or 
even fully counterproductive in some situations. The analysis in this report 
clarifies, where necessary, why certain questions were not asked for one or more 
cluster(s). 
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3  Mutual recognition of investigative measures 
The first pillar of the study relates to the desirability and feasibility to 
introduce more MR characteristics into the current MLA environment and thus 
create a more MR-based MLA. To asses the political and practical support for a 
such future policy option, a general preliminary question was asked. It served as 
an introduction to the questionnaire but should also be seen as the justification 
for the entire study. More specifically, member states were asked to what extent 
they considered it to be the better future policy option for the EU to base the 
entirety of MLA as much as possible on a MR-based footing, as in the EEW 
Framework Decision. Such an option would replace the current dual-track 
system, which is likely to cause confusion among practitioners.  
 
70%
30%
MR-based footing better policy 
option for MLA?
Yes
No
 
 
Figure 6. MR-based footing better policy option for MLA? 
 
70% of the member states accept this “broadening” as future policy option, 
which shows the will of member states to go further than what the EEW 
provides for.  
Subsequently, the hypothesis of cluster 2 was tested. Member states were 
asked whether they consider it to be an acceptable future policy option to 
broaden the application EEW to all forms of (house)search and seizure. 
Considering the responses to the introductory question and the general 
willingness to broaden the MR-basis in MLA it was only logical that 60% of the 
member states confirm the project hypothesis with regard to cluster 2.  
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60%
40%
EEW regime for all 
(house)search or seizure?
Yes
No
 
Figure 7. EEW regime for all (house)search or seizure? 
 
Notwithstanding this acceptance to broaden the MR influence, it should be 
noted that it is impossible to replace the entirety of MLA with MR. Two pitfalls 
support this position. First, it is important to underline that not all forms of MLA 
can be replaced with an MR regime. The functioning and specific features of a 
joint investigation team for example are fully incompatible with the ordering 
and executing principles of MR. Second, replacing the entirety of MLA with an 
MR-based regime runs the risk of losing the flexibility offered by the MLA 
obligation to afford each other the widest possible measure of assistance. In today’s 
reality, a significant number of highly intrusive investigative measures is not 
explicitly regulated. Hence the compilation of clusters 5 and 6.   
Nevertheless, MLA for those investigative measures remains possible based 
on the obligation to afford each other the widest possible measure of assistance. 
Therefore, the importance of this article may not be underestimated. Future 
(MR-based) MLA instruments should either maintain this flexibility or regulate 
each and every possible investigative measure.  
The biggest challenge to assess the extent to which an MR based MLA is 
desirable and feasible is the operationalisation of MR itself. Four main MR 
characteristics are singled out as the backbone of the study and the backbone of 
the structure of this report. 
MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES 
 
 
55 
 
The first MR characteristic is the use of the 32 MR offences (to abandon the 
double criminality requirement).  
The second MR characteristic relates to the enhanced stringency in 
cooperation. Introducing MR into MLA raises questions as to the feasibility of 
limiting the grounds for refusal. Linked to those grounds for refusal are the 
grounds for postponement and the impact such grounds have on the speed with 
which recognition takes place and execution is commenced. 
The third MR characteristic relates to the shift from merely requesting to a 
regime in which orders are issued.  
The fourth MR characteristic relates to the horizontalisation of cooperation.  
The following sections reflect the analysis of these characteristics. 
 
3.1 The 32 MR offences  
The first MR characteristic singled out for this analysis is the list of 32 MR 
offences linked to the abandonment of the double criminality requirement.  
Traditionally, MR is made dependent on double criminality.27  It is safe to say 
that the more far-reaching MR is, the more far-reaching the double criminality 
requirement is likely to be.28 This is of course closely linked to the rationale 
behind the introduction of the double criminality requirement: it is a protection 
mechanism which aims at preventing member states from being obliged to 
cooperate in the enforcement of a decision contrary to their own legal (and 
criminal policy) views.  
However, recent evolutions reveal a tendancy to abandon, either in full or 
partially, such double criminality requirement. The title of this section refers to 
the list of 32 offences for which some MR instruments abandon double 
criminality. 
This study does not only assess these 32 MR offences in relation to the double 
criminality requirement. The study also looks into the future of those 32 MR 
offences in other domains. It is analysed whether there are other possible aspects 
to judicial cooperation for which the introduction of the 32 MR offences might 
have an added value. 
 
                                                             
27 In the Framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant, it is required that the act 
constitutes an offence under the law of the executing member state, whatever the constituent 
elements or however it is described; In the Framework decision on the mutual recognition of 
confiscation orders, it is required that the act constitutes an offence which permits confiscation 
under the law of the executing state, whatever the constituent elements or however it is 
described under the law of the issuing state; 
28 DE BONDT, W. and VERMEULEN, G. (2010). Appreciating Approximation. Using common 
offence concepts to facilitate police and judicial cooperation in the EU. in COOLS, M. Readings On 
Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing. Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland, Maklu. 4: 15-40. 
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3.1.1 Erosion of the double criminality requirement 
Traditionally, the 32 MR offences are linked to the abandonment of the 
double criminality requirement. Notwithstanding the importance of the double 
criminality requirement, it is considered an obstacle for smooth cooperation. 
Member states looked into alternatives and the possibility to limit the use of the 
double criminality requirement.29 
The erosion of the double criminality requirement only became truly 
apparent with the adoption of the new MR instruments. Today, two tracks 
appear. The first consists of a partial abandonment of the double criminality 
requirement through incorporation of a list of offence types. The second consists 
of a general abandonment of the double criminality requirement, regardless of 
the offence types involved.  
 
Partial abandonment: no double criminality for the listed offence (types) 
A first appearance of the abandonment of the double criminality requirement 
can be found in the offence lists introduced in most mutual recognition 
instruments. A list of offence types in compiled for which double criminality will 
no longer be tested. In this report the list is referred to as the 32 MR offences. 
The listed offences vary slightly across instruments. The list featuring in the 
2005 FD on the MR of financial penalties30 is unusually broad as it lists more 
specific offences31 and ends with the inclusion of “all offences established by the 
issuing state and serving the purpose of implementing obligations arising from 
instruments adopted under the EC Treaty or under Title VI of the EU Treaty”.32  
 
General abandonment: no double criminality what so ever 
The second appearance of the abandonment of the double criminality 
requirement is not linked to offence types. The 2008 FD on the taking into 
account of prior convictions, does not feature a list at all.33 Art. 3 stipulates that a 
conviction handed down in another member state shall be taken into account in 
                                                             
29 Thomas, F. (1980). De Europese rechtshulpverdragen in strafzaken. Gent, Rijksuniversiteit te 
Gent. 
30 Council of the European Union (2008). "Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA of 24 July 2008 on 
taking account of convictions in the Member States of the European Union in the course of new 
criminal proceedings." OJ L 220 of 15.08.2008. 
31 That list includes all the offences on the equivalent EAW list, and makes a meaningful 
supplement considering the context of financial penalties by introducing infringement of road 
traffic regulations, smuggling, intellectual property offences, threats and acts of violence against persons, 
criminal damage and theft. 
32 OJ L 78 of 22.3.2005. 
33 OJ L 220 of 15.8.2008 
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the course of new criminal proceedings. Legal effects equivalent to previous 
national convictions must be attached in accordance with national law. It is 
amazing that unanimity was found to demand MR of any conviction, which in 
practice includes the recognition of a conviction for behaviour not criminalised 
in own national criminal law provisions. 
 
3.1.2 Future of 32 MR offences in MLA 
In light of the abovementioned two tracks showing the erosion of the double 
criminality requirement identified in MR instruments, the member states were 
asked to what extent either partial or general abandonment of the double 
criminality requirement is considered an acceptable future policy option for the 
entire MLA environment. 
However, this question does not appear for all six clusters. Considering the 
architecture of the questionnaire and the clustering of the investigative 
measures, these questions are not relevant for each of the six clusters. Clusters 1 
and 2 are related to the EEW, which has a clear regime related to the double 
criminality requirement and the use of the 32 MR offences. Similarly the 
questions were not asked for clusters 4 and 6 because introducing a double 
criminality requirement for them would consistute a step back. Generally, the 
granting of traditional MLA does not depend on the condition of dual 
criminality. These two clusters were specifically designed to be composed of 
investigative measures for which it is either explicitly regulated or highly 
plausible that member states cannot make execution dependent on conditions of 
dual criminality, (dual) minimum threshold or consistency with national law. 
Therefore this set of questions only featured in clusters 3 and 5.  
The future of the 32 MR offences was not only tested with regard to double 
criminality. The 32 MR offences proved to have significant potential to increase 
efficient cooperation in providing a framework for the abandonment of the 
double criminality requirement. Because of its potential, the question has 
already been raised whether there are alternative uses for the list. Today, one 
example can already be found. In its Art. 11, 3 the EEW requires member states 
to ensure that measures which would be available in a similar domestic case in 
the executing state are also available for the purpose of the execution of the 
EEW. Regardless of availability of measures for domestic cases, the EEW 
additionally requires measures, including (house)search or seizure, to be 
available for the purpose of executing an EEW which relates to acts included in 
the 32 MR offences. 
Following the attempts to look into alternative uses for the 32 MR offences, 
the questionnaire looked into its added value with regard to three applications: 
limiting the possibility to require execution in consistency with the national law 
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of the executing member state, limiting refusal and postponement grounds and 
finally, ensuring admissibility of information/evidence. 
The following paragraphs present the empirical results of the study, starting 
off with the traditional link between the 32 MR offences and the double 
criminality requirement, before going into alternatives. 
 
Abandoning the double criminality requirement 
Considering the historic ties between the two concepts, the project team 
started off with an analysis of the link between the 32 MR offences and the 
abandonment of the double criminality requirement. Strikingly, only 10% of the 
member states indicated to attach great importance to a full fledged double 
criminality requirement for cluster 3 measures. This means that no less than 90% 
of the member states are willing to cooperate even if the investigative measure 
relates to acts which do not constitute an offence in there own national law. In 
current practice 60% of the member states do not even apply the double 
criminality requirement, even though they are allowed to do so. Considering 
that abandoning the double criminality requirement constitutes a significant 
improvement in terms of efficient cooperation, and considering that an 
additional 30% accept abandonment as a future policy, the future legal 
framework can no longer maintain the double criminality requirement. 
With regard to the investigative measures included in cluster 5, member 
states are slightly more conservative which is of course linked to the more 
intrusive character of the measures concerned. Nevertheless, 70% of the member 
states accept the abandonment of the double criminality requirement as a future 
policy.  
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30%
30%
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criminality
 
20%
40%
10%
30%
Double criminality in cluster 5
currently not 
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drop for 32 MR 
offences
always maintain 
double 
criminality
 
Figure 8. Future of 32 MR offences: Double criminality in clusters 3 and 5 
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Consistency issues 
Secondly, the (future) link between the 32 MR offences and the execution in 
consistency with the national law of the executing member states was assessed. 
Several instruments allow the executing member state to require execution in 
consistency with its national law. Because such a requirement might hinder 
efficient cooperation, it is worth looking into the willingness of member states to 
waive this right when execution is related to acts included in the 32 MR offences. 
Member states were asked how they deal with a request for a measure which 
cannot cannot be taken/ordered in a national case according to the national law 
of the executing state. Member states could indicate whether or not execution is 
possible and whether or not a link with any of the 32 MR offences makes a 
difference. 
Analysis revealed that only 20% would never allow execution of a measure 
which cannot be taken/ordered in a national case accordind to their national law. 
No less than 80% of member states are either now executing or willing to accept 
a policy to oblige execution if the acts concerned are included in the 32 MR offences. 
Making reference to the 32 MR offences clearly results in a significant step 
forward to facilitate coopeation and execute foreign requests. This result 
undeniable proves that it is worth while looking into the added value an 
introduction of the 32 MR offences can have for the execution of requests of 
which execution is inconsistent with the law of the executing member state. 
 
 
0%
50%
30%
20%
Consistency issues in cluster 3
measure will be 
executed
execution currently 
limited to 32 MR 
offences
acceptable to oblige 
execution for 32 MR 
offences
never an option, not 
even for 32 MR 
offences
 
Figure 9. Future of 32 MR offences: Consistency issues in clusters 3 
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Figure 10. Future of 32 MR offences: Consistency issues in clusters 5 
 
 
Grounds for refusal and ground for postponement 
Thirdly, the (future) link between the 32 MR offences and the grounds for 
refusal and postponement was assessed. The questionnaire aimed at assessing 
the feasibility of limiting refusal and postponement grounds. The MR 
philosophy requires refusal and postponement grounds to be limited as much as 
possible. The question again rises whether the introduction of the 32 MR 
offences would have an added value. Analysis revealed that neither for 
operational, nor for financial capacity issues, the introduction of the 32 MR 
offences has added value, be it for different reasons.  
Operational capacity is both used as a ground for refusal and as a ground for 
postponement. Considering that 70% of the member states indicated not to use 
operational capacity as a refusal ground, added value via introduction of the 32 
MR offences can only be generated for the remaining 30%. Even though one 
third (for cluster 3) up to half (for cluster 5) of the remaining member states 
accepts removing the possibility to refuse when acts are included in the 32 MR 
offences list, the result would be rather marginal as only a small number of 
member states refuse to begin with.  
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Figure 11.  Future of 32 MR Offences: Operational capacity as a ground for refusal  
 
In parallel, even though 50 to 60% of the member states do postpone 
execution, none or only 20% of the remaining member states are willing to 
accept the removing the possibility to postpone when acts are included in the 32 
MR offences. In both cases the netto effect of an introduction would be marginal. 
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Figure 12.  Future of 32 MR Offences: Operational capacity as a ground for postponement 
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Similarly, financial capacity as a refusal ground would not benefit from the 
introduction of the 32 MR offences. Analysis reveals that member states favour a 
system in which a fair share of the costs/expences would be borne/refunded by 
the requesting/issuing authority/member state over a regime in which execution 
would be obliged regardless of any form of sharing the financial burden. 
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Figure 13.  Future of 32 MR Offences: Financial capacity as a ground for refusal in cluster 3 
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Figure 14. Future of 32 MR Offences: Financial capacity as a ground for refusal in cluster 5 
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Figure 15. Future of 32 MR Offences: Financial capacity as a ground for refusal in cluster 6 
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Admissibility of evidence 
Fourthly, the (future) link between the 32 MR offences and the admissibility 
of evidence was put to the test. The questionnaire aimed at assessing the added 
value of the 32 MR offences in the context of admissibility of evidence. Member 
states were asked whether they would consider it to be an acceptable future 
policy option that information lawfully obtained by a member or seconded 
member while part of a joint investigation team which is not otherwise available 
to the competent authorities of the member states would constitute per se 
admissible evidence under the national law of the member states concerned. 
Only 10% considered this not to be an option. The other 90% do not require that 
such admissibility is limited to the 32 MR offences.  
Similarly, member states were asked whether they would consider it to be an 
acceptable future policy option that competent authorities from other member 
states who are lawfully present on their territory in while executing a 
request/order/warrant (e.g. when seconded member of a joint investigation team 
operating on your territory, when present during a hearing or house search etc) 
draft official reports having the same probative value under your national law as 
if they had been drafted by your own competent authorities. 80% of the member 
states consider this to be an acceptable future policy and do not require this to be 
limited to the 32 MR offences. 
 
Conclusion 
It is safe to say that the introduction of the 32 MR offences in other areas than 
the abandonment of the double criminality requirement needs to be well 
considered. Whereas the introduction might seem a step forward, analysis 
clearly revealed that limiting such a step forward to the 32 MR offences, can 
actually hinder from taking an even bigger step forward. This view is shared by 
the Eurojust College. In their replies, it is clarified that in general, the taking of 
evidence should not be dependent on whether the underlying offence is one of 
the 32 MR offences set out in previous instruments of mutual recognition. 
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3.2 Enhanced stringency in cooperation  
The second MR characteristic singled out for this analysis is the enhanced 
stringency in cooperation MR brings about. The well-known shift from 
requesting member state to issuing member state and from requested member state 
to executing member state is not merely symbolic in nature: the MR concept must 
turn traditional judicial cooperation – in casu MLA – into a more reliable and 
faster mechanism. This implies more stringency for the requested (now: 
executing) member state or authority, in that traditional grounds for refusal 
(now: non-execution) are reduced and requests (now: orders to execute decisions) 
must be replied to and effectively executed within strict deadlines. 
 
 
Both the 2003 Freezing Order34 and the 2008 EEW35 reflect these 
characteristics, especially where it comes to enhanced speediness. A potential 
further roll-out of MR for the entirety of MLA requires a scrupulous and 
systematic assessment of traditional grounds for refusal (non-execution) in MLA 
(including the testing of new or amended non-execution grounds as they appear 
in the EEW in particular, of a new MR based non-execution ground in case of 
immunity from prosecution for the same facts in the executing member state and 
of the need for additional capacity-related refusal or non-execution grounds) as 
well as the feasibility of introducing strict reply and execution deadlines for the 
requested (executing) member state. 
 
3.2.1 Grounds for refusal or non-execution 
First, grounds for refusal and non-execution are assessed. In MR instruments 
designed until date, there has only been a reassessment of traditional 
substantive refusal grounds (even if, as will be explained hereafter, the 
systematic taking over of certain grounds of non-execution that had been 
inserted in the EAW, serving as the archetypical MR instrument, in other MR 
instruments, including the EEW, has prompted counterproductive effects).  
Transposing MR to MLA altogether would however mean rendering the 
entirety of MLA more stringent, i.e. including when it comes to a variety of 
investigative measures that currently lack explicit regulation in MLA 
instruments but the taking of which could be asked for under the notion ‘widest 
                                                             
34 Council of the European Union (2003). "Framework Decision of 22 July 2003 on the execution 
in the EU of orders freezing property or evidence." OJ L 196 of  2.8.2003. 
35 Council of the European Union (2008). "Framework decision of 18 December 2008 on the 
European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in 
proceedings in criminal matters " OJ L 350 of 30.12.2008. 
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measure of mutual assistance’ in Art. 1 ECMA, granting of the requested assistance 
then however being left to the full discretion of the requested member state. 
Introducing MR for these investigative measures (in our study comprised in 
clusters 5 and 6) would logically imply putting a stop to such discretion, and 
allowing for refusal or non-execution of the cluster 5 and 6 investigative 
measures for a limited set of reasons only – most likely mirroring the (revised) 
traditional grounds for refusal or non-execution. However, given the potential 
impact for the executing member state in executing the measures concerned 
(including e.g. special investigative measures as comprised in cluster 5), in that 
the implications thereof in terms of operational or financial capacity may be very 
substantial, the project team has chosen to not only test the position of member 
states vis-à-vis the (revised) traditional grounds for refusal or non-execution, but 
also to check the preparedness of member states to accept semi-mandatory 
execution of the measures under clusters 5 en 6 irrespective of their potential 
financial and operational capacity impact. Given that currently (in the EU MLA 
Convention) for two measures comprised in cluster 3, i.e. the interception of 
telecommunications and the video conference hearing, there is a reverse 
financial cost regulation in place (shifting the financial burden towards the 
requesting member state), the project team has chosen to revisit cluster 3 
measures from the same perspective, in order to see whether member states in 
the mean time would be willing to step away from the reverse financial cost 
regulation, or – alternatively – would be in for a new financial regulation for 
considerable-cost measures. For the above reasons, a distinction is implemented 
below between substantive and capacity refusal or non-execution grounds. 
Worth mentioning, finally, is that the project team has chosen to also test 
support among member states for an additional susbtantive ground for refusal 
or non-execution, which it believes logically should be introduced from an MR-
perspective. It relates to the situation where the proceedings in the issuing 
member state relate to a person who the executing member state has granted 
immunity from prosecution for the same facts as a benefit for his or her 
collaboration with justice. 
 
Substantive grounds for refusal or non-execution 
Ne bis in idem  
 
The first substantive ground for refusal or non-executipon is the ne bis in idem 
principle. Ne bis in idem is a fundamental legal principle which is enshrined in 
most legal systems, according to which a person cannot be prosecuted more than 
once for the same act (or facts). It is also found in regional and international 
instruments, particularly in Art. 4 of the 7th Protocol to the ECHR of 22 
November 1984 and in Art. 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
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Political Rights of 19 December 1966. However, under these international 
provisions the principle only applies on the national level, i.e. prohibits a new 
prosecution under the jurisdiction of a single state. These instruments make the 
principle binding in the state where a final judgment has been passed, but do not 
prevent other states from launching further proceedings for the same 
facts/offence.  
In the past (too) little significance has been assigned to the ne bis in idem 
principle in the field of MLA in terms of treaty law. The ECMA itself does not 
recognise the principle. Therefore it does not come as a surprice that quite some 
contracting parties have taken the initiative themselves, and have reserved the 
right, in a reservation to Art. 2 ECMA, not to meet a request for legal assistance 
with regard to a prosecution or proceedings which is irreconcilable with the ne 
bis in idem principle. Still, notwithstanding the international connotation these 
reservations attach to the ne bis in idem principle, this approach does not 
anticipate problems caused by the fact that the interpretation of the principle 
differs significantly from country to country. In a strict sense, the ne bis in idem 
principle should prevent legal assistance from being granted for the prosecution 
or conviction of a person who has already been the subject of a final judgement 
in his own country (or in a third state). Traditionally, there is the additional 
condition that the person concerned was acquitted in the judgement that was 
passed, or that, in the case of a conviction, no sanction was imposed, the 
sanction had been executed, is still being executed, or can no longer be executed, 
according to the law of the convicting state (because it has lapsed, a pardon has 
been granted, or there has been an amnesty). In a wider sense, the principle can 
also be invoked as an obstacle to granting legal assistance with regard to acts for 
which the proceedings have already been instituted in the country of the person 
concerned (or in a third state). Finally, the ne bis in idem effect can also be 
assigned to decisions of the requested (or a third) state, to stop the proceedings 
or even decide not to institute proceedings with regard to the acts for which the 
legal assistance has been requested (no grounds for proceedings or dismissal).   
Despite the non-recognition of the ne bis in idem principle in the ECMA – 
which should still be seen as the international common law for European MLA 
in criminal matters – it must be recalled that also the member states which did 
not formulate any reservation regarding the ne bis in idem principle to Art. 2 
ECMA, have all joined the Schengen group, and are as such all obliged to 
observe the ne bis in idem principle in assessing the desirability of instituting or 
continuing proceedings. Chapter 3 of the SIC (Art. 54 to 58, the text of which was 
taken from a the Convention between the Member states of the European 
Communities on Double Jeopardy signed in Brussels on 25 May 1987) – which in 
the mean time has been formally integrated into the EU acquis as part of the 
Schengen acquis – deals with the application of an EU wide ne bis in idem 
principle. In contrast to other international instruments, which only provide for 
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the applicability of the ne bis in idem at national level (application of the rule in 
the legal order of a state for convictions/acquittals delivered in the legal order of 
that state), the SIC applies the principle of ne bis in idem between EU member 
states on a trans-national level. In other words, the SIC incorporates to the 
national legal order of the member states a ne bis in idem principle which can 
result from convictions and acquittals, (or for other “final decisions” in general) 
which have been handed down in other EU member states. In its path breaking 
judgment of 11 February 2003 (Gözütok/Brügge, Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-
385/01), the ECJ developed important guidelines for the interpretation of the SIC, 
which must be the guiding principles to any further steps by the EU legislator as 
regards enhancing the principle of ne bis in idem among the EU member states 
from a MR perspective. Even though the Schengen provisions do not formally 
prevent the granting of legal assistance, it is obviously difficult from a logical 
point of view to (have to) take into account the ne bis in idem principle for the 
instituting the criminal proceedings in one’s own member state, on the one 
hand, while not (having to) do so with regard to taking a decision about whether 
or not to cooperate in implementing proceedings in another member state, on 
the other hand. It must been seen as a missed opportunity that this imbalance 
has not been removed with the introduction of an imperative ne bis in idem 
exception in establishing the EU MLA Convention in 2000 and the EU MLA 
Protocol thereto in 2001. 
It should be applauded that the ne bis in idem principle as a ground for refusal 
found its way from formerly applicable extradition instruments between the 
member states into the EAW as a ground for non-execution and later – due to 
the archetypical character attributed to the EAW when it comes to shaping new 
MR instruments – has been copied into further MR instruments, including in the 
EEW. From the perspective that MR must reduce traditional grounds for refusal, 
that was a step backwards compared to traditional MLA, where, as was 
explained above, the principle does not appear as a ground for refusal in the 
ECMA, the EU MLA Convention or the Protocol thereto. However, from an 
emancipatory perspective, and in line with the MR Strategy of November 2000, 
which had pointed out the importance of a further roll-out of the ne bis in idem 
principle between the member states, the ‘accidental’ copying of the 
corresponding ground for non-execution from EU surrender law to the sphere of 
MLA must be welcomed. It is only logical therefore that a further introduction of 
MR throughout the sphere of MLA, irrespective of the cluster concerned, must 
follow the line of the EEW, turning the ne bis in idem principle into (at least an 
optional) ground for non-execution. 
This hypothesis has been tested both for the application sphere of the EEW 
(cluster 1), where the EU has already chosen to introduce a ne bis in idem ground 
for non-execution, and for all other cooperation clusters, for which the current 
cooperation instruments do not foresee such refusal ground (except cluster 2, 
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which should logically follow the cluster 1 regime, and cluster 4, where the 
project team assessed that it could definitely be introduced in case introduction 
of it in the clusters 3, 5 and 6 would not be opposed by member states). The 
results are clear: the vast majority of member states indicates that execution on 
the basis of ne bis in idem would be refused, or that it should be possible to refuse 
execution on the basis of it. The overall recommendation therefore must be that 
the ne bis in idem principle should be enshrined throughout future (MR-based) 
MLA instruments between the member states as (at least an optional) ground for 
refusal or non-execution. 
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Figure 16.  Ne bis in idem as a ground for refusal in clusters 1, 3, 5 and 6 
 
 
Immunity from prosecution for the same facts 
 
The second substantive ground for refusal or non-execution is immunity from 
prosecution for the same facts. Linked to the ne bis in idem principle – and as already 
mentioned above – the project team has chosen to also test support among 
member states for the introduction of an additional susbtantive ground for 
refusal or non-execution, i.e. the situation where the proceedings in the issuing 
member state relate to a person who the executing member state has granted 
immunity from prosecution for the same facts as a benefit for his or her 
collaboration with justice. which it believes logically should be introduced from 
an MR-perspective. 
The importance of taking EU legislative initiative in the sphere of 
(international cooperation relating to) protection of witnesses and collaborators 
with justice was underlined in Recommendation 25 of the 2000 Millennium 
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Strategy36. The importance of MR of immunities granted to collaborators with 
justice was already argued in the final report of the 2004 study on EU standards 
in witness protection and collaboration with justice, conducted by IRCP,37 as a 
logical complement or extension of the ne bis in idem philosophy underlying the 
Gözütok/Brügge ECJ jurisprudence referred to above. In line with the 
transposition of the Schengen ne bis in idem acquis into a ground for refusal or 
non-execution in the sphere of MLA, the project team therefore believes an 
analogue approach should be followed with regard to immunity from 
prosecution for the same facts. 
Even though wholly new as a suggested ground for refusal or non-execution, 
support among member states for its introduction is strikingly high. Being at 
70% for the EEW cluster (and logically therefore also for cluster 2), support 
among member states even amounts to 80% for all other clusters. It is therefore 
recommended to introduce the newly suggested (optional) ground for refusal or 
non-execution throughout future (MR-based) MLA instruments between the 
member states. 
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Figure 17. Immunity from presecution as a ground for refusal for clusters 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
 
                                                             
36 European Council (2000). "The prevention and control of organised crime: a European Union 
strategy for the beginning of the new millennium." OJ C 124 of 3.5.2000. 
37 G. Vermeulen (ed.), EU standards in witness protection and collaboration with justice, 2005, 
Antwerp-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 256, where – in the context of a draft framework decision on 
collaborators with justice the adoption is suggested of – the following text of a provision on 
‘Mutual recognition’ (Article 11) is proposed: ‘A collaborator with justice who has been granted 
immunity from prosecution in accordance with Article [...] in one member state, may not be 
prosecuted by another member state for the offences for which he has been granted immunity 
from prosecution [...]’. 
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Lack of double criminality 
 
The third substantive ground for refusal or non-execution is lack of double 
criminality. It has already been pointed out above that the granting of traditional 
MLA generically does not depend on the condition of double criminality, and 
that the possibility of refusal on the basis of lack of double criminality is limited 
to a series of coercive or potentially intrusive investigative measures only. 
Currently that is the case for (house)search or seizure (cluster 2 and, the case 
being, cluster 1) and for the investigative measures comprised in cluster 3. As for 
cluster 1 measures, within the sphere of the EEW, Art 13, 1, b EEW has already 
introduced a prohibition to raise lack of double criminality as a ground for non-
execution for the 32 MR offences and, where execution of an EEW would not 
require search or seizure, also for other offences. The project team has logically 
taken the position that the same approach can be introduced for (house)search or 
seizure measures under cluster 2, with the effect that double criminality should 
no longer be a ground for non-execution for any of the 32 MR offences. The 
results of testing that hypothesis have been described above, not only for cluster 
1-2 measures, but in general. For cluster 4 measures a double criminality test is 
currently prohibited in MLA (so that testing its reduction to other offences than 
the 32 MR offences is pointless). By analogy, the project team believes it should 
be altogether prohibited for cluster 6 measures too (for which, logically, the 32 
MR offences scenario has not been tested either). For cluster 5 one obviously 
doesnot know, even though – by analogy – it seems logical that member states 
would definitely require double criminality for cluster 5 measures if they choose 
to retain the principle for cluster 3 measures. 
The project team has therefore tested whether member states would refuse 
execution of cluster 3 and 5 measures in case of lack of double criminality, or 
would want to be able to refuse execution on that basis. As shown below, only 
30% respectively 20% of the member states would not (insist to have the 
possibility to) invoke lack of double criminality as a ground for non-execution. 
Hence, complete removal of double criminality as a refusal or non-execution 
ground for cluster 3 and 5 measures is illusionary. The Eurojust College, in its 
reply, has taken firm position along the same lines: ‘Member states should have 
the possibility to make the taking of evidence which would involve the use of coercive 
measures [...] subject to the condition of dual criminality’. As was shown above, 
however, the potential of introducing a prohibition to invoke it for the 32 MR 
offences in these cases is far more promising.  
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Figure 18.  Double criminality in clusters 3 and 5 
 
Impossibility to execute 
 
The fourth substantive ground for refusal or non-execution is the impossibility 
to execute the investigative measure. Art. 13, 1, c EEW stipulates that recognition 
or execution of an EEW may be refused in the executing member state if it is not 
possible to execute it by any of the measures available to the executing authority 
in the specific case in accordance with Art. 11(3). This article in turn states that 
each member state shall ensure: (i) that any measures which would be available 
in a similar domestic case in the executing state are also available for the purpose 
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of the execution of the EEW; and (ii) that measures, including search or seizure, 
are available for the purpose of the execution of the EEW where it is related to 
any of the offences as set out in Art. 14(2) – which are the 32 MR offences 
excluded from verification of double criminality.  
This non-execution ground is EEW-specific, and is inexistent under current 
MLA instruments. The reason it has been introduced for the EEW is that issuing 
the latter is intrinsically result-oriented (obtaining objects, documents or data), 
leaving the executing member state discretion in choosing the investigative 
measures or steps necessary to that end and available to it within the limits of its 
national law. Consequently, if no measures are available to it under its national 
law, execution is impossible, so that execution of an EEW should obviously be 
refusable. Introducing such ground for refusal or non-execution for other forms 
of MLA than in the sphere of the EEW (cluster 1) would be a step backwards, 
and moreover pointless, as all other clusters comprise investigative measures as 
such (i.e. means that could lead to results instead of result-oriented orders). 
Hence, the extent to which the project team has tested the continued relevance 
for the future of the ‘impossibility to execute’ ground for non-execution was 
therefore necessarily limited to cluster 1, whereby it should also be firmly stated 
that, unlike for other aspects, the cluster 1 regime should not be copied to cluster 
2 measures when it comes to retaining or introducing the ground for non-
execution at stake. 
Asked whether they would refuse execution of an EEW (or would want to be 
able to refuse it) if it is not possible to execute it by any of the measures which 
would be available to them in a similar domestic case (provided that for the 32 
MR offences it must be ensured that there are measures, including search and 
seizure, available for the purpose of its execution, the majority of member states 
answered affirmatively. Both for theoretical reasons and on the basis of the 
empirical research among member states, it is therefore recommended to retain 
the ground for non-execution for cluster 1 (EEW), recalling that it should 
obviously not be introduced for any other cluster, not even cluster 2. 
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Figure 19.  Impossibility to excecute as a ground for refusal in cluster 1  
 
 
Immunity or privilege under national law 
 
The fifth substantive ground for refusal or non-execution is the presence of 
immunity or privilege under national law. Art.13, 1, d EEW, as Art. 7, 1, (b) of the 
2003 Freezing Order, has explicitely introduced as a non-execution ground the 
circumstance where there is an immunity or privilege under the law of the 
executing member state which makes it impossible to execute the EEW or 
respectively freezing order. Even if there is no common definition of what 
constitutes an immunity or privilege in the EU and the precise definition of these 
terms is therefore left to national law, it is important to remember that the 
introduction of this ground for refusal or non-execution is a step backwards, 
compared to traditional MLA, and should therefore, from an MR perspective, 
definitely not be rolled out over the entirety of MLA. On the contrary, the project 
team proposes its deletion even for the sphere of the EEW (cluster 1) and the 
freezing of evidence. The reason is simple: progress in MLA is incompatible with 
the introduction of new non-MR-based grounds for refusal or non-execution. 
Moreover, it should be recalled that the insertion in the EEW and the 2003 
Freezing Order of ‘immunity or privilege under national law’ as a ground for 
non-execution is the mere result of mainstream copying through of non-
execution grounds from the EAW, erroneously considered to be the archetypical 
standard to which all later MR instruments must be modelled. It is relevant here 
to also recall that the ground for non-execution concerned has been inserted in 
the EAW (it was inexistent in former extradition law) during the December 2001 
negotiations on the instrument for the sole reason of convincing Italy (which did 
not want to run the risk that Italians under a national (political) immunity or 
MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES 
 
 
78 
 
privilege would become surrenderable under the EAW, Italy not having ratified 
the 1996 EU Extradition Convention38, which, in the relationship between the 
other then member states had already introduced the principle of extradition of 
own nationals) and thus reaching unanimous support for adoption of the EAW. 
Whilst it should already be pitied that this was the price to be paid for reaching 
consensus at the level of the JHA Council on the EAW, there was clearly no good 
reason to simply copy the ground for non-execution into the sphere of MLA by 
introducing it in the EEW or the Freezing Order, for the effect of execution 
would not come close to surrender, as in the case of the EAW.  
Surprisingly, when tested for the clusters 1, 3 and 5, as shown below, there is 
significant support among member states for keeping (cluster 1) or even 
introducing (clusters 3 and 5) the ground for non-execution concerned. 
Notwithstanding this empirical result, the project team strongly suggests 
redeliberation on the issue, for objectively it would be a step backwards to keep 
or further introduce the ground for non-execution throughout future (MR based) 
MLA.  
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Figure 20. Immunity or privilege under national law as a ground for refusal in clusters 1, 3 
and 5 
 
                                                             
38 "Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, of 27 
September 1996 relating to Extradition between the Member States of the European Union." OJ 
C 313 of 23.10.1996. 
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(Extra)territoriality principle 
 
The sixth substantive ground for refusal or non-execution is the 
(extra)territoriality principle. Art 13, 1, f EEW states that recognition or execution 
of an EEW may be refused in the executing state if the EEW relates to criminal 
offences which: (i) under the law of the executing state are regarded as having 
been committed wholly or for a major or essential part within its territory, or in a 
place equivalent to its territory; or (ii) were committed outside the territory of 
the requesting state, and the law of the executing state does not permit legal 
proceedings to be taken in respect of such offences where they are committed 
outside that state’s territory.  
This ground for non-execution ground has equally been copied from the 
EAW. In extradition law, this refusal ground has always taken a prominent 
place. However, copying it into an MLA instrument seems a mistake, and is 
regrettable. Extradition and surrender law cannot be simply assimilated with 
MLA. The project team therefore opposes introduction of it in in future (MR 
based) MLA instruments, and deletion of it even for cluster 1 (EEW). When 
asked to what extent they used or felt should be able to use the 
(extra)territoriality rule as a refusal or non-execution ground for the coercive or 
intrusive measures of clusters 1, 3 and 5, only a small fraction of member states 
answered affirmatively. This strengthens the call for non-introduction of this 
non-execution ground in the spehere of MLA and for disposing of it for the 
EEW. 
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Figure 21. (Extra)territoriality principle as a ground for refusal in clusters 1, 3 and 5 
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Essential national security, classified information and ordre public  
 
The seventh substantive ground for refusal or non-execution is the essential 
national security, classified information and ordre public. As a general provision, the 
ECMA states in Art. 2, (b) that assistance may be refused if the requested party 
considers that execution of the request is likely to prejudice the sovereignity, 
security, ordre public or other essential interests of its country. Neither in the EU 
MLA Convention, in the 2001 Protocol to it or in the 2003 Freezing Order, this 
traditional ordre public refusal ground has been reduced in scope. 
In the EEW, it has been successfully reduced in scope, and moreover 
finetuned in relevance to documents and data in particular. Art. 13, 1, g EEW 
stipulates that if, in a specific case, the execution of an EEW would harm 
essential national security interests, jeopardise the source of the information or 
involve the use of classified information relating to specific intelligence 
activities, recognition or execution of the EEW may be refused in the executing 
state. According to the preamble to the EEW, however, it is accepted that such 
ground for non-execution may be invoked only where, and to the extent that, the 
objects, documents or data would for those reasons neither be used as evidence 
in a similar domestic case. Through the latter interpretation, the traditional ordre 
public exception has lost the traditional inter-state dimension it has always had 
in judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The new rationale seems to lay in the 
protection of national security interests and (classified) (state) intelligence 
against interference or unwanted disclosure through criminal investigations 
(irrespective whether these are domestic or foreign investigations), and no 
longer against other member states as such. The project team considers this as 
genuine progress, and theoretically supports extending such reduction 
throughout future (MR based) MLA between the member states, i.e. for all 
clusters. 
That is why, alongside with assessing continued support for the traditional 
orde public exception in clusters 3-6 (not for cluster 1, the reduced formula having 
been introduced there, nor for cluster 2, which will likely follow the EEW 
regime), the relevance of the reduced national interest formula as embedded in 
the EEW has been tested for all clusters (i.e. 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6). 
As shown immediately hereafter, member state support for keeping the 
traditional ordre public exception in place for clusters 3-6, is total. 
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Figure 22. Ordre public as a ground for refusal in clusters 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
 
As explained before, and notwithstanding the empirical results shown above, 
the project team sees no reason for keeping the traditional orde public exception 
in place, as apparently the member states have already generically agreed to a 
more limited approach along the lines of the EEW formulation of it. Support for 
the new formula, as shown below, varies from 80% (clusters 3-6) to 90%, the 
potential of which to replace the traditional ordre public exception is thereby 
convincingly proven. 
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Figure 23. Classified information as a ground for refusal in clusters 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
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If it would be felt that the latter suggestion, i.e. to generically reduce the ordre 
public exception to a national interest exception (EEW style) that could be 
invoked only where it would also be invoked in a mere domestic context, would 
not be feasible after all (which the project team would find illogical), its is 
suggested to at least consider reducing it in the sense of the Dutch-German 
‘Wittem’ Convention of 30 August 1979, concluded to supplement the ECMA.39 
According to Art. III. 2 of this Convention, MLA in the cases of Art. 2, (b) of the 
ECMA, is granted ‘if possible, imposing conditions, if this can avoid affecting the 
interests of the requested state’. Such provision entails an obligation to make this 
effort with regard to the requested/executing member state, to try and find a 
solution, which also complies with the wishes of the requesting/issuing member 
state, even in those cases in which guaranteeing its essential interests is at stake. 
It would definitely render MLA between the member states more effective.  
 
Political offences 
 
The eigth substantive ground for refusal or non-execution are the political 
offences. The possibility to refuse cooperation referring to the political offence 
exception has for long held an important position in cooperation instruments. 
Today this position cannot be maintained any longer for two main raisons. First, 
for reasons of internal consistency in the legislative framework it is advised to 
ban the political offence exception altogether. Second it should be noted that 
calling upon the political offence exception is a clear sign of distrust with regard 
to the requesting member state, which is odd having explicitly expressed 
confidence in the structure and operation of the legal systems of the other 
member states and confidence in the capacity of all the member states to ensure 
just legal procedures in the preamble to the TEU. The following paragraphs will 
clarify the rationale underlying this twofold argumentation. 
First, the political offence exception can nolonger be maintained for reasons 
of internal consistency. Traditionally, extradition provisions were more strict 
then less invasive MLA provisions. Therefore, traditionally, the political offence 
exception was a mandatory ground for refusal in extradition treaties, where it 
was only an optional ground for refusal in MLA. Therefore it is no surprice that 
Art. 2 (a) ECMA stipulates that legal assistance can be refused if the request 
relates to criminal acts which are considered by the requested party to be a 
political offence, or an act related to such an offence.  
The strict application of the political offence exception in extradition law was 
left in 1996. In light of the common commitment to prevent and combat 
terrorism, the EU Extradition Convention prescribed as a general principle that 
                                                             
39 "Overeenkomst tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de Bondsrepubliek Duitsland 
betreffende de aanvulling en het vergemakkelijken van de toepassing van het Europees 
Verdrag betreffende uitlevering van 13 december 1957." Wittem 30.8.1979. 
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for the purposes of applying the EU Extradition Convention, no offence may be 
regarded by the requested member state as a political offence, as an offence 
connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives. 
However, the provision concerned continued and in doing so eroded that 
general principle, by allowing member states to declare only to apply the general 
rule with regard to terrorist offences. In practice extradition could no longer be 
refused for terrorist offences, which constituted a significant simplification of the 
regime. Considering that MLA is traditionally more lenient and less strict in the 
application of refusal grounds, it would only have been logical that in the EU 
MLA Convention the possibility to use the political offence exception as a refusal 
ground in MLA would have been reduced to the same extent. It was not until 
the adoption of the 2001 Protocol thereto, that the restriction inscribed in the 
1996 EU Extradition Convention found its way into MLA. 
Meanwhile, the provisions with regard to extradition have been replaced by 
the regime installed by the EAW. Intrestingly, in the EAW, the political offence 
exception has been banned altogether, without any form of clarification. Again 
referring to the traditionally more lenient cooperation for MLA, it is only logical 
that such general abolition is copied into the MLA regime. 
Second, calling upon the political offence exception is a sign of distrust with 
regard to the requesting/issuing member state, so that it seems virtually out of 
the question that the possibility of refusal will be used in the EU. 
Even though logically the chances for the ground for refusal for political 
offences to be called upon in (MR based) MLA between the member states are 
expected to be minimal, still a surprising 70-80% of the member states have 
indicated continued support for the exception (clusters 3-6; for clusters 1-2, the 
question was not raised, as the member states have already accepted abolition of 
the exception in the EEW sphere (cluster 1), and should logically be willing to 
also do so for cluster 2). It seems to the project team that member states’ 
positions lack behind reality itself, for they have accepted abolition of the 
exception altogether for extradition/surrender law and the EEW sphere already. 
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Figure 24. Political offences as a ground for refusal in clusters 3, 4, 5 and 6 
 
 
Fiscal offences 
 
The nineth and final substantive ground for refusal or non-execution is the 
fiscal offence exception. Given that support for a continued double criminality rule 
in the clusters 1, 2, 3 and 5 is low, and that at least it can be recommended to 
reduce the relvance of that rule to other than the 32 MR offences, it seems clear 
that the fiscal offence exception, which has already been drastically reduced in 
scope in the 2001 EU MLA Protocol, (acquis that has been copied into Art. 14, 3, 2 
EEW, combined with a restriction to (house)search and seizure for other offences 
than the 32 MR offences), has no real future any more. At least, its reduction 
along the lines of the EEW can be recommended throughout future (MR based) 
MLA between the member states. As shown below, however, 60% (clusters 4-6) 
to 70% (cluster 3) of the member states do no longer insist that there be a fiscal 
offence exception altogether.  
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Figure 25.  Fiscal offences as a ground for refusal in clusters 3, 4, 5 and 6 
 
 
Capacity refusal or non-execution grounds 
As already explained above, the potential implications in terms of 
operational or financial capacity for the executing member state in executing 
under a stringent MR regime investigative measures that currently lack an 
explicit regulation (clusters 6 and 5, comprising a.o. special investigative 
measures) may be very substantial. The project team has therefore chosen to not 
only test the position of member states vis-à-vis the (revised) traditional grounds 
for refusal or non-execution (supra), but also to check the preparedness of 
member states to accept semi-mandatory execution of the measures under 
clusters 5 en 6 irrespective of their potential financial and operational capacity 
impact. Given that currently (in the EU MLA Convention) for two measures 
comprised in cluster 3, i.e. the interception of telecommunications and the video 
conference hearing, there is a reverse financial cost regulation in place (shifting 
the financial burden towards the requesting member state), the project team has 
chosen to revisit cluster 3 measures from the same perspective, in order to see 
whether member states in the mean time would be willing to step away from the 
reverse financial cost regulation, or – alternatively – would be in for a new 
financial regulation for considerable-cost measures. 
Financial respectively operational capacity refusal or non-recognition grounds 
pass in review hereafter. 
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Financial capacity as a ground for refusal or non-execution 
 
Firstly, financial capacity as a ground for refusal or non-execution is 
analysed. None of the current MLA instruments explicitly provide for a general 
refusal ground for reasons of financial capacity. Still, reference to the 2001 
ECMA Protocol and to EU MLA Convention is relevant. Art. 5 ECMA Second 
Protocol states that parties shall not claim from each other the refund of any 
costs resulting from the application of the ECMA or its Protocols. The article 
further provides for some specific exceptions to the general rule of ‘the executing 
member state pays’. Particularly noteworthy as an exception to the general rule 
is that costs of substantial or extraordinary nature in the execution of requests 
for MLA may be claimed back. In the EU MLA Convention reference is made to 
financial capacity and financial implications of MLA in two specific articles, 
relating respectively to refunding (which may be waived) of certain costs that 
the execution of requests for hearings by video conference can entail (Article 10, 
7) and the mandatory payment by the requesting member state of 
telecommunication interception costs (Article 21).  
Another relevant example of an EU judicial cooperation instrument – be it 
from the non-MLA sphere – that pays attention to the financial implications of 
executing requests is the 2006 framework decision on the application of the 
principle of MR to confiscation orders.40 Its purpose is to establish the rules 
under which a member state shall recognize and execute confiscation orders, 
issued by a criminal court of another member state, in its territory. The most 
interesting article for the analysis of monetary consequences of the execution of 
MLA requests or orders, is Article 16 of the MR instrument. It has introduced the 
splitting of revenues from the execution of confiscation orders surpassing the 
amount of 10.000 EUR on a 50/50 basis between executing and requesting 
member state. Only if the revenues are not very significant, i.e. below or 
equivalent to 10.000 EUR, they will accrue to the executing member state, as in 
traditional scenario’s of transfer of execution of confiscation. This article may not 
seem directly relevant for the analysis of financial issues that executing requests 
or orders for investigative measures can entail. However, the possibility of 
broadening the new approach embedded in the confiscation framework decision 
as to the 50/50 division of profits to a possible future 50/50 division of substantial 
costs in executing MLA requests or orders, deserves further reflection and has 
teherfore been implictely integrated in the questionnaire by the project team. 
As a preliminary question, member states were asked if they felt that 
requests for investigative measures under clusters 3, 5 and 6 are refused or 
should be able to be refused when it is felt that the implications of their 
                                                             
40 Council of the European Union (2006). "Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 
on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders." OJ L 328 of 
24.11.2006. 
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execution in terms of financial capacity or resources is or would be substantial or 
extraordinary. Half of the member states did not consider this an option. The 
other half did. Member state reality clearly contrasts here with the standpoint 
taken by the Eurojust College, i.e. that MLA should not be refused solely on the 
basis that the execution of a request would have substantial implications as to 
financial resources. Member states were further asked if, provided they would 
refuse execution of requests for financial reasons, they would execute the request 
anyway if the costs would be fully refunded by the requesting/issuing member 
state. Almost none of the member states claimed that this would make any 
difference to them. However, as a follow-up question and relating to the analysis 
made above relating to the 2006 MR of confiscation framework decision, 
member states were asked if they would be willing to execute the request 
anyway if a fair share, for example at a 50/50 rate, would be borne by the 
requesting/issuing member state. The results of the answers provided are 
spectacular to say the least. For cluster 3 measures, 50% out of 60% of member 
states that claimed that they would refuse execution of requests for financial 
reasons, would accept executing it anyway if a fair share (e.g. 50%) was paid or 
refunded by the requesting/issuing member state. For cluster 5 measures, all 
member states would accept this. A slightly lower but still very significant 
number of member states would be willing to accept this for cluster 6 measures. 
These results are significant for the debate on a possible future policy option to 
introduce a 50/50 sharing of costs made in the execution of (MR based) MLA 
requests or orders, as an agreed fall-back position in case where the financial 
consequences of executing a request or order would be substantial or 
extraordinary, in that the cost involved would surpass an amount of e.g. 10.000 
EUR (which the project team suggests to copy from the 2006 MR of confiscations 
framework decision, thus introducing a consistent mirroring regime in the 
sphere of (MR based) future MLA between the member states). Wholly in line 
with the recommendation of the Eurojust College, i.e. that the principle that the 
execution of requests for MLA will not entail refunding of expenses, must be 
maintained, the traditional system could remain in place for all MLA the 
execution cost of which would be unsubstantial or non-extraordinary (e.g. not 
higher than 10.000 EUR). 
Asked for both of the above questions whether it would make an additional 
positive difference for them in increasing their willingness to execute requests or 
orders anyway if it would relate to any of the 32 MR offences, the member states’ 
positions only marginally changed in a positive fashion. 
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Figure 26. Financial capacity as a ground for refusal in cluster 3 
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Figure 27. Financial capacity as a ground for refusal in cluster 5 
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Figure 28. Financial capacity as a ground for refusal in cluster 6 
 
 
 
 
Operational capacity as a ground for refusal or non-execution 
 
Secondly, operational capacity as a ground for refusal or non-execution is 
analysed. The executing member state might feel that the implications of the 
execution of a request or order in terms of operational capacity or resources 
would be too heavy and thus hamper the proper functioning of the executing 
member state’s own criminal justice system. For example, it is very likely that 
extensive requests may require a lot of working hours from authorities in the 
requested/excecuting member state and that the latter considers that the impact 
on the domestic workload is disproportionally heavy or that other priority 
domestic cases would be jeopardised. The project team therefore assessed to 
what extent member states were likely to refuse the execution of requests for 
operational reasons, or if they felt that refusal for these reasons should be 
MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES 
 
 
91 
 
possible. Also, it was tested to what extent member states would consider it a 
good future EU policy option to require the measures to be taken anyway if the 
measures related in any way to any of the 32 MR offences. As the EEW does not 
offer the possibility to refuse an order for operational reasons (member states are 
likely to have the technical capacity to execute EEW’s for the measures under its 
scope), and in order to maintain the logic with questions reaised concerning 
financial capacity issues, the questions were only asked in relation to measures 
under clusters 3 and 5. The large majority of member states indicated that 
irrespective of the cluster, lack of operational capacity would and should not 
count as a refusal or non-execution ground. Whilst this may come as a 
surprising outcome at first sight, especially given the capacity-intensive nature 
of certain measures under clusters 3 and 5, member states are apparently willing 
to execute such requests notwithstanding their potentially significant 
operational capacity impact because of the likely serious nature of the offences 
for which they would logically be most required.  
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Figure 29. Operational capacity as a refusal ground in clusters 3 and 5 
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3.2.2 Strict reply and execution deadlines 
Besides the reduction of grounds for refusal and non-execution, the enhanced 
stringency in cooperation also implies respecting strict reply and execution 
deadlines. Of vital importance for the safeguarding of evidence, be it under 
traditional MLA or under MR, is that requests or orders are replied to in a timely 
fashion and swiftly executed. Time limits are necessary to ensure quick, effective 
and consistent cooperation on obtaining objects, documents or data and other 
types of evidence for use in proceedings in criminal matters throughout the EU. 
The EU MLA Convention requires in Art. 4, 2 that the requested member 
state has to execute a request for assistance as soon as possible, taking as full 
account as possible of the procedural deadlines and other deadlines indicated by 
the requesting member state. In doing so the member states recognize that in 
certain cases it is crucial for an MLA request to be dealt with within a specific 
and strict time frame. Furthermore, if the requesting member state authority 
considers it necessary to have the request executed before a certain date, it may 
state so in the request, provided it states relevant reasons for it. It is in the 
interests of all member states that the possibility of setting deadlines is not to be 
abused. Hence, when setting a time limit to the execution of a request, member 
states should only specify a deadline which is reasonable or necessary under the 
particular circumstances of the case. Art. 4, 4 EU MLA Convention further refers 
to the arrangements to be adopted if a deadline cannot be complied with by the 
requested/executing member state. The latter must indicate as quickly as 
possible the estimated time that will be required to execute the request. The 
requesting member state must respond without delay indicating whether the 
request should continue to be processed. In addition, the text allows the 
authorities of both member states to agree as to how the matter should be taken 
forward. Mention should also be made of the Joint Action on Good Practice in 
MLA41, basically promoting analogue practice.  
As a possible introduction of the MR concept must turn traditional MLA into 
a more reliable mechanism, including from a speediness perspective, it would be 
mandatory for requests and orders to be replied to and effectively executed 
within strict deadlines. Such timing principles have been laid down – as in all 
MR based instruments – in both the 2003 Freezing Order and the EEW, Art. 15 of 
the latter requiring orders to be answered to within 30 days, and the objects, 
documents or data concerned to be effectively obtained within 60 days. If the 
deadline for execution cannot be complied with, the requested/executing 
member state must inform the issuing member state thereof and also indicate 
what the timeframe for effective execution will be.  
                                                             
41 Council of the European Union (1998). "Joint Action of 29 June 1998 on Good Practice in 
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters." OJ L 191 of 7.7.1998. 
MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES 
 
 
93 
 
The project team has chosen not to ask member states what deadlines they 
thought would be appropriate for replying to a request or order. On the basis of 
the EEW and other MR based instruments it could easily be set at e.g. 30 days, 
being the time limit then for either agreeing to execution, refusing it or asking 
for postponement of effective execution of the request or order. 
Questioned about deadlines relating to effective execution of requests, 
irrespective of the clusters, approximately half of the member states require the 
requested/executing member state to execute the measure concerned within a 
provided deadline.  
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Requirement of execution 
within a provided deadline 
yes
no
 
Figure 30. Requirement of execution within a provided deadline  
 
 
For clusters 3, 4 and 5, most responding member states feel that when they 
do not provide a deadline for execution, the requested/executing member state 
satisfactorily rapidly executes the the request. For cluster 6 measures, member 
states are relatively less content with the speed in executing measures for which 
no execution deadline has been provided. When deadlines are provided by the 
member states for cluster 3, 4 and 5 measures, approximately half of them claim 
that these are often not respected by the requested/executing member state. For 
cluster 6 measures, the satisfaction rate is slightly higher. 
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Figure 31. Satisfaction with execution with and without the provision of a specific deadline 
 
 
Here, the project team inclines to share the standpoint taken by the Eurojust 
College, i.e that, whilst recognising that it may be difficult to set a general 
deadline for the execution of requests for the taking of evidence, such requests 
should be executed as quickly as possible, and preferably within a 60 day term, 
with a possible extension for another 30 days in case postponement would be 
requested.  
The importance of postponement possibilities was tested seperately. As 
described when elaborating on operational capacity as a refusal or non-
execution ground, execution of a foreign order/request/warrant may have 
significant implications for the executing member state. Interestingly however, 
40% (up to 50% for clusters 5 and 6) of the member states indicate they would 
not postpone execution, even if such execution would have a significant impact 
on routine domestic workload or other domestic priorities and even if such 
execution entails the risk of hampering the fluent functioning of their own 
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criminal justice system. It is particularly encouraging to see that member states 
show this kind of willingness to cooperate, and that this willingness increases 
with an additional 10% for investigative measures currently not explicitly 
regulated. This increase might seem surprising considering the intrusive 
character of those not explicitly regulated measures (especially those of cluster 
5), but can be explained referring to the type of cases these measures are likely to 
be asked for. In high profile cases involving serious crime, member states are 
even more willing to cooperate. 
Member states that did indicate to use the possibility to postpone execution 
of a foreign order/request/warrant indicate that they are still willing to start 
execution within a reasonable deadline provided by the issuing/requesting 
member state. Irrespective of the nature of the investigative measure, 60% of the 
member states indicate it is reasonable to execute within 45 days. The remaining 
40% indicate it is reasonable to execute within 60 days. 
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Figure 32. Reasonable deadline to execute investigative measures 
 
Finally, the questionnaire also tested whether it would be an acceptable 
future policy option to require execution within the deadline provided for by the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state if the request/order/warrant relates to 
acts/offences included in the 32 MR offences. The use of the list in this context 
does not provide significant added value. Only 10% of the member states who 
want to be able to postpone execution where it is felt that implications of 
immediate execution would impact too heavily on operational capacity, are 
willing to waive the postponement possibility if the order/request/warrant 
relates to any of the 32 MR offences. 
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Figure 33. Operational capacity as a ground for postponement 
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3.3 Accepting and executing orders 
As indicated when clarifying the structure of this section, introducing MR 
characteristics in MLA applications will cause tension with regard to the law 
applicable to the execution of investigative measures. Traditional MR foresees 
execution in the manner provided for by the national law of the executing 
member state (locus regit actum), whereas MLA application require at least the 
taking into account of expressly indicated procedural requirements and 
formalities by the requesting/issuing authority/member state to ensure 
admissibility in future criminal proceedings (forum regit actum). 
This distinction is of course closely linked to the functions and finality of MR 
and MLA. In MLA, the central and overall most important member state is the 
requesting member state. The requesting member state is the lead state in that 
the criminal proceedings and prosecution are intended to be held in that 
member state. Other member states are only involved to the extent the lead 
member state is in need of assistance. An MLA request aims at gathering 
information/evidence to be used in the course of the criminal proceedings in that 
lead member state. Because the results of the MLA-request return to the 
requesting/lead member state, it is important to take expressly indicated 
procedural requirements and formalities into account. 
By contrast, MR does not have such a clear lead member state, because a 
caesura is made between the issuing and the executing member state. The 
executing member state accepts the judicial decision as if it was handed down by 
its own authorities. Execution therefore takes place in conformity with the law of 
the executing member state, which is only logicall considering it is to execute the 
foreign decision as if it was its own.  
Because of this tension between execution in an MLA or MR philosophy, it is 
crucial to test to what extend a future more MR-based MLA is acceptable. 
This section deals with the general willingness of member states to accept the 
validity of judicial decisions taken in the issuing member state and step away 
from the traditional MR locus regit actum regime. Furthermore the position of 
member states with respect to consistency problems is analysed. Finally, 
compliance with expressly indicated formalities is put to the test. 
 
3.3.1 Accepting the validity of judicial decisions taken in the 
issuing member state 
Traditional MLA between the member states does not require the requesting 
member state to domestically take either an internal decision or issue an 
order/warrant for the investigative measure in the MLA request. Neither is the 
granting of traditional MLA by the requested member state dependent on proof 
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that the measure requested could be taken by the requested member state in a 
similar case on the territory and under the law and procedures of the latter. The 
only formal condition incumbant upon the requesting member state for being 
allowed to request the ‘widest possible measure of mutual assistance’, is to have 
jurisdiction at the time the MLA request is made for the offences the proceedings 
to which request relates (Art. 1, 1 ECMA), irrespective whether the offences 
concerned are administrative offences (in either one of the states concerned) or 
constitute offences or infringements for which a legal person may be held liable 
in the requesting member state (as extended by Art. 3 EU MLA Convention). 
The sole exceptions to this traditional stand have only been recently 
introduced, i.e. by the EU MLA Convention for interception of 
telecommunications and by the Prüm Convention for collecting and examining 
cellular material and supplying the DNA profile obtained. According to Art. 18, 
3, b) and 20, 3, b) EU MLA Convention, the requesting respectively intercepting 
member state must provide the requested respectively notified member state a 
confirmation ‘that a lawful interception order has been issued’ in connection 
with a criminal investigation. According to Art. 7, (3) Prüm42, the requesting 
contracting party must ‘produce an investigation warrant or statement issued by 
the competent authority, as required under that contracting party’s law, 
showing that the requirements for collecting and examining cellular material 
would be fulfilled if the individuals concerned were present within the 
requesting contracting party’s territory’. 
When considering to base the entirety of MLA between the EU member 
states as much as possible on a MR-based footing, as in the EEW framework 
decision, instead of keeping a dual-track system in place, the question of course 
arises as to whether this implies that the investigative measures the execution of 
which is sought by the issuing member state, must first have been domestically 
decided or ordered, as currently in case of requests for interception of 
telecommunications or DNA collection, examination and supply, or not, as 
currently for any other MLA request. In this respect, one could be tempted to 
believe that the choice between both scenario’s basically comes down to the 
choice between a warrant-like MR system (based on execution of standardized 
European warrants directly issued internationally by domestic authorities in the 
issuing member state, like in the case of the EAW or the EEW) and a MR system 
based on international execution of domestic decisions or orders of the issuing 
member state, provided they are sent to the executing member state together 
with a standardised certificate (like in the case of all other MR-based 
                                                             
42 "Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Republic of Austria on the stepping up of cross border 
cooperation,particularly in combating terrorism, cross border crime and illegal migration (Prüm 
Convention)." 25.8.2005. 
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instruments, including the 2003 Freezing Order). The fragmentary introduction 
of MR in the domain of MLA – through the warrant-like EEW on the one hand 
and the domestic order and certificate-like Freezing Order on the other hand – 
would then not consistently show the way to go. However, the above 
classification of the EEW as a warrant-like instrument, and therefore at first sight 
not requiring a locus test in the issuing member state, is wholly misleading. 
Firstly, the issuing of an EAW, upon which the EEW has been archetypically 
modeled, does also require the issuing member state to deliver domestic 
‘evidence of an enforceable judgement, an arrest warrant or any other 
enforceable judicial decision having the same effect’ (Art. 8, 1, (c) EAW), and 
hence has in common with all domestic order & certificate-like MR instruments 
that the measure the execution of which is sought, must first have been 
domestically decided or ordered in the issuing member state. Secondly, even 
where the EEW does not require the latter, Art. 7, b) EEW imposes comparable 
self-restraint on the issuing member state, in that an EEW should not be issued 
unless the objects, documents or data could be obtained under its (domestic) law 
in a comparable case if they were available on its territory, even though different 
procedural measures might be used. The lesson learned seems to be that all MR-
based instruments that so far have been designed, prevent a decision or measure 
to be excuted abroad unless it has first been taken or ordered domestically or – 
mutatis mutandis – could have been taken or ordered in a similar or comparable 
domestic case, in due conformity with the national law and procedures of the 
issuing member state. Given that the very essence of the MR principle lays 
precisely in the expectation that member states will trust one another sufficiently 
to mutually recognise each others judicial decisions in criminal matters, as if it 
were their own, this is no more than logical. Consequently, the question at hand 
when considering to base the entirety of MLA between the EU member states as 
much as possible on a MR-based footing, is not whether that should be via a 
warrant-like or a domestic order and certificate-like instrument. The only and 
real question is whether the EEW – which apparently is the only MR instrument 
under which the actual taking or existence of a domestic decision in the issuing 
member state must not be evidenced vis-à-vis the executing member state as a 
precondition for its execution by the latter – can or must serve as a model for 
reorienting MLA towards MR, if that were to be decided. 
The answer is negative, for the EEW (cluster 1) is extremely atypical in what 
it envisages, compared to traditional MLA requests (clusters 2-5). Whereas MLA 
essentially is a vehicle for requesting investigative measures or the transfer of 
precise objects, documents or data, the issuing of an EEW envisages a result, i.e. 
obtaining certain objects, documents or data, leaving it to the executing member 
state to take any investigative measures that it domestically may need to deploy 
(including, if necessary, search of premises and seizure) to that end. For it is not 
clear which investigative measures the executing member state will need to 
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deploy in order to obtain the evidence sought, the EEW – even if categorized as a 
typical MR instrument – actually is no such instrument stricto sensu. For the 
bunch of MLA not covered by the EEW (comprised in clusters 2-5) the situation 
is different, in that it truly relates to the taking of investigative measures or to 
the transfer of objects, documents or data. It is heardly imagineable that a future 
EU MR-based system would envisage altering this situation, by allowing the 
issuing of e.g. ‘find the truth’ warrants, ‘get incriminating testimony’ warrants or 
the like by the issuing member state, instead of the latter spelling out which 
concrete measures or procedural steps it seeks the execution of in the executing 
member state. Consequently, only a single question remains: should it be 
required from the issuing member state to always first order these measures or 
take these steps in accordance with its domestic law and procedures. The answer 
is obviously no. For a vast majority of measures or procedural steps, it would 
not even be possible to have them formally decided or ordered, especially in the 
phase of preliminary (police) investigations. Even where the measures 
concerned would require a formal domestic decision if they would need to be 
taken on the territory of the issuing member state itself, it would largely undo 
the flexibility that characterizes current MLA if each time the taking of the 
measures concerned would need to be formally decided domestically – and 
embedded in a formilised decison eligible for recognition by the executing 
member state as if it were its own decision. Consequently, the philosophy 
underlying Art. 7, b) EEW, i.e. that the issuing member state should not seek the 
MR-based execution of investigative measures that it would not be able to take 
in a similar or comparable domestic case with due respect for its national law 
and procedures, must be the generic point of departure for any reorganisation of 
the remaing part of MLA between the members states. Only to the extent that 
member states do not have sufficient trust in one another to suffice with self-
declared observance potentialis by the issuing member state of its domestic law 
and procedures in issuing investigation orders or warrants, it seems acceptable 
to require the issuing member state to actually deliver proof of the taking of a 
domestic decision or the issuing of a domestic order or warrant to the envisaged 
effect, as under current MLA for interception of telecommunications or DNA 
collection, examination and supply. Whether, even for far-reaching coercive or 
intrusive measures included in cluster 3 and – a fortiori – under cluster 5 – such 
distrust level is to be maintained when a roll-out of MR is envisaged, seems to be 
the only real question left. 
Therefore, member states have been asked for their position on the matter. 
The results – as shown below – are inconclusive. For measures under cluster 3, 
positions are dived on a 50/50 basis.  
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50%50%
Domestic decision, order or 
warrant as a precondition for 
execution in cluster 3
yes 
no
 
 
Figure 34. Domestic decision, order or warrant of the requesting/issuing member state as a 
precondition for its execution in cluster 3  
For measures under cluster 5, unregulated in current MLA and potentially 
even more coercive or intrusive in nature, the current distrust level mounts up to 
60%. It may suffice though to require the issuing member state to confirm or 
declare that the measure the execution of which is envisaged, could be taken in a 
similar or comparable national case to promote full trust and hence allow for its 
execution without prior evidence of any formal domestic decision/order/warrant 
to the same effect in the issuing member state. 
60%
40%
Domestic decision, order or 
warrant as a precondition for 
execution in cluster 5
yes 
no
 
Figure 35. Domestic decision, order or warrant of the requesting/issuing member state as a 
precondition for its execution in clusters 3 and 5 
 
 
MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES 
 
 
102 
 
3.3.2 Executing judicial decisions by the execution member state 
As clarified above, the execution of a traditional MLA request is considerably 
different from the execution of a traditional MR request. Whereas the result of an 
MLA request is intended to be used in criminal proceedings in the requested 
member state, execution of an MR order/warrant is not in such a way linked to 
the law of the issuing member state. Introducing MR features in MLA means as 
much as introducing a link with the law of the issuing member state in the 
execution of an MR order/warrant.  
Therefore, it needs to be tested whether member states remain willing to 
recognise foreign decisions as if they were their own and at the same time execute 
taking into account that they are foreign and thus taking into account expressly 
indicated procedural requirements and formalities by the issuing member state. 
The project team tested this willingness on three levels. First, compatibility 
issues were analysed. Member states were asked which position their own 
national law occupies, and whether execution needs to be fully in accordance 
with their national law. Second, consistency issues were analysed. Member 
states were asked how they deal with requests that require them to go beyond 
the limits of their own national law in that the request surpasses those limits e.g. 
ratione materiae. Third, member states were asked whether they stipulate 
conditions in terms of procedural requirements and formalities and whether 
those conditions are complied with. 
 
Compatibility issues 
Because of the importance of admissibility of the gathered evidence in the 
requesting/issuing member state, acceptance of forum regit actum linked to the 
willingness to step away from strict locus regit actum plays an essential role. 
Member states were asked which position their own national law occupies 
with respect to the execution of a request/order warrant (essential, 
complementary or subordinate) Additionally, member states could indicate 
what the current position of the persons concerned by the execution ofthe 
measures is. Finally it was tested whether there is support for the alternative of 
introducing minimum procedural standards for gathering information/evidence 
commonly agreed at EU level.  
 
Position of the national law 
 
For clusters 3 and 5, only 20% of the member states indicated that their own 
national law plays an essential role and that execution is only possible where 
fully in accordance with/in the manner provided for in their national law (and 
procedures). For cluster 6 none of the member states indicated this strict locus 
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regit actum requirement. 10% of the member states give their own national law a 
complementary role in that execution can only take place under specific 
condition(s) which would have to be observed in a similar national case (e.g. 
compliance with certain formalities and procedures, purpose or use limitations 
etc). This 10% does not vary over the different clusters. 
Interestingly, 60% (cluster 3 and 5) upto 70% (cluster 6) of the member states 
indicate to be willing to accept forum regit actum. In doing so, national law of the 
executing member states is granted a subordinate position in that execution will 
be in compliance with the formalities and procedures expressly indicated by the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state provided that these are not contrary 
to the fundamental principles of their national law. These percentages are 
encouraging considering the importance of forum regit actum in MLA. The high 
score for cluster 6 confirms the hypothesis for this cluster that it is likely that 
member states would accept forum regit actum. 
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the executing member state 
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Figure 36. Compatibility of execution with the national law of the executing state 
 
Position of the persons concerned 
 
Additionally, member states could indicate what the current position of the 
persons concerned by the execution of the measure is. It was asked whether it is 
possible for the persons concerned to claim the specific procedural guarantees or 
rights that would accrue to him/her/them in the execution of the measure(s) in a 
similar case under their national law. Furthermore, the possibility of granting 
the best of both worlds regime was enlisted, asking member states whether 
execution would be possible only where the persons concerned can claim the 
specific procedural guarantees or rights that would accrue to him/her/them in 
the execution of the measure(s) in a similar case under either their national law 
or that of the requesting/issuing member state. The rationale for the inclusion of 
these options is the occurance of this possibility in Art. 10, 5, e EU MLA 
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Convention in the context of hearing by videoconference. For clusters 3 and 5 
none of the member states indicated the position of the persons concerned 
currently plays a role. For cluster 6, 10% of the member states indicated that the 
position of the persons concerned is currently taken into account.  
The current practice is contrasted by the support the inclusion of the position 
of the persons concerned as a future policy. Between 70 and 80% of the member 
states (depending on the clusters and on the scope of the rights that would be 
granted to the persons concerned) consider it to be an acceptable future policy.  
It should be clarified that the slight decrease in support for this future option 
for the measures included in cluster 6 does not necessarily mean member states 
are opposed to such a policy. This decrease might also be an indication that the 
member states feel less need for regulation and EU intervention for the measures 
included in this cluster. 
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Figure 37. position of the persons concerned by the execution of the measure 
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EU level minimum procedural standards 
 
Finally, it was tested whether there is support for the alternative of 
introducing minimum procedural standards for gathering information/evidence 
commonly agreed to at EU level. Linked to this question, member states were 
asked to indicate whether these minimum standards should be based on/derived 
from the ECHR/other common fundamental rights texts and the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence, to the extent available, or be of a higher or lower level. Whereas 
only 10% of the member states indicated to currently already apply this kind of 
regime, upto 70% consider the elaboration of such common minimum rules an 
acceptable future option, which for 90% of the member states should based 
on/derived from the ECHR/other common fundamental rights texts and the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to the extent available. Eurojust too considers that 
observance of minimum procedural standards is essential in the context of 
taking evidence, although non-observance of these standards will not necessarily 
render the evidence obtained inadmissible. 
 
Consistency issues 
Secondly it was assessed to what extend member states are willing to go 
beyond the limits of their own legal system. This section of the questionnaire 
links in with the possibility to require that the (execution of the) investigative 
measure is consistent with the law of the requested member state. It is 
regrettable that none of the legal instruments that include this possibility (e.g. 
Art. 51 SIC) clarify what this consistency test should look like. There are several 
possible issues that could fall within the scope of a consistency problem. 
Execution can be inconsistent with the law of the executing member state in 
that it surpasses the scope ratione auctoritatis because the requesting/issuing 
authority (or the authority having validated the request/order/warrant) is not a 
judge, a court, an investigating magistrate or a public prosecutor, whereas in a 
similar national case the measure(s) would need to be ordered or supervised by 
such an authority. This situation is explicitly described in Art. 11 EEW. The 
possibility is foreseen to refuse execution if the issuing authority is not a judge, a 
court, an investigating magistrate or a public prosecutor and the EEW has not 
been validated by one of those authorities in the issuing state. However, under 
the current regime member states can make a declaration that it is their general 
policy to require such validation in all cases where the issuing authority is not a 
judge, a court, an investigating magistrate or a public prosecutor and where the 
measures necessary to execute the EEW would have to be ordered or supervised 
by a judge, a court, an investigating magistrate or a public prosecutor under the 
law of the executing state in a similar domestic case. 
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Execution can also be inconsistent with the law of the executing member 
state in that it surpasses the scope ratione loci, ratione temporis or ratione personae 
(because the measure(s) can only be taken to a more limited category of 
persons). For the latter scope, the link with corporate criminal liability and the 
possibility to execute investigative measures is obvious. Furthermore, the 
possibility to execute an investigative measure can also be limited to a more 
narrow category of natural persons in terms of for example their age, procedural 
status and definition.  
This last aspect of the consistency issues was presented to the member states 
in the questionnaire. Analysis revealed that member states are very reluctant to 
proceed with the execution of an investigative measure if it surpasses the 
national scope ratione personae. 70% indicated that execution would not be 
possible in such cases. Only 30% is prepared to go ahead with this investigative 
measure albeit this percentage increases with 10% in cluster 5.  Again a similar 
conclusion can be drawn: because of the typology of the cases in which the more 
intrusive investigative measures included cluster 5, member states are more 
likely to proceed. 
30%
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Execution of an investigative measure surpassing 
the national scope ratione personae in cluster 3
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Execution of an investigative measure surpassing 
the national scope ratione personae in cluster 5
Yes
No
 
Figure 38. Execution of an investigative measure surpassing the national scope ratione 
personae in clusters 3 and 5 
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The final hypothesis developed by the project team in terms of issues related 
to inconsistency with national law, is linked to surpassing the scope ratione 
materiae, which is linked to the double criminality requirement. Initially, member 
states are not willing to execute if the order/warrant/request relates to acts which 
do not constitute offences in their national law. Having anticipated this outcome, 
the questionnaire made a distinction between a general ratione materiae issue and 
a ratione materiae issue linked to the 32 MR offences. As this list embodies the 
abandonment of the double criminality test, it is only logical for member states 
to be willing to cooperate if the acts concerned are included in 32 MR offences, 
regardless of criminalisation under the own national law. This hypothesis was 
confirmed by the results of the study in that 50% of the member states currently 
already applies this rule for cluster 3 and an additional 30% considers it a valid 
future policy option to abandon the possibility to make execution dependant on 
double criminality for cluster 3. With only few exceptions, the member states did 
not make a distinction in their responses according to the different clusters.  
The fact that 10% of the member states indicated to be more willing to 
cooperate for investigative measures in cluster 5 and thus indicated that the lack 
of double criminality would not constitute a hurdle for execution for 
investigative measures included in cluster 5 only confirms the hypothesis that 
even though not explicitly regulated, member states are largely willing to 
provide MLA even for these intrusive investigative measures in cluster 5, 
because of the high profile cases they are linked to. 
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Consistency issues in clusters 3 and 5 
 
These results undeniably proof that it is worth while looking into the added 
value an introduction of the 32 MR offences can have in the context of requests 
for which the execution is inconsistent with the law of the executing member 
state. 
 
Compliance with requested formalities 
Considering the importance of admissibility of the gathered information/ 
evidence in the course of criminal proceedings in the requesting/issuing member 
state, several instruments foresee the possibility to expressly indicate that the 
requested/ordered member state in the execution of the measure, should comply 
with certain formalities and procedures (e.g. compliance with certain formalities 
and procedures, purpose or use limitations etc).  
Art. 12 EEW proscribes that the executing authority shall comply with the 
formalities and procedures expressly indicated by the requesting authority 
unless otherwise provided, and provided that such formalities and procedures 
are not contrary to the fundamental principles of law of the executing state. 
Differently put and obvious in the light of the compulsory character of EEWs, 
executing member states are not only obliged to answer to the order/warrant, 
but equally have to respect additional formal or procedural requirements 
attached by the issuing state provided that the requirements are not contrary to 
the executing member states’ fundamental principles of law.  
Considering the importance for the admissibility of evidence, it is interesting 
to note that not all member states use this possibility. The percentage ranges 
from 50% in cluster 1 to 80% in cluster 6. This might indicate a great deal of trust 
in the legal systems of the executing member states.  
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Figure 39. Requesting formalities and the compliance thereto 
 
Furthermore it is equally encouraging that for clusters 1 and 4, member states 
indicated that their requests are rarely not complied with. In this respect, the 
Eurojust College indicated to be of the opinion that member states should not be 
obliged to comply with requests for the taking of evidence which go beyond the 
limits of their own law when coercive measures are necessary to exexute the 
request. Even though for the other clusters only 10% to 15% of the member states 
indicated that their requests are often not complied with, it is important to again 
underline the consequences thereof. Different from other MR applications, the 
end goal of mutual assistance is the obtaining of information/evidence to be used 
in the course of criminal proceedings in the issuing/requesting member state. 
Not complying with the formalities expressly indicated constitutes an important 
risk of gathering information/evidence, that will be inadmissible in the 
requesting/issuing member state. Efforts by the executing authority are totally 
useless. Therefore the importance of compliance with expressly indicated 
formalities cannot be underlined enough.  
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3.4 Horizontalisation of cooperation 
The fourth MR characteristic relates to the horizontalisation of cooperation. 
MR typically takes place between the authorities of the member states. This 
characteristic can also be found in MLA ever since the introduction of Art. 6,1 
EU MLA Convention.  
Direct communication between the authorities involved, has a significant 
influence on the speediness and ease of cooperation. In contract, communication 
via central authorities can be complex and cumbersome. Currently, 
communication via central authorities only takes place for two kinds of 
cooperation: first, for the transfer of persons held in custody and second for the 
exchange of criminal records information. Besides these two explicit exceptions, 
an additional option to derogate from the rule to communicate amongst 
authorities is foreseen in Art. 6, 2 EU MLA Convention. This article allows for a 
derogation of the general rule in special cases, without further clarifying what 
constitutes a special case.  
The project team has a twofold recommendation in this respect. First, it 
considers it advisable to eliminate the possiblity to derogate from the general 
rule. Second, only one exception should be maintained namely for the transfer of 
persons held in custody. The current exeption for the exchange of criminal 
records is no longer required. It should be noted that the exchange of criminal 
records information is now regulated via the ECRIS system43 – which will 
replace the current practice of exchanging criminal records information via 
central authorities.  
Consequently, direct communication and thus further horizontalisation of 
the cooperation environment impacts on the importance of institutional capacity 
at all autority levels within the member states. Regardless of the investments in 
EU support mechanisms in the past (EJN, Eurojust, fiches belges, judicial atlas, 
etc), further investment is vital to ensure that MLA becomes a well oiled 
machine. A reference to this discussion explains why questions related to 
institutional capacity were included in the questionnaire. This section deals with 
accepting requests issued in a foreign language and technical capacity issues 
judicial authorities are confronted with. 
 
3.4.1 Accepting requests issued in a foreign language  
In a Union which counts 27 members and 23 different languages, MLA and 
MR become empty concepts when member states do not have the institutional 
                                                             
43 Council of the European Union (2009). "Council Framework Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6 April 
2009 on the establishment of the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA." OJ L 93 of 7.4.2009. 
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capacity to make sure that all requests are understandable for all parties 
involved. Linguistic and translation facilities and staff are of undeniable 
importance. 
When member states send out requests in their very own language to other 
member states that do not have this language in common with the requesting 
member states, obvious problems arise. Member states cannot reasonably be 
expected to have the capacity to have interpretation and translation facilities 
available for the 23 languages of the European Union.  
The 2009 Green Paper on obtaining evidence in criminal matters from one member 
state to another and securing its admissibility44, aimed at identifying current 
difficulties with cross-border cooperation in criminal matters and at formulating 
future prospects and solutions for identified difficulties. The Green Paper 
stressed that it is important to examine whether it would be appropriate to 
supplement any existing or future instrument with non-legislative measures. 
These non-legislative masures, according to the Green Paper, could include 
initiatives aimed at raising awareness of the instrument(s) among practitioners, 
such as drafting guidelines or providing training to practitioners on their 
application. Possible future measures addressing language-issues certainly may 
be seen as falling under this scope of “non-legislative measures”. The following 
analysis will clarify why it is certainly useful to consider this aspect in the future.  
Art. 16 ECMA states that principally, translations of requests and annexed 
documents are not required. However, Art. 16.2 allows for member states to 
reserve the possibility of declaring to require that requests made to them be 
accompanied by a translation into their own language or in one of the official 
languages of the Council of Europe.  
Art. 6.2 EEW however requires EEW’s to be written in, or translated by the 
requesting state into, the official language or one of the official languages of the 
executing state. This is a significantly heavy obligation and it requires member 
states to have extensive linguistic institutional capacity such as for example 
qualified linguistic staff. Furthermore, the EEW instrument which is supposed to 
facilitate cross-border cooperation, in this respect is more demanding than 
previous MLA instruments, which is not desirable and certainly is incompatible 
with the principles and goals of MR. The executing state may also accept 
translations into other official EU languages by submitting a declaration to the 
General Secretariat of the Council.  
Member states were asked to what extent they had translations in English, 
French or German of their criminal code, their code of criminal procedure or 
(other) MLA and MR legislation available. The fact that German was included in 
this and in following questions, is that with the expansion of the EU, more 
                                                             
44 European Commission (2009). "Green Paper on obtaining evidence in criminal matters from 
one Member State to another and securing its admissibility." COM(2009) 624 final of 11.11.2009. 
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countries acceded that do not at all have any Francophone or Anglo-Saxon 
tradition but do have certain links with the Germanic tradition. When 
developing the questionnaire, both the project team and the EU Comission 
recognized the importance of including German next to French and English in 
the analyses of language issues.  
The relevance of the previously mentioned question lies in the fact that most 
request for MLA are accompanied by the corresponding extracts from the 
relevant legislation, applying to the circumstances of the case. Analysis revealed 
that as far as complete translated versions of relevant legislation are concerned, 
the general situation is that they are more available in member states in English 
than they are in French and German. A small fraction of member states does not 
have any kind of translations in English (20%) or French (10%) available. 
However, all of them have either full or partial German versions available. It is 
important to note in this respect that a possible explanation for this high 
availability of German translations may be that most member states to the 
questionnaire have strong links with Germany and the German language, be it 
historical, political or for other reasons.  
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Figure 40. Availibility of translations of MLA/MR legislation 
 
In future (MR based) MLA it should be an obligation to accept 
requests/orders in English. Therefore, it is worrying that 20% of the member 
states indicate not to have any translation into English. It is highly 
recommendable that all member states invest time, effort and resources in 
having at least partial translations of the most relevant passages of their criminal 
codes, their codes of criminal procedure or (other) MLA and MR legislation into 
English available.  
MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES 
 
 
113 
 
Furthermore, member states were asked to what extent they had technically 
and linguistically qualified staff available to deal with the translation and 
processing of incoming and outgoing requests for MLA. Additionally, the 
questionnaire wanted to assess the extent to which technical and legal basic and 
specialized foreign language training for staff was available. The general 
situation in the responding member states is that a sufficient number of qualified 
staff is indeed available. However, more member states responded that not 
enough basic and specialized language training opportunities are in place. The 
obvious but important recommendation in this respect is to invest more 
resources in much needed language training of staff.  
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Figure 41. Availability of staff and training 
 
Going further when examining language-related issues in relation to MLA, 
the questionnaire assessed member states’ general willingness to accept requests 
and orders they receive from other member states, written in one of three 
aforementioned languages. The results of this assessment are clear; Up to 90% of 
the member states accept requests and orders in English, while requests and 
orders in French and German are not accepted by 70% of the member states. This 
conclusion strengthens the position to make acceptance of incoming 
requests/orders in English an obligation. 
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Figure 42. Willingness to accept requests/orders in English, French and/or German 
 
The questionnaire also asked member states if proper translation and 
interpretation facilities were available to translate and interpret requests and 
orders from and into English, French, and/or German. English interpretation and 
translation facilities were most available in the responding member states, 
followed by German facilities and French facilities were in place the least. It is 
necessary to repeat that the most logical explanation for the German facilities’ 
upper hand on the French is the fact that many Germany-linked member states 
were among the responding member states. 
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Figure 43. Availibility of proper translation and interpretation facilities 
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3.4.2 Technical capacity 
As previously mentioned, the 2009 Green Paper on on obtaining evidence in 
criminal matters from one member state to another and securing its admissibility45, 
aimed at identifying current difficulties with cross-border cooperation in 
criminal matters and at formulating future prospects and solutions for identified 
difficulties. The Green Paper, among many other things, stressed that it is 
important to examine whether it would be appropriate to supplement any 
existing or future instrument with non-legislative measures. These non-
legislative masures, according to the Green Paper, could include initiatives 
aimed at raising awareness of the instrument(s) among practitioners, such as 
drafting guidelines or providing training to practitioners on their application. 
The issues relating to language-difficulties in cross-border cooperation in 
criminal matters have already been analysed above. Other non-legislative 
measures which could facilitate cross-border cooperation and which deserve 
analysis can be put under the term “technical capacity issues”. Just as difficulties 
arise when member states receive requests or orders for assistance in a language 
they do not understand, answering to requests or orders without having the 
technical capacity to do so is problematic. Even though technical issues do not 
have any sort of legal framework in MLA nor MR-instruments, the project team 
recognized the importance of the issue and included questions about technical 
issues in the questionnaire. The following analysis will clarify why it was useful 
and necessary to include this aspect in the analysis and why it is certainly useful 
to consider these issues in the future broadening of MLA and MR in the EU.  
It is of vital importance for the success of MLA to have the technical means 
and capacity to answer to incoming requests and send out own requests in a 
speedy and effective manner.  
To investigate the status questionis of technical capacity of member states to 
effectively process requests for MLA, a number of relevant questions there-to 
were asked in the questionnaire. More specifically, the extent to which certain 
technical and other facilitators for the fluent and speedy processing of requests 
and orders were available in responding member states was assessed.  
First, ICT equipment such as telephones, faxes, modem lines, e-mail, fast 
internet connectivity, etc. are either of high or medium-level availability to the 
responding member states. None of the member states claimed to have a low 
availability of such ICT-facilitators. 60% indicated high availability and the 
remaining 40% indicated a medium availability. 
When asked about the availability of technical means for video or telephone 
conferences including available measures for protection in such a context (such 
as audio/video distortion), there were as many member states claiming a high 
                                                             
45 Ibid. 
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availability thereof as member states claiming a low availability of such means 
(40% each). Only 20 of the member states claim medium-level availability. Art. 
10 and 11 EU MLA Convention specifically deal with this issue. 
According to the explanatory report of the EU MLA Convention, Art. 10 was 
designed to serve as a basis for and as a facilitator for the use of video 
conferencing to overcome difficulties that can arise in criminal cases when a 
person is in one member state and attendance at a hearing in a second member 
state is not desirable or possible. In particular, it lays down rules relating to 
requests for, and the conduct of, videoconference hearings. The article applies 
generally to hearings of experts and witnesses, but may, under particular 
conditions also be applied to hearings of accused persons. Where the relevant 
technical means are lacking, the requesting member state may, with the 
agreement of the requested member state, provide suitable equipment to permit 
the hearing to take place. 
Art. 11 EU MLA Convention deals specifically with the hearing of witnesses 
and experts by telephone conference. Such hearings can be particularly useful in 
situations where, for example, a statement on a routine matter is required from a 
witness. In addition they can be arranged and conducted quite easily and 
economically. Art. 11.3 obliges the requested member state to comply with a 
request provided it is not contrary to the fundamental principles of its law. It is 
noteworthy that no provision is included in this article about technical capacity 
of member states to conduct telephone conferences. The obvious explanation for 
this is that member states are of course considered as having the technical 
capacity to be able to execute requests for telephone conferences. 
When asked for the level of availability and quality of technical means 
required for special investigative measures such as interception, audio or video 
monitoring, etc. up to 70% of the member states reported only medium-level 
availability there-of. The importance of having the technical capacity to execute 
these kinds of measures is however is however not to be underestimated. In the 
last decade telecommunications technology has undergone considerable 
development, particularly in the field of mobile telecommunications. These are 
very widely used by offenders in the context of their criminal activities, 
especially in the field of cross-border crime. A considerable amount of attention 
has been paid especially to the interception of telecommunications in the EU 
MLA Convention, more specifically in Art. 17 to 22. This is not to place to offer a 
complete analysis of the extensive technical requirements and subsequent 
difficulties that arise in interceptions of telecommunications. It is however 
noteworthy that executing requests for interception of telecommunications is 
likely to face difficulties, be it in the execution of the request in a timely manner 
or in the execution of the request all together due to technical challenges. 
Furthermore, member states were asked about availability of and access to travel 
budgets for certain authorities to for example participate in joint investigation 
MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES 
 
 
117 
 
teams or to assist in the execution of requests abroad. Only 10% of the member 
states claimed that such budgets were highly available, half of the member states 
responded that such budgets were only available to a low extent. An important 
recommendation in this respect, especially considering the importance of 
successful JIT-cooperation and the need for extra impulses to engage in such 
cooperation, is that more budgets should urgently be made available. As a more 
general question, member states were asked about the availability and quality of 
off-line (paper and electronic versions) relevant legal documentation. 70% of the 
member states claimed a high availability and quality of such documentation 
and none of the member states reported a low availability and quality. More 
specifically, the availability and quality of circulars, practical guidelines, best 
practice manuals, model forms, and finally technical, legal and practical support 
was reported to be mostly high, only 30% of the member states claimed 
medium-level availability of such documentation and support.  
As a very last question, member states were asked if the executions of 
requests were monitored for quality and speed. Again results were satisfying, as 
70% of the member states reported that such a monitoring mechanism was 
indeed in place. The remaining 30% of the member states reported that such a 
mechanism was in place to a moderate extent. Art. 20 EEW provides for a legal 
framework for monitoring the general effectiveness of the framework decision, 
which should be understood as monitoring the success of EEW’s, meaning 
among other things the assessed quality and speed of execution of EEW’s across 
the member states. The article proscribes that if repeated problems in the 
execution of EEW’s occur, the Council should be notified of the problem.  
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Figure 44. Technical capacity 
 
The importance of all the above assessed issues is that member states might 
refuse to comply with or answer to certain orders or request for measures to be 
taken, because they are technically not capable of doing so. The implicit legal 
basis for such refusals is the overarching Art. 1 ECMA, stating that member 
states are obliged to grant each other the widest measure possible of mutual 
assistance. If member states do not have the capacity to answer to requests or 
orders, it is obviously not possible for them to grant assistance and cross-border 
cooperation fails. The importance of measures for the future in this respect, 
should not be underestimated. 
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4 Free movement of evidence 
The second pillar of the study and thus this report is the possibility to 
introduce the concept of free movement of evidence. Effective prosecution in 
cases having a cross-border aspect is often hampered because evidence gathered 
in one member state is not automatically recognized in another member state of 
the EU. National rules of evidence are still too different in matters of detail 
across the Union. The question of mutual admissibility of evidence across EU-
borders deserves a special focus in the light of the topics of this report. 
Discussions about the adminssibilty of evidence are far from new. The 1999 
Tampere conclusions note that “evidence lawfully gathered by one member 
states’ authorities should be admissible before the courts of other member states, 
taking into account the standards that apply there”.46  
The European Commission’s Green Paper on the European Public Prosecutor 
specifically addressed the question of the mutual admissibility of evidence. In 
summary, the Green Paper concluded that the prior condition for any mutual 
admissibility of evidence is that the evidence must have been obtained lawfully 
in the member state where it is found. The law that must be respected if 
evidence is not to be excluded is first and foremost the national law of the place 
where the evidence is situated.47 A number of comments were submitted in 
response to the question in the Green Paper on mutual admissibility of 
evidence.48 For example, some considered that such a system raised serious 
problems both for defence rights and for certainty as to the law. The differences 
between national criminal justice systems and alleged inequalities in the 
protection of fundamental rights were also reported to be seen as obstacles. 
Many of the member states were of the opinion that the mutual admissibility 
principle proposed by the Commission should therefore be adopted only if 
appropriate mechanisms are established to secure legal guarantees and the 
effective protection of fundamental rights. 
The EEW does not explicitely address the issue of mutual admissibility of 
evidence, nor do other MR and MLA-instruments. Nevertheless, the EEW is 
intended to facilitate the admissibility of evidence obtained from the territory of 
another member state. Four techniques occur in the report which contribute to 
the chance at admissibility of the evidence in the state that requested the EEW.   
Firstly, the admissibility of evidence should be facilitated by the overall 
inclusion of procedural safeguards to protect fundamental rights.  
                                                             
46 European Council (15-16 October 1999). "Conclusions of the Presidency." SN 200/1/99 REV 1. 
47 European Commission (2001). "Green Paper on criminal-law protection of the financial 
interests of the Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor." COM (2001) 715 
final of 11.12.2001. 
48 European Commission (2003). "Follow-up report on the Green Paper on the criminal-law 
protection of the financial interests of the Community and the establishment of a European 
Prosecutor." COM (2003) 128 final of 19.3.2003. 
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Secondly, admissibility should be facilitated by maintaining and clarifying 
the approach of previous instruments with regards to requiring additional 
formalities and procedures for the execution of requests. The possibility for 
member states to attach additional requirements to their request is provided in 
several MLA instruments. Art. 3 ECMA provides for the execution of requests in 
the manner provided for by the law of the requested state. Art. 4.1 EU MLA 
Convention states that requested member states must comply with the 
additional formal or procedural requirements of requesting member states, 
when they agree to afford MLA. In other words, MLA does not have a 
compulsory character but when a state agrees to grant MLA, they are agreeing to 
the “full package”, unless of course the additional requirements are contrary to 
their fundamental principles of law or where the Convention itself expressly 
states that the execution of requests is governed by the law of the requested 
member state. According to an explanatory report of the EU MLA Convention, 
the reason for this provision is to facilitate the use of the information gathered by 
MLA as evidence in the subsequent proceedings in the requesting member state.  
The EEW goes further than the EU MLA Convention by removing the 
possibility to refuse to comply with those formalities. Art. 12 EEW proscribes 
that the executing authority shall comply with the formalities and procedures 
expressly indicated by the requesting authority unless otherwise provided, and 
provided that such formalities and procedures are not contrary to the 
fundamental principles of law of the executing state. Differently put and obvious 
in the light of the compulsory character of EEW’s, requested member states are 
not only obliged to answer to the request, but equally have to respect additional 
formal or procedural requirements attached by the requesting state provided 
that the requirements are not contrary to the requested member states’ 
fundamental principles of law. This aspect has been thoroughly analysed in a 
previous chapter of this report. 
Thirdly, the EEW should be issued only when the requesting authority is 
satisfied that it would be possible to obtain the objects, documents or data in 
similar circumstances if they were on the territory of its own member state. This 
should also facilitate the subsequent admissibility of the objects, documents or 
data as evidence in proceedings in the issuing state. This article equally prevents 
the EEW from being used to circumvent protections in the national law of the 
requesting state on admissibility of evidence. 
Fourthly, there is an obligation to inform the issuing authority immediately if 
the executing authority believes that the warrant was executed in a manner 
contrary to its national law. This should provide further reassurance that the 
evidence was lawfully obtained, and thus facilitate its admissibility in the courts 
of the issuing state. 
In the light of investigating the extent to which broadening the scope of the 
EEW would be desired and possible for the future, detailed evidence-related 
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questions were therefore included in the questionnaire. The project team wanted 
to assess the possibility of a future implementation of a system of mutual 
admissibility of evidence across the EU. Assessing the value of evidence, in 
principle, may seem as having little to do with MLA and MR as it is the national 
judge who, in the end-fase of of the criminal justice process, will assess if certain 
evidence will be admissible or not. This does not seem to have anything to do 
with police or judicial cooperation and may occur as being a purely national 
issue. However, the entire question of MLA in obtaining evidence becomes 
completely useless if in the end, the obtained evidence will not serve any 
purpose in trial due to inadmissibility. It is now 100% unclear what will happen 
with the evidence, gathered or obtained on the basis of cross-border cooperation. 
Will it be admissible? Will its value be questioned? The question has never been 
properly addressed, except for some small and very detailed stand-alone issues. 
Therefore this question is closely related to the question of expansion of MR, 
which is the core topic of this report. The issues are “core businesses” for the 
goals of creating “one European area of Freedom, Justice and Security”.  
This chapter of the report is split into two main parts. First member states 
were asked how they deal with unlawfully obtained evidence. A similar set of 
questions was presented for three different situations: evidence unlawfully 
obtained at domestic level, evidence unlawfully obtained abroad, and evidence 
unlawfully obtained abroad in execution of a national request. Second, member 
states were asked to clarify their position with regard to four investigative 
techniques. Being the center of attention in recent discussion and expecting 
difficulties as to their admissibility, the lie detection test, provocation, the use of 
anonymous witnesses and hearsay evidence, were singled out. 
 
4.1 Unlawfully obtained evidence 
4.1.1 At domestic level 
As previously mentioned, the prior condition for any mutual admissibility of 
evidence is that the evidence must have been obtained lawfully in the member 
state where it is found. The question of the exclusion of evidence obtained 
contrary to the law therefore has to be considered. 
The law that must be respected if evidence is not to be excluded is first and 
foremost the national law of the place where the evidence is situated. The rules 
governing exclusion would be those of the member state in which the evidence 
was obtained. This is why as a first point of focus, the status of rules on 
unlawfully obtained evidence in domestic cases was assessed.  
Member states were asked in the questionnaire to what extent they have any 
general rule(s) rendering information/evidence which has been unlawfully or 
irregularly obtained inadmissible or reducing its probative value as evidence at 
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domestic level, where the information/evidence has been obtained in breach of 
formalities or procedural rules. The question of availability of rules was asked 
for three types of scenario’s; rules that sanction unlawfully obtained evidence 
with absolute nullity, rules that proscribe that the unlawfulness or irregularity 
impacts upon the reliability of the information/evidence, or rules that state that 
use of the information/evidence as evidence would violate the right to a fair trial. 
Subsequently, the project team assessed what the consequence of such absolute 
nullity, relative nullity or violations of the right to fair trial were for domestic 
cases. Furthermore, if member states had such rules in place at a domestic level, 
they were asked what the character of these rules was. From the results of the 
questionnaire, it seems that 80 up to 90% of the member states have rules in 
place for all three sets of rules for unlawfully or irregularly obtained evidence.  
When it comes to the consequences of absolute nullity, 62% of the member 
states having rules that sanction with absolute nullity, claimed that the 
information/evidence would need to be excluded as evidence altogether, 
without the same applying to the so called ‘fruits of the poisonous tree’, so that it 
could still be used as mere steering information. The other 38% of the member 
states claimed that the information/evidence would need to be excluded as 
evidence altogether and that the same would apply to the ‘fruits of the 
poisonous tree’, so that it could not even be used any longer as mere steering 
information. None of the member states claimed that the information/evidence 
would still be able to be used as supportive evidence, more specifically that it 
would have to be corroborated by other evidence and could not form the sole or 
decisive basis for a conviction, in which case the court would motivate the 
probative value it has attributed to such evidence. This is an important 
observation, as this option does appear when analysis the rules concerning 
foreign evidence. 
When asked about the character of the rules that proscribed absolute nullity, 
the variety among answers was enormous. One conclusion, next to the one of 
large variety, can however be drawn; 80% of the member states answered 
affirmatively on the question if they had statutory rules on absolute nullity in 
evidence-matters.  
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Figure 45. Absolute nullity at domestic level 
 
 
For the rules proscribing that unlawfulness or irregularity impacts upon the 
reliability of the information/evidence, the consequence of this can, on the basis 
of the answers of the member states, be all three scenario’s; either the 
consequence of exclusion all together, the consequence of use as steering 
information or the consequence of use as supportive evidence. As for the 
character of the rule, the same conclusion as for the sanction of absolute nullity 
counts, however more member states also claimed the existence of 
jurisprudential rules. 
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Figure 46. Impact on reliability at domestic level 
 
For rules on a domestic level stating that the use of the evidence would 
violate the right to a fair trial, the consequence there-of can also entail all three 
scenario’s. As for the sort of rule, again statutory rules are most common to 
entail rules on unlawfully obtained evidence. 
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Figure 47. Right to fair trial at domestic level 
 
The conclusions of this preliminary analysis on the consequences of 
unlawfully obtained evidence in a merely national context, is that rules are most 
likely to be statutory, that a variety of consequences is attributed to unlawfully 
obtained evidence and most importantly, that there is no pattern (except for the 
fact that rules are most likely to be statutory) in these rules and consequences to 
be found across borders. A variety of scenario’s exists in different member states, 
rules are not at all harmonized, which can logically hamper mutual admissibility 
of evidence.  
 
4.1.2  Foreign unlawfully obtained evidence 
Existing, later transferred evidence 
The exact same set of questions was asked for the situation in which 
unlawfully obtained evidence is transferred to a member state, after it was 
collected there or it was in another way already available in that member state. 
The transfer can be done spontaneously or following a request/order/warrant. 
Member states were again asked if they had any rules rendering that evidence 
inadmissible or reducing its probative value, what the consequences there-of 
where and what kinds of rules were in place. 70% of the member states claimed 
that rules were in place that sanctioned foreign unlawfully obtained and 
available evidence with absolute nullity. All three scenario’s of consequences are 
possible. Whereas use as supportive evidence was never indicated in a purely 
domestic case, 10% of the member states indicated such an interpretation of 
“absolute nullity” in a foreign context. Rules were also most likely to be 
statutory.  
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Figure 48. Absolute nullity for foreign evidence 
 
80% of the member states claims to have rules who impact on the reliability 
of foreign evidence which is slightly less compared to a purely domestic 
situation. Again, all three scenario’s are possible. No significant differences are 
revealed when compared to a strictly domestic situation. 
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Figure 49. Impact on reliability for foreign evidence 
 
As for rules on the use of this kind of evidence being a violation of the right 
to a fair trial, 80% of the member states equally had such rules in place, most of 
the rules being statutory or general principles of law. The consequences could be 
all three scenario’s. It is interesting to note that the member states answered 
differently when compared to the responses of a purely domestic case. However 
no significant differences seem to exist. 
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 As a preliminary comparison to rules for unlawfully obtained evidence in a 
merely domestic context, no significant differences seem to exist.  
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Figure 50. Right to fair trial for foreign evidence 
 
Requested evidence 
Finally, the set of questions was asked for the scenario in which a member 
state requests or orders information or evidence to another member state, and 
where the requested member state obtains this information or evidence in an 
unlawful or irregular manner.  
For absolute nullity, there is no difference between foreign existing evidence 
and evidence collected upon a request as the responses are a perfect copy. 
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Figure 51. Absolute nullity for foreign evidence gathered upon request 
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This conclusion cannot be extended to rules that state the unlawfulness 
impacts on the reliability. Even though an equal 80% of the member states claim 
to have rules in place, a slight difference can be noticed between regulations 
with regard to foreign existing evidence and foreign evidence collected upon 
request. For the latter category, it is less likely that the sanction results in an 
exclusion all together (including the fruits of the poisonous tree). 10% of the 
member states shifted from such overall exclusion to exclusion without the fruits 
of the poisonous tree.  
Even though this difference in reply might seem insignificant at first sight, it 
is important to note however that rules may not only differe between domestic 
and foreign evidence, but that an additional distinction may need to be made 
between existing foreign evidence and foreign evidence collected upon request.  
For violations of the rught to fair trial when using this kind of evidence, 80% 
of the member states have suc rules in palce, the consequences can be all three 
options, and the rules are most likely to be statutory with a significant amount of 
member states claiming to have general principles of law for this. 
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Figure 52. Impact on reliability for foreign evidence gathered upon request 
 
For violations of the right to fair trial when using this kind of evidence, 80% 
of the member states have such rules in place, the consequences can be all three 
options, and the rules are most likely to be statutory with a significan amount of 
member states claiming to have general principles of law for this.  
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Figure 53. Right to fair trial for foreign evidence gathered upon request 
 
The overall conclusion after the analysis of rules and their consequences and 
character for unlawfully obtained evidence both domestically and abroad is 
firstly that a multitude of scenario’s are possible. Secondly, in most member 
states all of these rules are governed by statutory law, only a small fraction of 
member states has these rules imbedded in their constitution. This could mean 
that the future harmonization of rules for mutual admissibility of evidence 
would not necessarily pose major legal problems for the large majority of 
member states.  The greatest variety exists in member states when it comes to the 
value that they attribute to unlawfully obtained evidence in further stages of the 
criminal justice process. Not only is there a great variety among member states 
as to the use of unlawfully obtained evidence in a merely national context as 
steering or supportive evidence or the complete exclusion thereof, some 
variation also exists as to the value that member states attribute to this evidence 
in a national context on the one hand, and to this evidence when it is obtained 
abroad on the other hand. While some member states attribute the exact same 
value to unlawfully obtained evidence in a national context and when it comes 
from another member state, others do show some difference in the validation of 
foreign evidence. Some member states are more strict in the validation of 
unlawfully obtained evidence in another member state, and surprisingly, 
sometimes more leniency is shown in this validation of foreign evidence.    
The fact that a significant amount of member states already does not make 
any difference in the validation of unlawfully obtained evidence as to where it 
was obtained, is certainly a sign of the possibility of future complete mutual 
admissibility of evidence, and attributing the same value to any kind of 
evidence, no matter where in the EU it was obtained.  
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Furthermore, as nearly all member states have existing sets of rules of their 
own for attributing a certain value to unlawfully obtained evidence, the 
previously made remark of the law that must be respected if evidence is not to 
be excluded is first and foremost the national law of the place where the 
evidence is situated, poses no problems. As member states have sufficient rules 
in place to qualify the value of certain evidence, member states that request the 
obtainement and transfer of evidence should trust that these rules are of a high 
enough standard to mutually recognize the value that the requested member 
state has attributed to evidence that has moved across their borders. The rules 
governing exclusion can and should be those of the member state in which the 
evidence was obtained. This is an important recommendation for the future of 
mutual admissibility of evidence, and more generally for the future of mutual 
recognition.  
 
4.2 Four techniques that deserve special focus 
As previsouly mentioned, the EEW entails some important minimum 
safeguards to help protect fundamental rights. More specifically and of 
importance for this sub-chapter, Art. 6 ensures that the EEW will be issued only 
when the issuing authority is satisfied that the following conditions have been 
met: that the objects, documents and data are likely to be admissible in the 
proceedings for which it is sought. This prevents the EEW from being used to 
circumvent protections in the national law of the issuing state on admissibility of 
evidence, particularly if further action is taken in the future on the mutual 
admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to the EEW. 
This article is important, especially since a lot of differences exist among 
member states as to the admissibility of certain investigation techniques. If a 
member state does not allow for a certain technique and the evidence it brings 
forth, they should not request for such techniques and subsequent evidence to 
be transferred to them from another member state under the cover of cross-
border cooperation. This would be a complete abuse of the system and 
jeopardise the future of MR. The rule of the EEW is clear: if a member state does 
not allow for a certain technique, they should not request for it to be done in 
another member state. The perfect solution for the future of the issue would be 
that no differences exist across member states as allowing certain investigation 
techniques, but as the complete harmonization of criminal procedural law across 
the EU is far from near, this rule of Art. 6 EEW is necessary and useful.  
Four types of techniques and the evidence they bring with them have been 
assessed in the questionnaire. The reason for the selection of these particular 
four, is that they are under heavy discussion and the most differences across 
member states as to their admissibility can be expected. These large differences 
can be problematic if one wants to move in the direction of complete mutual 
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admissibility of evidence and MR in general. Therefore, the questionnaire has 
adressed just how big these differences in admissibility are across member 
states, and how willing member states are to accept evidence that these 
techniques bring forth, when having been conducted abroad.  
 
4.2.1  Lie detection test 
The first investigative technique the project team focused on, is the lie 
detection test.  
Because its reliability is highly controverse, this investigative measure is 
heavilty criticized. Even though it is a technical process that reflects 
physiological processes such as heart beath and blood pressure, the validity of 
the results is not generally accepted, because – unlike with tests such as a DN A 
test – the results are said to be possibly influenced by the subject. Therefore it is 
unlikely that the introduction of a lie detection test has the potential to expedite 
the proceedings. It might even be counterproductive because issues of reliability 
will inevitably be brought up in court. 
When asked to what extent member states allowed for the technique of a lie 
detector test in their own country, 50% of the member states claimed that they 
do allow for it.60% of the member states that do allow for it, said that it could be 
used as supportive evidence. 40% of the member states said it could be used as 
steering information. None of these member states claimed that it could be used 
as sole or decisive evidence.  
 
50%
30%
20%
Domestic use of lie detection test
not allowed
supportive evidence
steering information
 
Figure 54. Domestic use of lie detection test 
 
When asked how they would treat this type of evidence if it came from 
another member state, only 30% of the member states consider this evidence to 
be inadmissible. Considering that up to 50% does not allow for this technique 
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domestically, this means there are member states that allow a foreign lie 
detection test whereas such a technique is not allowed domestically. Member 
states that make this shift, allow evidence from a foreign lie detection test as 
steering information.  
 
30%
30%
40%
Admissibility of foreign lie detection test
inadmissible
supportive evidence
steering information
 
Figure 55. Admissibility of foreign lie detection test 
 
This willingness to accept foreign evidence is an important finding which is 
not completely contradictory to Art. 6 EEW per se, as the foreign evidence can 
only be used as steering information, not as actual evidence. Member states that 
do allow for lie detection tests, attribute the exact same value to the foreign 
evidence as in a merely national context, which is perfectly in line with the MR 
principle.   
 
4.2.2 Provocation/entrapment/(the offence being provoked by the 
police/authorities)  
The second investigative technique the project team focused on, is the use of 
provocation or entrapment. 
The ECtHR clarified that police incitement or provocation occurs where the 
officers involved – whether members of the security forces or persons acting on 
their instructions – do not confine themselves to investigating criminal activity 
in an essentially passive manner, but exert such an influence on the subject as to 
incite the commission of an offence that would otherwise not have been 
committed, in order to make it possible to establish the offence, that is, to 
provide evidence and institute a prosecution. Provocation is not allowed.49 
Inspite of this clear case law, it remains interesting to analyse how this relates 
to the exclusion of evidence. 
                                                             
49 Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, 9 June 1998, § 38; Malininas v. Lithuania, 1 July 2008, § 38. 
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When asked to what extent member states allowed for the technique of 
provocation/entrapment in their own country, 70% of the member states claimed 
that they do not allow for it. 66% of the member states that do allow for it, said 
that it could be used as decisive or sole evidence, 33% said it could be used as 
supportive evidence. None of these member states claimed that it could be used 
as steering information.  
70%
20%
10%
Domestic use of provocation
not allowed
decisive evidence
supportive evidence
 
Figure 56. Domestic use of provocation 
 
When asked how they would treat this type of evidence if it came from 
another member state, only 50% of the member states indicated that such 
evidence was inadmissible. Again, member states are more lenient and willing 
to accept foreign evidence. Some of them however claimed it could be used as 
steering information. This means that again a more lenient approach is taken 
towards foreign evidence in this matter.  
50%
30%
0%
20%
Admissibility of foreign provocation
inadmissible
decisive evidence
supportive evidence
steering information
 
Figure 57. Admissibility of foreign provocation 
 
The same remark can be made as to the compatibility with Art. 6 EEW. Most 
member states that do allow for the technique domestically, attribute the exact 
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same value to the foreign evidence as in a merely national context, this perfectly 
in line with the principle of MR. A very small fraction of the member states 
however claimed that the evidence, which would have the value of supportive 
evidence domestically, could be used as sole or decisive evidence when coming 
from abroad. This again means a more lenient approach towards foreignly 
obtained evidence.  
  
4.2.3 Using statements of anonymous witnesses taken in the 
requested/executing member state not covered in the EU MLA 
Convention 
The third investigative technique the project team focused on, is the use of 
anonymous witnesses. 
An anonymous witness is defined as any person, irrespective of his status 
under national criminal procedural law, who provides or is willing to provide 
information relevant to criminal proceedings and whose identity is concealed 
from the parties during the pre-trial investigation or the trial proceedings 
through the use of procedural protective measures.  
In several cases, the ECtHR dealth with the issue of anonymous witnesses.50 
The court either stated that there was a violation of Art. 6, §3 (d) ECHR on the 
ground that the statements of anonymous witnesses had been used as the sole or 
decisive reason for conviction51, or stated that there was no such violation 
because these statements were corroborated by other evidence.52 In light of this 
clear case law, and in light of the question whether future EU level minimum 
standards should be based on ECHR standards or be of lower or higher leve,, it 
is interesting to analyse how the member states interprete and use the current 
ECtHR acquis in their national practice. 
  When asked to what extent member states allowed for this in their own 
country, 80% of the member states claimed that they do allow for it. 62% of the 
member states that do allow for it, said that it could be used as supportive 
evidence. The remaining 38% of the member states said it could be used as sole 
or decisive evidence, which is contrary to the ECtHR case law. None of these 
member states claimed that it could be used as steering information.  
                                                             
50 VERMEULEN, G. (2005). EU standards in witness protection and collaboration with justice. Antwerp-
Apeldoorn, Maklu. p 47. 
51 Delta v. France, 19 December 1990; Kostovski v. The Netherlands, 20 November 1989; 
Windisch v. Austria, 27 September 1990;  
52 Solakov v. The Formar Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 31 October 2001; Isgro v Italy, 19 
February 1991; Asch v. Austria, 26 April 1991;  
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20%
30%
50%
Domestic use of anonymous witnesses
not allowed
decisive evidence
supportive evidence
 
Figure 58. Domestic use of anonymous witnesses 
 
When asked how they would treat this type of evidence if it came from 
another member state, half of the member states that claimed that the technique 
was inadmissible domestically would consider the foreign evidence inadmissible 
too. The other half however claimed it could be used as steering information. A 
more lenient approach is therefore again sometimes taken towards foreign 
evidence. Member states that allow for this technique domestically attribute the 
same value to evidence when it is gathered abroad. 
 
10%
30%
50%
10%
Admissibility of foreign anonymous witnesses
inadmissible
decisive evidence
supportive evidence
steering information
 
Figure 59. Admissibility of foreign anonymous witnesses 
 
The same remark can again be made as to the compatibility with Art. 6 EEW, 
as it only would mean that it could be used as steering information. Most 
member states that do allow for the technique domestically, attribute the exact 
same value to the foreign evidence as in a merely national context, this perfectly 
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in line with the principle of MR. A very small fraction of the member states 
however claimed that the evidence, which would have the value of supportive 
evidence domestically, could be used as sole or decisive evidence when coming 
from abroad. This again means a more lenient approach towards foreignly 
obtained evidence. One small fraction is however more strict for this technique, 
saying that even when it would be considered as sole or decisive evidence 
domestically, it could only be used as supportive evidence if it came from 
abroad. 
  
4.2.4 Hearsay evidence 
  The fourth and final investigative technique focused on by the project team 
is hearsay evidence. 
Hearsay evidence is a typically common law feature. Most jurisdictions 
however, are quite reluctant to allow hearsay evidence, because it is felt that the 
assertions are often unreliable, insincere or subject to flaws in memory and/or 
perception. Because of this controversy, strict rules apply before hearsay 
evidence is considered admissible. The ECHR can be interpreted as holding a 
ground for exclusion of hearsay evidence. Although it is not prohibited as such, 
restrictions laid down for other types of evidences can be applied. Because the 
truthfulness and accuracy of the persons words – who are spoken by another – 
cannot be tested by cross-examination, the rights of the defence are in danger. 
When asked to what extent member states allowed for hearsay evidence, 
which is indirectly obtained information, other than from direct witnesses, in 
their own country, 90% of the member states claimed that they do allow for it. 
77% of the member states that do allow for it, said that it could be used as 
supportive evidence, 11% said it could be used as sole or decisive evidence and 
an equal 11% said it could be used as steering information.  
10%
10%
70%
10%
Domestic use of hearsay
not allowed
decisive evidence
supportive evidence
steering information
 
Figure 60. Domestic use of hearsay evidence 
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When asked how they would treat this type of evidence if it came from 
another member state, 11% of the member states that claimed that the technique 
was inadmissible domestically would consider the foreign evidence inadmissible 
too. Most member states that do allow for the technique domestically, attribute 
the exact same value to the foreign evidence as in a merely national context. The 
rest of the member states claimed the evidence, which would have the value of 
supportive evidence domestically, could be used as sole or decisive evidence 
when coming from abroad. Once again more leniency is shown towards 
foreignly obtained evidence.  
20%
60%
20%
Admissibility of foreign hearsay
decisive evidence
supportive evidence
steering information
 
Figure 61. Admissibility of foreign hearsay evidence 
 
The overall conclusion of this assessment is that most of the time, the same 
value is attributed to these techniques and the evidence that they bring forth, 
whether it comes from another member state or is domestically obtained. This is 
a very positive outcome for the MR principle. Even more, sometimes more 
leniency is shown for foreign evidence in comparison with domestically 
obtained evidence, which is a surprising outcome to say the least. This however 
does not violate Art. 6 EEW per se, for the reason explained above. When 
however comparing the admissibility and value of the techniques on a domestic 
level, as predicted, large differences exist. This could be problematic for the 
discussion of harmonization of procedural criminal law in the EU.  
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4.3 Admissibility and value of lawfully obtained 
foreign evidence  
Finally, member states’ views and current situations of mutual admissibility 
of lawfully obtained evidence was assessed.  
More specifically, experts in member states were asked to what extent they 
felt that, according to their experience, information/evidence which has been 
collected in another member state in accordance with its domestic law and 
procedures, being eligible for use as evidence under its domestic law, was often 
considered inadmissible or of a reduced probative value because of the manner 
in which it has been gathered? 
Most member states claimed that they did not feel this was often the case, 
which is a positive outcome for the future of MR. A smaller fraction of member 
states did however claim that this was often the case. These member states were 
asked what, in their experience, would often be the underlying reason for this 
inadmissibility or reduced probative value.  
 
The provided reasons were;  
- that the manner in which is was gathered was not fully in accordance with/the 
manner provided for in the own national law (and procedures) 
- that the manner in which it was gathered did not respect specific condition(s) 
which would have to be observed in a similar national case (e.g. compliance 
with certain formalities and procedures, purpose or use limitations etc) 
- that the manner in which it was gathered did not (fully) respect the formalities 
and procedures expressly indicated by the member state in the capacity of 
requesting/issuing authority/member state 
- that the manner in which it was gathered had not granted the person(s) 
concerned by the execution of the measure(s) that has/have prompted the 
information/evidence the specific procedural guarantees or rights that would 
have accrued to him/her/them in the execution of such measure(s) in a similar 
case under the member states’ law, or not having allowed the person(s) 
concerned to claim these 
- that the manner in which it was collected, in a similar case under the member 
states’ national law would be a breach of formalities or procedural rules the 
violation of which would be sanctioned with absolute nullity 
- that the manner in which it was collected, in a similar case under respndents’ 
national law would impact upon the reliability of the information/evidence 
- that the manner in which it was collected, in a similar case under member 
states’ national law would violate the right to a fair trial 
- that the manner in which it was collected, in a similar case under member 
states’ national law would constitue a violation of ECHR/other common 
FREE MOVEMENT OF EVIDENCE 
 
 
138 
 
fundamental rights texts and/or the ECtHR’s jurisprudence (relating to other 
issues than to the right to a fair trial) 
As for the third reason, being that the manner in which it was gathered did 
not respect specific condition(s) which would have to be observed in a similar 
national case (e.g. compliance with certain formalities and procedures, purpose 
or use limitations etc), member states that felt that this reason was often applied, 
were asked if it was their experience that this often was because the requested 
formalities were considered to be contrary to fundamental principles of their 
own law. The one member state that claimed to use this reason as a refusal 
ground or as a ground for reducing the probative value of the 
information/evidence, responded negatively on this question. This issue has 
already been detailedly addressed in a previous chapter. Art. 12 EEW proscribes 
that the executing authority shall comply with the formalities and procedures 
expressly indicated by the requesting authority unless otherwise provided, and 
provided that such formalities and procedures are not contrary to the 
fundamental principles of law of the executing state. Differently put and obvious 
in the light of the compulsory character of EEW’s, requested member states are 
not only obliged to answer to the request, but equally have to respect additional 
formal or procedural requirements attached by the requesting state provided 
that the requirements are not contrary to the requested member states’ 
fundamental principles of law. When asked about this in another part of the 
questionnaire, all member states claimed that when additional requirements 
were attached to a request, they were never refused to them as requesting 
member states on the basis of the contradiction with requested member states’ 
fundamental principles of law. The answers in this chapter are consistent with 
these findings.    
As a general question, member states were asked to what extent, according to 
their experience, they felt that where information/evidence has been collected 
in/from another member state, its admissibility, reliability or probative value is 
often being challenged or questioned by defence lawyers or judges? Almost half 
of member states answered that they do felt that this was often the case. As an 
overall positive outcome for the future of mutual admissibility of evidence, the 
majority claimed that the value of foreign evidence was not often challenged by 
judges or lawyers.  
The question of admissibility of evidence was also assessed in a detailed 
manner. Member states were asked if information/evidence obtained in/from 
another member state in most cases would constitute admissible evidence under 
their national law, where it has been collected in the other member state 
concerned in accordance with/in the manner provided for in its domestic law 
(and procedures) or is otherwise available there, being eligible for use as 
evidence under its domestic law.  
FREE MOVEMENT OF EVIDENCE 
 
 
139 
 
All member states answered affirmatively, which is a first positive outcome 
of this specific assessment for the future of complete mutual admissibility of 
evidence in the EU.  
Secondly, the question was asked if information/evidence obtained in/from 
another member state in most cases would constitute admissible evidence under 
their national law under the condition that the person(s) concerned by the 
execution of the measure(s) that has/have prompted the information/evidence 
has/have been granted the specific procedural guarantees or rights that would 
accrue to him/her/them in the execution of such measure(s) in a similar case 
under either their national law or that of the requesting/issuing member state, or 
has/have been able to claim these. Only one member state claimed that this 
would not be the case, but did however accept this as a future policy option. 
Again, an overall positive outcome.  
Thirdly, the question was asked if information/evidence obtained in/from 
another member state in most cases would constitute admissible evidence under 
their national law where it has been collected in the other member state 
concerned in accordance with certain (specific) minimum procedural standards 
for gathering information/evidence (other than merely technical or forensic) 
standards, commonly agreed to at EU level. The same member state answered 
that this would not be the case but again accepted it as a future policy option. 
Member states that answered this question affirmatively were also asked what 
the minium standards to be agreed upon should be. All but one member state 
claimed that the minimum standards would have to be based on or derived from 
ECHR/other common fundamental rights texts and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, 
to the extent available. One member state claimed that these standards would 
have to be of a lower standard than the ECHR. The outcomes of all three large 
questions are surprisingly positive for the question of mutual admissibility of 
evidence, and nothing seems to stand in the way of the development of such a 
system in the EU. 
Two final questions were asked in this respect. First, member states were 
asked if they would consider it an acceptable EU future policy option that 
information lawfully obtained by a member or seconded member while part of a 
joint investigation team which is not otherwise available to the competent 
authorities of the member states would constitute per se admissible evidence 
under the national law of the member states concerned? 90% of the member 
states would indeed consider this to be a good policy option. Secondly, member 
states were asked to what extent they currently accepted that competent 
authorities from other member states who are lawfully present on their territory 
in while executing a request/order/warrant (e.g. when seconded member of a 
joint investigation team operating on their territory, when present during a 
hearing or house search etc) draft official reports having the same probative 
value under their national law as if they had been drafted by their own 
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competent authorities; Almost all member states currently accept this. Half of 
the ones that do not consider this to be a good future policy option. Only one 
member states would not be willing to accept this. 
In globo, as a conclusion of this assessment of the status quo in member 
states of mutual admissibility of evidence, the outcome is very positive and no 
significant issues would have to be faced if the system of per se admissibility of 
evidence were to be installed in the EU. The Eurojust College also comes to this 
conclusion and considers that in principle, evidence taken abroad in an EU 
member state in conformity with the law of that state, should be admissible 
evidence in other member states, unless the way the evidence was obtained is 
contrary to their fundamental principles. 
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5 Findings and recommendations for the future 
5.1 The use of the 32 MR offences 
As far as the first MR characteristic, being the use of the 32 MR offences to 
abandon the double criminality requirement, is concerned, member states were 
asked to what extent either partial or general abandonment of the double 
criminality requirement is considered acceptable in MLA. Strikingly, only 10% of 
the member states indicated to attach great importance to a full fledged double 
criminality requirement. This means that no less than 90% of the member states 
are willing to cooperate even if the investigative measure relates to acts which 
do not constitute an offence in their own national law. In current practice 60% of 
the member states do not even apply the double criminality requirement, even 
though they are allowed to do so. Abandoning the double criminality 
requirement most definitely constitutes a significant improvement in terms of 
efficient cooperation. Considering that an additional 30% accept abandonment 
as a future policy, double criminality can and should no longer be inserted into 
the future legal framework. 
Furthermore, the questionnaire aimed at assessing the feasibility to use the 32 
MR offences beyond the double criminality framework. 
First, the requirement to execute in consistency with the national law of the 
executing member state was put to the test. Because such a requirement might 
hinder efficient cooperation, it was worth looking into the willingness of 
member states to waive this right when execution is related to acts included in 
the 32 MR offences. The enquired situation concerned the execution for acts for 
which the requested measure cannot be taken/ordered in a national case 
according to the national law of the executing state. Analysis revealed that only 
20% would never allow execution. No less than 80% of member states are either 
now executing or willing to accept a policy to oblige execution if the acts 
concerned are included in the 32 MR offences. 
Second, the possibility to limit refusal and postponement grounds was put to 
the test. The MR philosophy requires refusal and postponement grounds to be 
limited as much as possible. The question again rises whether the introduction of 
the 32 MR offences would have an added value in this context. Analysis 
revealed that neither for operational, nor for financial capacity issues the 
preparedness of member states to limit refusal and postponement grounds is 
linked to the 32 MR offences. 
Third, the questionnaire aimed at assessing the added value of the 32 MR 
offences in the context of admissibility of evidence. Member states were asked 
whether they would consider it to be an acceptable future policy option that 
information lawfully obtained by a member or seconded member while part of a 
joint investigation team which is not otherwise available to the competent 
authorities of the member states would constitute per se admissible evidence 
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under the national law of the member states concerned. Only 10% considered 
this not to be an option. The other 90% do not require that such admissibility is 
limited to the 32 MR offences.  
Fourth and final, member states were asked whether they would consider it 
to be an acceptable future policy option that competent authorities from other 
member states who are lawfully present on their territory while executing a 
request/order/warrant  draft official reports having the same probative value as 
if they had been drafted by their own competent authorities. 80% of the member 
states consider admissibility of “draft official reports having the same probative 
value as if they had been drafted by own competent authorities” to be an 
acceptable future policy and do not require such admissibility to be limited to 
the 32 MR offences. 
It is safe to say that the introduction of the 32 MR offences in other areas than 
the abandonment of the double criminality requirement needs to be well 
considered. Whereas the introduction might seem a step forward, analysis 
clearly revealed that limiting such a step forward to the 32 MR offences, can 
actually hinder from taking an even bigger step forward. This view is shared by 
the Eurojust College. In its replies, it is clarified that in general, the taking of 
evidence should not be dependent on whether the underlying offence comes 
under the 32 MR offences set out in previous MR instruments. 
 
5.2 Enhanced stringency in cooperation 
5.2.1 Grounds for refusal or non-execution 
The MR concept must turn traditional judicial cooperation into a more 
reliable and faster mechanism. This implies more stringency for the requested 
member state or authority, in that traditional grounds for refusal are reduced 
and requests must be replied to and effectively executed within strict deadlines. 
First, the position of member states vis-à-vis the (revised) traditional grounds 
for refusal or non-execution was tested.  
As far as the ne bis in idem principle is concerned, the vast majority of 
member states indicate that execution on the basis of ne bis in idem would be 
refused, or that it should be possible to refuse execution on the basis of it. The 
overall recommendation therefore must be that the ne bis in idem principle 
should be enshrined throughout future (MR-based) MLA instruments between 
the member states as (at least an optional) ground for refusal or non-execution.  
Even though wholly new and introduced in the questionnaire as a suggested 
ground for refusal or non-execution, support among member states for refusal or 
non-execution for the situation where the proceedings in the issuing member 
state relate to a person who the executing member state has granted immunity 
from prosecution for the same facts as a benefit for his or her collaboration with 
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justice, is strikingly high. It is therefore recommended to introduce this newly 
suggested (optional) ground for refusal or non-execution throughout future 
(MR-based) MLA instruments between the member states.  
Refusal or non-execution for reason of lack of double criminality, was also 
assessed. The granting of traditional MLA generically does not depend on the 
condition of double criminality, and the possibility of refusal on the basis of lack 
of double criminality is limited to a series of coercive or potentially intrusive 
investigative measures only. Therefore this refusal ground was only assessed for 
measures for which the refusal ground has not (yet) been prohibited. Only a 
small number of member states would not (insist to have the possibility to) 
invoke lack of double criminality as a ground for non-execution. Hence, 
complete removal of double criminality as a refusal or non-execution ground is 
illusionary. However, the potential of introducing a prohibition to invoke it for 
the 32 MR offences in these cases is far more promising.  
Subsequently, “impossibility to execute” as a refusal ground was assessed. 
Art. 13, 1, c EEW stipulates that recognition or execution of an EEW may be 
refused in the executing member state if it is not possible to execute it by any of 
the measures available to the executing authority in the specific case in 
accordance with the provisions of the EEW. This non-execution ground is EEW-
specific, and is inexistent under current MLA instruments. Asked whether they 
would refuse execution of an EEW (or would want to be able to refuse it) if it is 
not possible to execute it by any of the measures which would be available to 
them in a similar domestic case the majority of member states answered 
affirmatively. Both for theoretical reasons and on the basis of the empirical 
research among member states, it is highly recommended to retain the ground 
for non-execution for measures related to the EEW (cluster 1), and stressing that 
it should obviously not be introduced for any other cluster, not even cluster 2. 
Thereupon, the refusal ground of immunity or privilege under the law of the 
executing member state was assessed. The introduction of this ground for 
refusal or non-execution is a step backwards, compared to traditional MLA. 
Surprisingly, when tested, there was significant support among member states 
for keeping or even introducing the ground for non-execution concerned. 
Notwithstanding this empirical result, the project team strongly suggests 
redeliberation on the issue, for objectively it would be a step backwards to keep 
or further introduce the ground for non-execution throughout future (MR based) 
MLA.  
The next refusal ground to be assessed was the extra-territoriality principle; 
this refusal ground was copied in the EEW from the EAW, which seems a 
regrettable mistake. The project team therefore opposes introduction of it in 
future (MR based) MLA instruments, and deletion of it in the EEW. This stance 
is supported by the assessments made with member states.  
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As for the exception ground of ordre public, and notwithstanding the 
empirical results, the project team sees no reason for keeping the traditional ordre 
public exception in place. Traditionally, assistance may be refused if the 
requested party considers that execution of the request is likely to prejudice the 
sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests of its country. 
However, in the EEW the exclusion ground has been significantly reduced in 
that it may only be invoked where, and to the extent that, the objects, documents 
or data would for those reasons neither be used as evidence in a similar 
domestic case. Through the latter interpretation, the traditional ordre public 
exception has lost the traditional inter-state dimension it has always had in 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The project team recommends a middle 
course, as was introduced in the Wittem Convention of 1979, and allow to 
impose conditions to execution if this can avoid affecting the interests of the 
requested state. Furthermore, the possibility to refuse cooperation referring to 
the political offence exception, was assessed. It has for long held an important 
position in cooperation instruments. Today this position cannot be maintained 
any longer for two main raisons. First, for reasons of internal consistency in the 
legislative framework it is advised to ban the political offence exception 
altogether. Second it should be noted that calling upon the political offence 
exception is a clear sign of distrust with regard to the requesting member state, 
which is odd having explicitly expressed confidence in the structure and 
operation of the legal systems of the other member states and confidence in the 
capacity of all the member states to ensure just legal procedures in the preamble 
to the TEU.  
Also, the fiscal offence exception, which has already been drastically reduced 
in scope in the 2001 EU MLA Protocol has no real future any more. At least, its 
reduction along the lines of the EEW can be recommended throughout future 
(MR based) MLA between the member states.  
The potential implications in terms of operational or financial capacity for the 
executing member state in executing under a stringent MR regime investigative 
measures that currently lack an explicit regulation may be very substantial. The 
project team has therefore chosen to not only test the position of member states 
vis-à-vis the (revised) traditional grounds for refusal or non-execution but also to 
check the preparedness of member states to accept semi-mandatory execution of 
the measures under clusters 5 en 6 irrespective of their potential financial and 
operational capacity impact. For the interception of telecommunications and the 
video conference hearing, there is a reverse financial cost regulation in place, 
which is why the project team has chosen to assess whether member states in the 
mean time would be willing to step away from the reverse financial cost 
regulation, or – alternatively – would be in for a new financial regulation for 
considerable-cost measures.  
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As for refusal for reasons of lack of financial capacity, none of the current 
MLA instruments explicitly provides for such a general refusal ground. Member 
states were asked if they felt that requests for investigative measures were often 
refused or should be able to be refused when it is felt that the implications of 
their execution in terms of financial capacity or resources is or would be 
substantial or extraordinary. Half of the member states did consider this an 
option. Also, member states were asked if they would be willing to execute the 
request anyway if a fair share, for example at a 50/50 rate, would be borne by the 
requesting/issuing member state. The results of the answers provided were 
spectacularly positive to say the least. The results are significant for the debate 
on a possible future policy option to introduce a 50/50 sharing of costs made in 
the execution of (MR based) MLA requests or orders, as an agreed fall-back 
position in case where the financial consequences of executing a request or order 
would be substantial or extraordinary, in that the cost involved would surpass 
an amount of e.g. 10.000 EUR (which the project team suggests to copy from the 
2006 MR of confiscations framework decision, thus introducing a consistent 
mirroring regime in the sphere of (MR based) future MLA between the member 
states).  
Concerning refusing execution for reasons of lack operational capacity, the 
large majority of member states indicated that irrespective of the cluster, lack of 
operational capacity would and should not count as a refusal or non-execution 
ground 
 
5.2.2 Strict reply and execution deadlines 
Of vital importance for the safeguarding of evidence, be it under traditional 
MLA or under MR, is that requests or orders are replied to in a timely fashion 
and swiftly executed.  
The project team has chosen not to ask member states what deadlines they 
thought would be appropriate for replying to a request or order. On the basis of 
the EEW and other MR based instruments it could easily be set at e.g. 30 days, 
being the time limit then for agreeing to execution, refusing it or asking for 
postponement of effective execution of the request or order.  
Questioned about deadlines relating to effective execution of requests, 
irrespective of the clusters, approximately half of the member states require the 
requested/executing member state to execute the measure concerned within a 
provided deadline. The project team here inclines to share the standpoint taken 
by the Eurojust College, i.e that, whilst recognising that it may be difficult to set 
a general deadline for the execution of requests for the taking of evidence, such 
requests should be executed as quickly as possible, and preferably within a 60 
day term, with a possible extension for another 30 days in case postponement 
would be requested.  
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The importance of postponement possibilities was tested separately. 
Interestingly however, a lot of the member states indicate they would not 
postpone execution, even if such execution would have a significant impact on 
routine domestic workload or other domestic priorities and even if such 
execution entails the risk of hampering the fluent functioning of their own 
criminal justice system. It is particularly encouraging to see that member states 
show this kind of willingness to cooperate. Member states that did indicate to 
use the possibility to postpone execution of a foreign order/request/warrant 
indicate that they are still willing to start execution within a reasonable deadline 
provided by the issuing/requesting member state, which is set at 45 to 60 days, 
which is only slightly longer than the Eurojust position which allows for a 
possible extension of 30 days in case postponement would be requested. 
Based upon this analysis, the project team recommends that the time limit for 
agreeing to execution, refusing it or asking for postponement of effective 
execution of the request or order, be set at 30 days. Requests should be executed 
within a 60 day term, with a possible extension of 45 days in case postponement 
would be requested. 
 
5.3 Accepting and executing orders 
This section dealt with the general willingness of member states to step away 
from the traditional MR locus regit actum regime and the position of member 
states with respect to consistency problems. Furthermore, compliance with 
expressly indicated formalities was put to the test. 
 
5.3.1 Accepting the validity of domestic judicial decisions taken in 
the issuing member state 
All MR-based instruments that so far have been designed, prevent a decision 
or measure to be executed abroad unless it has first been taken or ordered 
domestically or – mutatis mutandis – could have been taken or ordered in a 
similar or comparable domestic case, in due conformity with the national law 
and procedures of the issuing member state. Given that the very essence of the 
MR principle lays precisely in the expectation that member states will trust one 
another sufficiently to mutually recognise each other’s judicial decisions in 
criminal matters, as if it were their own, this is no more than logical. 
Consequently, the question at hand when considering to base the entirety of 
MLA between the EU member states as much as possible on a MR-based footing, 
is not whether that should be via a warrant-like or a domestic order & certificate-
like instrument. The only and real question is whether the EEW – which 
apparently is the only MR instrument under which the actual taking or existence 
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of a domestic decision in the issuing member state must not be evidenced vis-à-
vis the executing member state as a precondition for its execution by the latter – 
can or must serve as a model for reorienting MLA towards MR, if that were to be 
decided. The answer is negative, for the EEW (cluster 1) is extremely atypical in 
what it envisages, compared to traditional MLA requests (clusters 2-5). Whereas 
MLA essentially is a vehicle for requesting investigative measures or the transfer 
of precise objects, documents or data, the issuing of an EEW envisages a result, 
i.e. obtaining certain objects, documents or data, leaving it to the executing 
member state to take any investigative measures that it domestically may need 
to deploy (including, if necessary, search of premises and seizure) to that end. 
For it is not clear which investigative measures the executing member state will 
need to deploy in order to obtain the evidence sought, the EEW – even if 
categorized as a typical MR instrument – actually is no such instrument stricto 
sensu. For the bunch of MLA not covered by the EEW (comprised in clusters 2-5) 
the situation is different, in that it truly relates to the taking of investigative 
measures or to the transfer of objects, documents or data. It is hardly imaginable 
that a future EU MR-based system would envisage altering this situation, by 
allowing the issuing of e.g. ‘find the truth’ warrants, ‘get incriminating 
testimony’ warrants or the like by the issuing member state, instead of the latter 
spelling out which concrete measures or procedural steps it seeks the execution 
of in the executing member state. Consequently, only a single question remains: 
should it be required from the issuing member state to always first order these 
measures or take these steps in accordance with its domestic law and 
procedures. The answer is obviously no. For a vast majority of measures or 
procedural steps, it would not even be possible to have them formally decided 
or ordered, especially in the phase of preliminary (police) investigations. Even 
where the measures concerned would require a formal domestic decision if they 
would need to be taken on the territory of the issuing member state itself, it 
would largely undo the flexibility that characterizes current MLA if each time 
the taking of the measures concerned would need to be formally decided 
domestically – and embedded in a formalised decision eligible for recognition by 
the executing member state as if it were its own decision.  Only to the extent that 
member states do not have sufficient trust in one another to suffice with self 
declared observance potentialis by the issuing member state of its domestic law 
and procedures in issuing investigation orders or warrants, it seems acceptable 
to require the issuing member state to actually deliver proof of the taking of a 
domestic decision or the issuing of a domestic order or warrant to the envisaged 
effect. Whether, even for far-reaching coercive or intrusive measures included in 
cluster 3 and – a fortiori – under cluster 5 – such distrust level is to be 
maintained when a roll-out of MR is envisaged, seems to be the only real 
question left. Therefore, member states have been asked for their position on the 
matter. The empirical results of the questionnaire are inconclusive, in that the 
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position of member states varies greatly. The project team recommends to suffice 
with requiring the issuing member state to confirm or declare that the measure 
the execution of which is envisaged could be taken in a similar or comparable 
national case to promote full trust and hence allow for its execution without 
prior evidence of any formal domestic decision, order or warrant to the same 
effect in the issuing member state. 
 
5.3.2 Executing judicial decisions in the executing member state 
Member states were asked which position their own national law occupies 
with respect to the execution of a request/order warrant. For clusters 3 and 5, 
only 20% of the member states indicated that their own national role plays an 
essential role and that execution is only possible where fully in accordance 
with/in the manner provided for in their national law (and procedures). For 
cluster 6 none of the member states indicated this strict locus regit actum 
requirement. 10% of the member states give their own national law a 
complementary role in that execution can only take place under specific 
condition(s) which would have to be observed in a similar national case (e.g. 
compliance with certain formalities and procedures, purpose or use limitations 
etc). This 10% does not vary over the different clusters. 
Considering the importance of admissibility of the gathered information/ 
evidence in the course of criminal proceedings in the requesting/issuing member 
state, several instruments foresee the possibility to expressly indicate that the 
requested/ordered member state in the execution of the measure, should comply 
with certain formalities and procedures (e.g. compliance with certain formalities 
and procedures, purpose or use limitations etc). Interestingly, 60% (cluster 3 and 
5) upto 70% (cluster 6) of the member states indicate to be willing to accept a 
forum regit actum regime.  
Additionally, member states could indicate what the current position of the 
persons concerned by the execution of the measure is. Three scenarios were put 
to the test: first, the possibility to grant a person the national guarantees of the 
executing member state; second, the possibility to grant a person the best of both 
worlds, being the guarantees of either the executing or the requested member 
state; third, the possibility to introduce a set of commonly agreed upon 
minimum standards. The results of the current practice with regard to these 
three scenarios is contrasted by a larger support of either of them as a future 
policy. Between 70 and 80% of the member states (depending on the clusters and 
on the scope of the rights that would be granted to the persons concerned) 
consider either of these three scenarios to be an acceptable future policy. When 
going into detail on the elaboration of common minimum rules, 90% of the 
member states should based on/derived from the ECHR/other common 
fundamental rights texts and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to the extent available. 
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Secondly it was assessed to what extend member states are willing to go 
beyond the limits of their own legal system. This section of the questionnaire 
linked in with the possibility to require that the (execution of the) investigative 
measure is consistent with the law of the requested member state. Analysis 
revealed that member states are very reluctant to proceed with the execution of 
an investigative measure if it surpasses the national scope ratione personae. 70% 
indicated that execution would not be possible in such cases. Only 30% is 
prepared to go ahead with this investigative measure albeit this percentage 
increases with 10% in cluster 5. Member states are not willing to execute if the 
order/warrant/request relates to acts which do not constitute offences in the 
national law of the executing member state. Having anticipated this outcome, 
the questionnaire made a distinction between a general ratione materiae issue and 
an issue linked to the 32 MR offences featuring in mutual recognition 
instruments. As this list embodies the abandonment of the double criminality 
test, it is only logical for member states to be willing to cooperate if the acts 
concerned are included in 32 MR offences, regardless of criminalisation under 
the own national law. This hypothesis was confirmed by the results of the study 
in that 50% of the member states currently already applies this rule and an 
additional 30% considers it a valid future policy option to abandon the 
possibility to make execution dependant on double criminality. The project team 
anticipates similar results when the 32 MR offences are attempted to be used to 
avoid lack of execution for other types of inconsistency with the national law of 
the execution member state. 
Furthermore, requested member states are not only obliged to answer to the 
request, but equally have to respect additional formal or procedural 
requirements attached by the requesting state provided that the requirements 
are not contrary to the requested member states’ fundamental principles of law. 
Considering the importance for the admissibility of evidence, it is interesting 
to note that not all member states use the possibility to request additional formal 
or procedural requirements. The percentage ranges from 50% in cluster 1 to 80% 
in cluster 6. This might indicate a great deal of trust in the legal systems of the 
executing member states. The end goal of mutual assistance is the obtaining of 
information/evidence to be used in the course of criminal proceedings in the 
issuing/requesting member state. Not complying with the formalities expressly 
indicated constitutes an important risk. The information/evidence gathered runs 
the risk of being inadmissible in the requesting/issuing member state. Therefore 
compliance with expressly indicated formalities is of utmost importance. 
 
5.4 Horizontalisation of cooperation 
The fourth MR characteristic relates to the horizontalisation of cooperation. 
MR typically takes place between the authorities of the member states. 
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Derogation from this general rule is possible in special cases, without further 
clarifying what constitutes a special case. The project team considers it advisable 
to eliminate such possibility to derogate from the general rule, and only 
maintain one single exception for the transfer of persons held in custody. The 
only other exception currently generally used is the exchange of criminal records 
data, which will be replaced by the ECRIS system and therefore no longer needs 
to be an exception to the direct communication rule.  
Direct communication and thus further horizontalisation of the cooperation 
environment impacts on the importance of institutional capacity at all authority 
levels within the member states. Further investment is vital to ensure that MLA 
becomes a well oiled machine. A reference to this discussion explains why 
questions related to institutional capacity were included in the questionnaire. 
Acceptance of requests issued in a foreign language and technical capacity issues 
judicial authorities are confronted with, were assessed.  
In a Union which counts 27 members and 23 different languages, MLA and 
MR become empty concepts when member states do not have the institutional 
capacity to make sure that all requests are understandable for all parties 
involved. Linguistic and translation facilities and staff are of undeniable 
importance. Member states were asked to what extent they had translations in 
English, French or German of their criminal code, their code of criminal 
procedure or (other) MLA and MR legislation available. The relevance of the 
previously mentioned question lies in the fact that most request for MLA are 
accompanied by the corresponding extracts from the relevant legislation, 
applying to the circumstances of the case. Anaysis revealed that as far as 
complete translated versions of relevant legislation are concerned, the general 
situation is that they are more available in member states in English than they 
are in French and German. In future (MR based) MLA it should be an obligation 
to accept requests/orders in English. Therefore, it is highly recommendable that 
all member states invest time, effort and resources in having at least partial 
translations of the most relevant passages of their criminal codes, their codes of 
criminal procedure or (other) MLA and MR legislation into English available.  
Going further when examining language-related issues in relation to MLA, 
the questionnaire assessed member states’ general willingness to accept requests 
and orders they receive from other member states, written in one of three 
aforementioned languages. The results of this assessment are clear; most 
requests and orders in English are accepted while requests and orders in French 
and German are not accepted by the large majority of the responding member 
states. This conclusion strengthens the position to make acceptance of incoming 
requests/orders in English an obligation. 
The questionnaire also asked member states if proper translation and 
interpretation facilities were available to translate and interpret requests and 
orders from and into English, French, and/or German. English interpretation and 
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translation facilities were most available in the responding member states, 
followed by German facilities and French facilities were in place the least. 
Other non-legislative measures which could facilitate cross-border 
cooperation and which deserve analysis can be put under the term “technical 
capacity issues”. Just as difficulties arise when member states receive requests or 
orders for assistance in a language they do not understand, answering to 
requests or orders without having the technical capacity to do so is problematic. 
Even though technical issues do not have any sort of legal framework in MLA 
nor MR-instruments, the project team recognized the importance of the issue 
and included questions about technical issues in the questionnaire. The 
importance of all the assessed issues is that member states might refuse to 
comply with or answer to certain orders or request for measures to be taken, 
because they are technically not capable of doing so. The implicit legal basis for 
such refusals is the overarching Art. 1 ECMA states that member states are 
obliged to grant each other the widest measure possible of mutual assistance. If 
member states do not have the capacity to answer to requests or orders, it is 
obviously not possible for them to grant assistance and cross-border cooperation 
fails. The importance of measures for the future in this respect, should not be 
underestimated. 
To investigate the status questionis of technical capacity of member states to 
effectively process requests for MLA, a number of relevant questions there-to 
were asked in the questionnaire. More specifically, the extent to which certain 
technical and other facilitators for the fluent and speedy processing of requests 
and orders were available in responding member states was assessed.  
First, ICT equipment such as telephones, faxes, modem lines, e-mail, fast 
internet connectivity, etc. are either of high or medium-level availability to the 
responding member states. None of the member states claimed to have a low 
availability of such ICT-facilitators. When asked about the availability of 
technical means for video or telephone conferences including available measures 
for protection in such a context (such as audio/video distortion), there were as 
many member states claiming a high availability thereof as member states 
claiming a low availability of such means. When asked for the level of 
availability and quality of technical means required for special investigative 
measures such as interception, audio or video monitoring, etc. the large majority 
of member states reported only medium-level availability there-of. The 
importance of having the technical capacity to execute these kinds of measures is 
however is however not to be underestimated. In the last decade 
telecommunications technology has undergone considerable development, 
particularly in the field of mobile telecommunications. These are very widely 
used by offenders in the context of their criminal activities, especially in the field 
of cross-border crime. Furthermore, member states were asked about availability 
of and access to travel budgets for certain authorities to for example participate 
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in joint investigation teams or to assist in the execution of requests abroad. Only 
a very small number of member states claimed that such budgets were available, 
most member states responded that such budgets were only available to a low 
extent. An important recommendation in this respect, especially considering the 
importance of successful JIT-cooperation and the need for extra impulses to 
engage in such cooperation, is that more budgets should urgently be made 
available. As a more general question, member states were asked about the 
availability and quality of off-line (paper and electronic versions) relevant legal 
documentation. Most member states claimed a high availability and quality of 
such documentation and none if the member states reported a low availability 
and quality. As a very last question, member states were asked if the executions 
of requests were monitored for quality and speed. Again results were satisfying, 
as most member states reported that such a monitoring mechanism was indeed 
in place. 
 
5.5 Free movement of evidence 
 The project team wanted to assess the possibility of a future implementation 
of a system of mutual admissibility of evidence across the EU. The entire 
question of MLA in obtaining evidence becomes completely useless if in the end, 
the obtained evidence will not serve any purpose in trial due to inadmissibility. 
It is now 100% unclear what will happen with the evidence, gathered or 
obtained on the basis of cross-border cooperation.  
As a first point of focus, the status of rules on unlawfully obtained evidence 
in domestic cases was assessed.  The exact same set of questions was asked for 
the scenario in which unlawfully obtained evidence is transferred to a member 
state, after it was collected there or it was in another way already available in 
that member state. Thirdly, the set of questions was asked for the scenario in 
which a member state requests or orders information or evidence to another 
member state, and where the requested member state obtains this information or 
evidence in an unlawful or irregular manner. The overall conclusion after the 
analysis of rules and their consequences and character for unlawfully obtained 
evidence both domestically and abroad is first that a multitude of scenario’s are 
possible. Secondly, in most member states all of these rules are governed by 
statutory law, only a small fraction of these rules imbedded are constitutionally 
embedded. This could mean that the future harmonization of rules for mutual 
admissibility of evidence would not necessarily pose major legal problems for 
the large majority of member states. The greatest variety exists in member states 
when it comes to the value that they attribute to unlawfully obtained evidence in 
further stages of the criminal justice process. Not only is there a great variety 
among member states as to the use of unlawfully obtained evidence in a merely 
national context as steering or supportive evidence or the complete exclusion 
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thereof, some variation also exists as to the value that member states attribute to 
this evidence in a national context on the one hand, and to this evidence when it 
is obtained abroad on the other hand. While some member states attribute the 
exact same value to unlawfully obtained evidence in a national context and 
when it comes from another member state, others do show some difference in 
the validation of foreign evidence. Some member states are more strict in the 
validation of unlawfully obtained evidence in another member state, and 
surprisingly, sometimes more leniency is shown in this validation of foreign 
evidence. The fact that a significant amount of member states already does not 
make any difference in the validation of unlawfully obtained evidence as to 
where it was obtained, is certainly a sign of the possibility of future complete 
mutual admissibility of evidence, and attributing the same value to any kind of 
evidence, no matter where in the EU it was obtained. Furthermore, as nearly all 
member states have existing sets of rules of their own for attributing a certain 
value to unlawfully obtained evidence, the previously made remark of the law 
that must be respected if evidence is not to be excluded is first and foremost the 
national law of the place where the evidence is situated, poses no problems. As 
member states have sufficient rules in place to qualify the value of certain 
evidence, member states that request the obtainment and transfer of evidence 
should trust that these rules are of a high enough standard to mutually 
recognize the value that the requested member state has attributed to evidence 
that has moved across their borders. The rules governing exclusion can and 
should be those of the member state in which the evidence was obtained. This is 
an important recommendation for the future of mutual admissibility of 
evidence, and more generally for the future of mutual recognition. 
Furthermore, four types of techniques and the evidence they bring with them 
have been assessed in the questionnaire. The reason for the selection of these 
particular our, is that they are under heavy discussion and the most differences 
across member states as to their admissibility can be expected. These large 
differences can be problematic if one wants to move in the direction of complete 
mutual admissibility of evidence and mutual recognition in general. The EEW 
entails some important minimum safeguards to help protect fundamental rights. 
More specifically, Art. 6 ensures that the EEW will be issued only when the 
issuing authority is satisfied that the following conditions have been met: that 
the objects, documents and data are likely to be admissible in the proceedings 
for which it is sought. This prevents the EEW from being used to circumvent 
protections in the national law of the issuing  state on admissibility of evidence, 
particularly if further action is taken in the future on the mutual admissibility of 
evidence obtained pursuant to the EEW. This article is important, especially 
since a lot of differences exist among member states as to the admissibility of 
certain investigation techniques. The four techniques analysed are the use of a lie 
detection test, the use of statements of anonymous witnesses taken in the 
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requested/executing member state not covered in the EU MLA Convention, the 
technique of provocation/entrapment and the use of hearsay evidence. The 
questionnaire has addressed just how big the differences in admissibility are 
across member states, and how willing member states are to accept evidence that 
these techniques bring forth, when having been conducted abroad. The overall 
conclusion of this assessment is that most of the time, the same value is 
attributed to these techniques and the evidence that they bring forth, whether it 
comes from another member state or is domestically obtained. This is a very 
positive outcome for the principle of MR. Even more, sometimes more leniency 
is shown for foreign evidence in comparison with domestically obtained 
evidence, which is a surprising outcome to say the least. This however does not 
violate Art. 6 EEW per se, for the reason explained above. When however 
comparing the admissibility and value of the techniques on a domestic level, as 
predicted, large differences exist. This could be problematic for the discussion of 
harmonization of procedural criminal law in the EU. 
Finally, member states’ views and current situations of mutual admissibility 
of lawfully obtained evidence was assessed.  
Finally, member states’ views and current situations of mutual admissibility 
of lawfully obtained evidence was assessed. More specifically, experts in 
member states were asked in the questionnaire to what extent they felt that, 
according to their experience, information/evidence which has been collected in 
another member state in accordance with its domestic law and procedures, being 
eligible for use as evidence under its domestic law, was often considered 
inadmissible or of a reduced probative value because of the manner in which it 
has been gathered? Most member states claimed that they did not feel this was 
often the case, which is a positive outcome for the future of MR. A smaller 
fraction of member states did however claim that this was often the case. These 
member states were asked what, in their experience, would often be the 
underlying reason for this inadmissibility or reduced probative value. 
Two very specific questions were asked in this respect. First, member states 
were asked if they would consider it an acceptable EU future policy option that 
information lawfully obtained by a member or seconded member while part of a 
joint investigation team which is not otherwise available to the competent 
authorities of the member states would constitute per se admissible evidence 
under the national law of the member states concerned? 90% of the member 
states would indeed consider this to be a good policy option. Secondly, member 
states were asked to what extent they currently accepted that competent 
authorities from other member states who are lawfully present on their territory 
in while executing a request/order/warrant (e.g. when seconded member of a 
joint investigation team operating on their territory, when present during a 
hearing or house search etc) draft official reports having the same probative 
value under their national law as if they had been drafted by their own 
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competent authorities; Almost all member states currently accept this. Half of 
the ones that do not, consider this to be a good future policy option. Only one 
member states would not be willing to accept this. 
In globo, as a conclusion of this assessment of the status quo in member 
states of mutual admissibility of evidence, the outcome is very positive and no 
significant issues would have to be faced if the system of per se admissibility of 
evidence were to be installed in the EU. The Eurojust College also comes to this 
conclusion and considers that in principle, evidence taken abroad in an EU 
member state in conformity with the law of that state, should be admissible 
evidence in other member states, unless the way the evidence was obtained is 
contrary to their fundamental principles. 
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7 Annex: Online questionnaire 
7.1 Preliminary evidence-related issues 
 
 
1. Is/are there any general rule(s) (constitutional, as a general principle of law, 
statutory, jurisprudential) rendering information/evidence which has been 
unlawfully or irregularly obtained inadmissible or reducing its probative 
value as evidence 
[mutually non-exclusive categories: please tick all applicable boxes] 
[optional: if yes: stipulate each time the type of rule [tickboxes, all 
applicable boxes to be ticked: constitutional, as a general principle of law, 
statutory, jurisprudential] 
• at domestic level, in a merely national context 
1) where the information/evidence has been obtained in breach of 
formalities or procedural rules the violation of which is sanctioned 
with absolute nullity 
 yes 
 no 
[if yes: 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded 
as evidence altogether and would the same apply to 
the so called ‘fruits of the poisonous tree’ (so that it 
could not even be used any longer as mere (steering) 
information) 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded 
as evidence altogether, without the same applying to 
the so called ‘fruits of the poisonous tree’ (so that it 
could still be used as mere (steering) information) 
 could the information/evidence still be used as 
supportive evidence (meaning that it has to be 
corroborated by other evidence and cannot form the 
sole or decisive basis for a conviction, in which case 
the court will motivate the probative value it has 
attributed to such evidence)] 
2) where the unlawfulness or irregularity impacts upon the reliability 
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of the information/evidence  
 yes 
 no 
[if yes:  
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded as evidence 
altogether and would the same apply to the so called ‘fruits of the 
poisonous tree’ (so that it could not even be used any longer as 
mere (steering) information) 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded as evidence 
altogether, without the same applying to the so called ‘fruits of 
the poisonous tree’ (so that it could still be used as mere 
(steering) information) 
 could the information/evidence still be used as supportive 
evidence (meaning that it has to be corroborated by other 
evidence and cannot form the sole or decisive basis for a 
conviction, in which case the court will motivate the probative 
value it has attributed to such evidence)] 
3) where use of the information/evidence as evidence would violate the 
right to a fair trial 
 yes 
 no 
[if yes:  
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded as evidence 
altogether and would the same apply to the so called ‘fruits of the 
poisonous tree’ (so that it could not even be used any longer as 
mere (steering) information) 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded as evidence 
altogether, without the same applying to the so called ‘fruits of 
the poisonous tree’ (so that it could still be used as mere 
(steering) information) 
 could the information/evidence still be used as supportive 
evidence (meaning that it has to be corroborated by other 
evidence and cannot form the sole or decisive basis for a 
ANNEX: ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
163 
 
conviction, in which case the court will motivate the probative 
value it has attributed to such evidence)] 
 
• abroad, having been collected or otherwise being available there, and 
only later on transferred to your member state before, either 
spontaneously by the (competent authorities from) another member 
state or following a request/order/warrant issued by (the competent 
authorities from) your member state  
1) where the information/evidence has been obtained in breach of 
formalities or procedural rules the violation of which is sanctioned 
with absolute nullity 
 yes 
 no 
[if yes:  
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded as evidence 
altogether and would the same apply to the so called ‘fruits of the 
poisonous tree’ (so that it could not even be used any longer as 
mere (steering) information) 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded as evidence 
altogether, without the same applying to the so called ‘fruits of 
the poisonous tree’ (so that it could still be used as mere 
(steering) information) 
 could the information/evidence still be used as supportive 
evidence (meaning that it has to be corroborated by other 
evidence and cannot form the sole or decisive basis for a 
conviction, in which case the court will motivate the probative 
value it has attributed to such evidence)] 
2) where the unlawfulness or irregularity impacts upon the reliability 
of the information/evidence 
 yes 
 no 
[if yes:  
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded as evidence 
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altogether and would the same apply to the so called ‘fruits of the 
poisonous tree’ (so that it could not even be used any longer as 
mere (steering) information) 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded as evidence 
altogether, without the same applying to the so called ‘fruits of 
the poisonous tree’ (so that it could still be used as mere 
(steering) information) 
 could the information/evidence still be used as supportive 
evidence (meaning that it has to be corroborated by other 
evidence and cannot form the sole or decisive basis for a 
conviction, in which case the court will motivate the probative 
value it has attributed to such evidence)] 
3) where use of the information/evidence as evidence would violate the 
right to a fair trial 
 yes 
 no 
 
[if yes: 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded as evidence 
altogether and would the same apply to the so called ‘fruits of the 
poisonous tree’ (so that it could not even be used any longer as 
mere (steering) information) 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded as evidence 
altogether, without the same applying to the so called ‘fruits of 
the poisonous tree’ (so that it could still be used as mere 
(steering) information) 
 could the information/evidence still be used as supportive 
evidence (meaning that it has to be corroborated by other 
evidence and cannot form the sole or decisive basis for a 
conviction, in which case the court will motivate the probative 
value it has attributed to such evidence)] 
• irregularly obtained by the requested/executing authority/member state 
in executing a request/order/warrant by (the competent authorities 
from) your member state  
1) where the information/evidence has been obtained in breach of 
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formalities or procedural rules the violation of which is sanctioned 
with absolute nullity 
 yes 
 no 
 
[if yes:  
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded as evidence 
altogether and would the same apply to the so called ‘fruits of the 
poisonous tree’ (so that it could not even be used any longer as 
mere (steering) information) 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded as evidence 
altogether, without the same applying to the so called ‘fruits of 
the poisonous tree’ (so that it could still be used as mere 
(steering) information) 
 could the information/evidence still be used as supportive 
evidence (meaning that it has to be corroborated by other 
evidence and cannot form the sole or decisive basis for a 
conviction, in which case the court will motivate the probative 
value it has attributed to such evidence)] 
2) where the unlawfulness or irregularity impacts upon the reliability 
of the information/evidence 
 yes    
 no 
[if yes:  
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded as evidence 
altogether and would the same apply to the so called ‘fruits of the 
poisonous tree’ (so that it could not even be used any longer as 
mere (steering) information) 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded as evidence 
altogether, without the same applying to the so called ‘fruits of 
the poisonous tree’ (so that it could still be used as mere 
(steering) information) 
 could the information/evidence still be used as supportive 
evidence (meaning that it has to be corroborated by other 
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evidence and cannot form the sole or decisive basis for a 
conviction, in which case the court will motivate the probative 
value it has attributed to such evidence)] 
3) where use of the information/evidence as evidence would violate the 
right to a fair trial 
 yes    
 no 
 
[if yes:   
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded as evidence 
altogether and would the same apply to the so called ‘fruits of the 
poisonous tree’ (so that it could not even be used any longer as 
mere (steering) information) 
 would the information/evidence need to be excluded as evidence 
altogether, without the same applying to the so called ‘fruits of 
the poisonous tree’ (so that it could still be used as mere 
(steering) information) 
 could the information/evidence still be used as supportive 
evidence (meaning that it has to be corroborated by other 
evidence and cannot form the sole or decisive basis for a 
conviction, in which case the court will motivate the probative 
value it has attributed to such evidence 
 
2. Do you allow for the following evidence (gathering techniques), and if so, 
how do you assess their probative value and, if the evidence has been 
gathered in another member state (using the techniques concerned), would 
you consider it admissible and what would the probative value of it be like 
[mutually non-exclusive categories: please tick all applicable boxes] 
• lie detection test  
1. do you allow for this technique domestically 
 yes     
 no 
[if yes: the evidence (gathered using this technique) 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
ANNEX: ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
167 
 
 could be used as the sole or decisive evidence 
 could only be used as supportive evidence 
 could only be used as mere (steering) information 
2. if the evidence has been gathered in another member state (using 
the technique concerned), it 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 would be inadmissible 
 could be used as the sole or decisive evidence 
 could only be used as supportive evidence 
 could only be used as mere (steering) information 
• provocation/entrapment (the offence being provoked by the 
police/authorities) 
1) do you allow for this technique domestically 
 yes     
 no 
[if yes: the evidence (gathered using this technique) 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 could be used as the sole or decisive evidence 
 could only be used as supportive evidence 
 could only be used as mere (steering) information 
2) if the evidence has been gathered in another member state (using 
the technique concerned), it 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 would be inadmissible 
 could be used as the sole or decisive evidence 
 could only be used as supportive evidence 
 could only be used as mere (steering) information 
• Using statements of an anonymous witness (any person, irrespective of 
his status under national criminal procedural law, who provides or is 
willing to provide information relevant to criminal proceedings and 
whose identity is concealed from the parties during the pre-trial 
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investigation or the trial proceedings through the use of procedural 
protective measures), taken in the requested/executing member state [not 
covered in EU MLA Convention]  
1) do you allow for this technique domestically 
 yes     
 no 
[if yes: the evidence (gathered using this technique) 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 could be used as the sole or decisive evidence 
 could only be used as supportive evidence 
 could only be used as mere (steering) information 
2) if the evidence has been gathered in another member state (using 
the technique concerned), it 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 would be inadmissible 
 could be used as the sole or decisive evidence 
 could only be used as supportive evidence 
 could only be used as mere (steering) information 
• hearsay (indirectly obtained information, other than from a direct 
witness) 
1) do you allow for this technique domestically 
 yes     
 no 
[if yes: the evidence (gathered using this technique) 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 could be used as the sole or decisive evidence 
 could only be used as supportive evidence 
 could only be used as mere (steering) information 
2) if the evidence has been gathered in another member state (using 
the technique concerned), it 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
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 would be inadmissible 
 could be used as the sole or decisive evidence 
 could only be used as supportive evidence 
 could only be used as mere (steering) information 
 
3. Where information/evidence has been collected in another member state in 
accordance with its domestic law and procedures or is otherwise available 
there, being eligible for use as evidence under its domestic law, is it your 
experience that it is often considered inadmissible or of a reduced probative 
value after having been transferred to your member state (either as a result 
of spontaneous information exchange or of a request/order/warrant 
made/issued by you) because of the manner in which it has been gathered 
(either in the requested/executing member state or in another state where it 
was initially collected) 
 yes    
 no 
 [if yes: 
[mutually non-exclusive categories: please tick all applicable boxes] 
 that manner being not fully in accordance with/the manner provided for 
in your national law (and procedures) 
 that manner not respecting specific condition(s) which would have to be 
observed in a similar national case (e.g. compliance with certain 
formalities and procedures, purpose or use limitations etc) 
 that manner not (fully) respecting the formalities and procedures 
expressly indicated by you in your capacity of requesting/issuing 
authority/member state 
[if yes: is it your experience that (the authorities of) other member 
states often refuse to comply with such formalities or procedures 
because they are considered contrary to fundamental principles of their 
national law? 
 yes     
 no 
 that manner not having granted the person(s) concerned by the 
execution of the measure(s) that has/have prompted the 
information/evidence the specific procedural guarantees or rights that 
would accrue to him/her/them in the execution of such measure(s) in a 
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similar case under your national law, or not having allowed the 
person(s) concerned to claim these 
 that manner in a similar case under your national law being in breach of 
formalities or procedural rules the violation of which would be 
sanctioned with absolute nullity 
 that manner being considered in a similar case under your national law 
to impact upon the reliability of the information/evidence 
 that manner being considered in a similar case under your national law 
to violate the right to a fair trial 
 that manner being considered in a similar case under your national law 
as in violation of ECHR/other common fundamental rights texts and/or 
the ECtHR’s jurisprudence (relating to other issues than to the right to a 
fair trial 
 Eurojust  
Where information/evidence has been collected in one member state in 
accordance with its domestic law and procedures or is otherwise available there, 
being eligible for use as evidence under its domestic law, is it Eurojust’s 
experience that it is often considered inadmissible or of a reduced probative 
value after having been transferred to another member state (either as a result of 
spontaneous information exchange or of a request/order/warrant made/issued 
by you) because of the manner in which it has been gathered (either in the 
requested/executing member state or in another state where it was initially 
collected) 
 yes 
 no 
[if yes:  
[mutually non-exclusive categories: please tick all applicable boxes] 
 
 that manner being not fully in accordance with/the manner 
provided for in the national law (and procedures) of the 
requesting state 
 that manner not respecting specific condition(s) which would 
have to be observed in a similar national case (e.g. compliance 
with certain formalities and procedures, purpose or use 
limitations etc) 
 that manner not (fully) respecting the formalities and 
procedures expressly indicated the requesting/issuing 
authority/member state 
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[if yes: is it Eurojust’s experience that (the 
authorities of) member states often refuse to comply 
with such requested formalities or procedures because 
they are considered contrary to fundamental principles 
of their national law? 
 yes 
 no 
 
 that manner not having granted the person(s) concerned by the 
execution of the measure(s) that has/have prompted the 
information/evidence the specific procedural guarantees or 
rights that would accrue to him/her/them in the execution of 
such measure(s) in a similar case under their national law, or 
not having allowed the person(s) concerned to claim these 
 that manner in a similar case under the national law of the 
requesting state being in breach of formalities or procedural 
rules the violation of which would be sanctioned with absolute 
nullity 
 that manner being considered in a similar case under the 
national law of the requesting state to impact upon the 
reliability of the information/evidence 
 that manner being considered in a similar case under the 
national law of the requesting state to violate the right to a fair 
trial 
 that manner being considered in a similar case under the 
national law of the requesting state as in violation of 
ECHR/other common fundamental rights texts and/or the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence (relating to other issues than to the right 
to a fair trial). 
 
4. Where information/evidence has been collected in/from another member 
state, is it your experience that its admissibility, reliability or probative 
value  is often being challenged or questioned by defence lawyers or 
judges? 
 
 yes 
 no 
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5. Would  information/evidence obtained in/from another member state in 
most cases constitute admissible evidence under your national law: 
 
• where it has been collected in the other member state concerned in 
accordance with/in the manner provided for in its domestic law (and 
procedures) or is otherwise available there, being eligible for use as 
evidence under its domestic law 
 yes 
 no 
 
[if not: do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option that, 
in this case, it would constitute per se admissible evidence under your 
national law?]  
 yes     
 no 
 
Eurojust 
Would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option that 
information/evidence obtained in/from one member state should constitute 
admissible evidence in another member state where it has been collected in the 
first member state concerned in accordance with/in the manner provided for in 
the domestic law of the obtaining state (and procedures) or is otherwise 
available there, being eligible for use as evidence under its domestic law? 
 yes 
 no 
 
• under the condition that the person(s) concerned by the execution of the 
measure(s) that has/have prompted the information/evidence has/have 
been granted the specific procedural guarantees or rights that would 
accrue to him/her/them in the execution of such measure(s) in a similar 
case under either your national law or that of the requesting/issuing 
member state, or has/have been able to claim these 
 yes 
 no 
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[if not: do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option that, 
in this case, it would constitute per se admissible evidence under your 
national law?]  
 yes     
 no 
 
Eurojust 
Would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option that 
information/evidence obtained in/from one member state should constitute 
admissible evidence in another member state under the condition that the 
person(s) concerned by the execution of the measure(s) that has/have prompted 
the information/evidence has/have been granted the specific procedural 
guarantees or rights that would accrue to him/her/them in the execution of such 
measure(s) in a similar case under either the national law of the 
requesting/issuing member state, or has/have been able to claim these? 
 yes 
 no 
 
 
• where it has been collected in the other member state concerned in 
accordance with certain (specific) minimum procedural standards for 
gathering information/evidence (other than merely technical or forensic) 
standards, commonly agreed to at EU level 
 yes 
 no 
 
[if yes 
[specify: the minimum standards to be agreed to should 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 be based on/derived from the ECHR/other 
common fundamental rights texts and the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to the extent 
available] 
 be of a higher standard 
 be of a lower standard] 
ANNEX: ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
174 
 
 
[if not: do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option that, 
in this case, it would constitute per se admissible evidence under your 
national law] 
 yes     
 no 
[if yes, specify: the minimum standards to be agreed to should 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 be based on/derived from the ECHR/other 
common fundamental rights texts and the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to the extent 
available] 
 be of a higher standard 
 be of a lower standard] 
 
       Eurojust  
Would  Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option that 
information/evidence obtained in/from one member state should constitute 
admissible evidence in another member state where it has been collected in the 
other member state concerned in accordance with certain (specific) minimum 
procedural standards for gathering information/evidence (other than merely 
technical or forensic) standards, commonly agreed to at EU level 
  
 yes 
 no 
 
[if yes 
[specify: the minimum standards to be agreed to should 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 be based on/derived from the ECHR/other common fundamental rights 
texts and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to the extent available] 
 be of a higher standard 
 be of a lower standard] 
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6. Do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option that information 
lawfully obtained by a member or seconded member while part of a joint 
investigation team which is not otherwise available to the competent 
authorities of the member states would constitute per se admissible 
evidence under the national law of the member states concerned 
 yes 
 no 
 only where the acts/offences the team has been set up for constitute any 
of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the 
law of the respective member states and being punishable there by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 
three years] 
 
Eurojust  
Would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option that 
information lawfully obtained by a member or seconded member while part of a 
joint investigation team which is not otherwise available to the competent 
authorities of the member states would constitute per se admissible evidence 
under the national law of the member states concerned? 
 yes 
 no 
 only where the acts/offences the team has been set up for constitute any 
of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the 
law of the respective member states and being punishable there by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years 
 
 
7. Do you currently accept that competent authorities from other member 
states who are lawfully present on your territory in while executing a 
request/order/warrant (e.g. when seconded member of a joint investigation 
team operating on your territory, when present during a hearing or house 
search etc) draft official reports having the same probative value under 
your national law as if they had been drafted by your own competent 
authorities 
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 yes 
 no 
 
[if not: do you consider this an acceptable EU future policy option] 
 yes 
 no 
 only where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to 
constitute any of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as 
defined by your law and being punishable in your member state by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 
three years] 
 
 
 
Eurojust 
Would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option that 
member states ought to accept that competent authorities from other member 
states who are lawfully present on their territory in while executing a 
request/order/warrant (e.g. when seconded member of a joint investigation team 
operating on their territory, when present during a hearing or house search etc) 
draft official reports having the same probative value their national law as if 
they had been drafted by their own competent authorities? 
 yes 
 no 
 only where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to 
constitute any of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ 
as defined by the law and being punishable in the respective 
member state by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a 
maximum period of at least three years 
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7.2 MLA/MR-related questions 
The replies to the questions below may/are likely to differ depending on the 
type of mutual assistance (MLA) or mutual recognition (MR) concerned. 
Member states are therefore requested to answer a similar set of questions (and 
thus differ their replies) for the various types of MLA/MR, which have 
conveniently been logically clustered below in 6 categories (1-6), listed 
immediately below for your information. 
1. Obtaining objects, documents or data which are already in the possession 
of the requested/executing authority/member state before a 
request/order/warrant is issued 
(including from a third party, from a search of premises including the private 
premises of the suspect, historical data on the use of any services including 
financial transactions, historical records of statements, interviews and hearings, 
electronic data not located in the requested/executing state (to the extent possible 
under its law), and other records, including the results of special investigative 
techniques) 
2. Investigative measures/measures of assistance (other than the 
aforementioned measures) which have been explicitly regulated in MLA legal 
instruments applicable between the EU member states and the taking/execution 
of which the requested/executing member state/member state on the territory of 
which the measure is to be taken/executed may currently make dependent on 
the condition(s) of dual criminality, (dual) minimum threshold or consistency 
with its national law 
i.e. (limitative list): 
(house) search and seizure (other than required for the execution of a 
request/order/warrant in fine of obtaining objects, documents or data which are 
already in the possession of the requested/executing authority/member state 
before the request/order/warrant has been made/issued) 
3. Investigative measures/measures of assistance (other than the 
aforementioned measures) which have been explicitly regulated in MLA legal 
instruments applicable between the EU member states and which currently 
would only be taken/executed in accordance with/in the manner provided for in 
the national law (and procedures) of the requested/executing member 
state/member state on the territory of which the measure is to be taken/executed 
or under the condition(s) which would have to be observed in a similar national 
case in the latter member state 
i.e. (limitative list): 
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- cross-border observation  
- observation on the territory of the requested/executing member state by its 
own authorities  
- cross-border hot pursuit; 
- covert investigations (by officials)  
- controlled delivery in the territory of the requested/executing member state 
(i.e. being the territory of destination of the delivery or where intervention is 
envisaged)  
- interception of telecommunications if the subject of the interception is 
present in the requested/executing member state and his or her 
communications can be intercepted in that member state, with immediate;   
- interception of telecommunications requiring the technical assistance of the 
requested member state (irrespective of whether the subject of the 
interception is present in the territory of the requesting, requested or a third 
member state), without transmission and without transcription of the 
recordings;  
- interception of telecommunications requiring the technical assistance of the 
requested member state (irrespective of whether the subject of the 
interception is present in the territory of the requesting, requested or a third 
member state), without transmission and with transcription of the  
- allowing an interception of telecommunications to be carried out or 
continued if the telecommunication address of the subject of the interception 
is being used on the territory of the requested/executing member state 
(‘notified’ member state) in case where no technical assistance from the 
latter is needed to carry out the  
- monitoring of banking transactions  
- collecting and examining cellular material and supplying the DNA profile 
obtained 
 
4. Investigative measures/measures of assistance (other than the 
aforementioned measures) which have been explicitly regulated in MLA legal 
instruments applicable between the EU member states and the taking/execution 
of which the requested/executing member state/member state on the territory of 
which the measure is to be taken/executed may currently not make dependent 
on any condition of dual criminality, (dual) minimum threshold or consistency 
with its national law 
i.e. (limitative list): 
Interception of telecommunications where the technical assistance  of the 
requested/executing member state is needed to intercept the telecommunications 
of the subject of the interception (irrespective of whether the latter is present in 
its territory or in that of a third member state) with immediate transmission 
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Interception of telecommunications where the technical assistance  of the 
requested/executing member state is needed to intercept the telecommunications 
of the subject of the interception (irrespective of whether the latter is present in 
its territory or in that of a third member state) without immediate transmission 
and without transcription of the recordings 
Interception of telecommunications where the technical assistance  of the 
requested/executing member state is needed to intercept the telecommunications 
of the subject of the interception (irrespective of whether the latter is present in 
its territory or in that of a third member state) without immediate transmission 
and with transcription of the recordings 
Transfer of detainees from the requested/executing to the requesting/issuing 
member state (provided the requested/executing member state may make such 
transfer dependent on the consent of the person concerned)  
Transfer of detainees from the requesting/issuing to the requested/executing 
member state (provided the requested/executing member state may make such 
transfer dependent on the consent of the person concerned) 
Hearing under oath (of witnesses and experts) 
hearing by videoconference 
hearing by telephone conference (of witnesses or experts, only if these agree 
that the hearing takes place by that method) 
5. Investigative measures/measures of assistance (other than the 
aforementioned measures), which have not been explicitly regulated in MLA 
legal instruments applicable between the EU member states and could therefore 
fall under the scope of ‘widest measure of mutual assistance’, but for which 
(because of their coercive, covert or intrusive nature or their potential/likeliness 
to negatively impact upon/affect the reliability/evidential value of the 
information they seek to bring about) it is unlikely that the requested/executing 
member state/member state on the territory of which the measure is to be 
taken/executed will be willing to take/execute/allow for them unless in 
accordance with/in the manner provided for in its national law (and 
procedures), under the condition(s) which would have to be observed in a 
similar national case, or on the condition(s) of dual criminality, (dual) minimum 
threshold or consistency with its national law 
including (non-limitative list): 
- registration of incoming and outgoing telecommunication numbers 
- interception of so-called direct communications 
- obtaining communications data retained by providers of a publicly available 
electronic communications service or a public communications network 
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- withholding/intercepting of mail (and reading it) 
- cooperation with regard to electronic communications (other than 
telecommunications) (registration of incoming and outgoing 
communications, interception etc) 
- controlled delivery through the territory of the requested/executing member 
state (i.e. across its territory, the territory of destination of the delivery or 
where intervention is envisaged being another member state or a third state) 
– This inclusion of this investigative measure in this cluster might not be self-
explanatory, as it may seem that it is regulated in the EU MLA Convention. 
Unlike in the corresponding provision of the 1997 Naples II Convention, 
however, the provision relating to controlled deliveries in the EU MLA 
Convention doe not relate to transit controlled deliveries also, and is limited 
to controlled deliveries ‘on’ the territory of the requested member state.  
- (cross-border) use of (police) informers and civilian infiltrators 
- (cross-border) use of (police) informers and civilian infiltrators 
- (cross-border) use of technical devices (camera, electronic/GPS tracking) for 
the purposes of observation 
- entry of premises without consent in view of discrete visual control or search 
- confidence buy (either or not including flash-roll) 
- establishing front business 
- (discrete) photo and video registration 
- assistance in non-procedural protection of protected witnesses and their 
family members (direct and physical protection; placement of a detainee in a 
specialised and protected section of the prison; relocation for a short period; 
relocation for a longer or indefinite period; change of identity, including the 
concealment of certain personal data by the administrative authorities; lesser 
measures, techno-preventative in nature) 
- carrying out bodily examinations or obtaining bodily material or biometric 
data directly from the body of any person, including the taking of 
fingerprints (other than collecting and examining cellular material and 
supplying the DNA profile obtained: supra) 
- exhumation and transfer of the corpse 
- (exhumation and) forensic anatomist investigation 
- lie detection test (of a non-consenting witness or suspect) 
line-up (including of a suspect, not consenting to appear) 
6. Investigative measures/measures of assistance (other than the 
aforementioned measures) which have not been explicitly regulated in MLA 
legal instruments applicable between the EU member states and could therefore 
fall under the scope of ‘widest measure of mutual assistance’, and for which it is 
likely that the requested/executing member state/member state on the territory 
of which the measure is to be taken/executed will be willing to 
take/execute/allow for them in compliance with the formalities and procedures 
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expressly indicated by the requesting/issuing authority/member state provided 
that these are not contrary to the fundamental principles of its own law (i.e. 
lowest requirements regime)  
including (non-limitative list): 
- conducting analysis of existing objects, documents or data 
- conducting interviews or taking statements (other than from persons present 
during the execution of a European Evidence Warrant (EEW) and directly 
related to the subject thereof, in which case the relevant rules of the executing 
state applicable to national cases shall also be applicable in respect of the 
taking of such statements) or initiating other types of hearings involving 
suspects, witnesses, experts or any other party, other than under oath or by 
video or telephone conference (supra) 
- reconstruction 
- making of video or audio recordings of statements delivered in the 
requested/executing member state 
- video conference hearing of accused persons 
- video conference hearing of suspects 
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B.1. Obtaining objects, documents or data which are already in the possession 
of the requested/executing authority/member state before a 
request/order/warrant is issued 
This first category encompasses the types of assistance currently covered in 
the so called European Evidence Warrant Framework Decision of 18 December 
2008, which will apply as from 19 January 2011 and introduce a MR-based 
system for the purpose of obtaining certain types of evidence abroad in criminal 
matters, whilst the entirety of other ways of gathering evidence abroad would 
still be governed by traditional MLA-based instruments. 
This gives rise to a preliminary question:  
Do you consider it the better policy option for the EU to base the entirety of 
MLA as much as possible on a MR-based footing, as in the European Evidence 
Warrant Framework Decision, instead of keeping a dual-track system in place, 
which may be likely to cause confusion among practitioners 
 yes     
 no 
 
Eurojust 
Would Eurojust consider it the better policy option for the EU to base the 
entirety of MLA as much as possible on a MR-based footing, as in the European 
Evidence Warrant Framework Decision, instead of keeping a dual-track system 
in place, which may be likely to cause confusion among practitioners 
 yes     
 no 
 
 
Requesting formalities & procedures or providing deadlines 
Can a request/order/warrant to take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) 
in another member state be made? 
 yes     
 no 
[if yes 
Would the requested/executing authority/member state be 
requested/ordered to comply with certain formalities and procedures 
expressly indicated in executing the measure(s) requested/ordered (in 
respect of legal or administrative processes which might assist in 
making the evidence sought admissible in your member state, e.g. the 
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official stamping of a document, the presence of a representative from 
your member state, or the recording of times and dates to create a chain 
of evidence) 
 yes     
 no 
[if yes: is it your experience that the requested/executing 
authority/member state often refuses to comply with formalities or 
procedures expressly indicated because they are considered contrary to 
the fundamental principles of its national law] 
 yes     
 no 
 
Eurojust 
Is it Eurojust’s experience that requested/executing authority/member state 
often refuses to comply with formalities or procedures expressly indicated 
because they are considered contrary to the fundamental principles of its 
national law? 
 yes     
 no 
 
 
Grounds for refusal/non-execution 
Would execution in your member state of a request/order/warrant 
made/issued by (the competent authority in) another member state to 
take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) (regardless of possible non-
execution for any other reason) be refused, or should it be possible to refuse 
execution: 
[mutually non-exclusive categories: tick all applicable boxes] 
 if execution of the request/order/warrant would infringe the ne bis in 
idem principle 
 If the person(s) concerned has been given immunity from prosecution in 
your member state for the same acts s given in the country itself for the 
same acts the request/order/warrant relates to  
 if the request/order/warrant, where its execution necessitates to carry 
out a search or seizure, relates to acts which do not constitute an offence 
under your law, unless these acts, as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state, do constitute any of the 32 
offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ and are punishable there by a 
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custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 
three years  
 if it is not possible to execute the request/order/warrant by any of the 
measures which would be available to the requested/executing 
authority in a similar domestic case (provided that for the 32 offences 
from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years, it must be ensured that there are measures, including 
search and seizure, available for the purpose of the execution of a 
request/order/warrant concerned) 
 if there is an immunity or privilege under your law which makes it 
impossible to execute the request/order/warrant 
 if the request/order/warrant relates to criminal offences which under the 
law of the requested/executing member state are regarded as having 
been committed wholly or for a major or essential part within its 
territory, or in a place equivalent to its territory, or were committed 
outside the territory of the requesting/issuing member state and your 
law does not permit legal proceedings to be taken in respect of such 
offences where they are committed outside your territory 
 if, in a specific case, execution of the request/order/warrant would harm 
essential national security interests, jeopardise the source of the 
information or involve the use of classified information relating to 
specific intelligence activities (be it only to the extent that the 
information obtained would not be used for those reasons as evidence 
in a similar domestic case) 
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B.2. Investigative measures/measures of assistance (other than the 
aforementioned measures) which have been explicitly regulated in MLA legal 
instruments applicable between the EU member states and the taking/execution 
of which the requested/executing member state/member state on the territory of 
which the measure is to be taken/executed may currently make dependent on 
the condition(s) of dual criminality, (dual) minimum threshold or consistency 
with its national law 
As member states have already accepted (in the European Evidence Warrant 
Framework Decision) (house) search and seizure required for the execution of a 
request/order/warrant in fine of obtaining objects, documents or data which are 
already in the possession of the requested/executing authority/member state 
before the request/order/warrant has been made/issued) to come under the 
principle of MR, it is only logical for them to be willing to agree that house) 
search and seizure other than for the execution of European Evidence Warrant 
be brought under the same regime as the measure(s) falling under the scope of 
the European Evidence Warrant Framework Decision. 
Therefore, this category only encompasses a single question: 
Do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option that the 
execution/taking of this/these measure(s) be governed by the same regime as 
you have accepted for the measure(s) falling under the scope of the European 
Evidence Warrant Framework Decision (meaning that there is no need to reply 
to the distinct questions listed under heading B.1 again, as the answers to them 
would be identical) 
 yes     
 no 
 
Eurojust 
Would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option that the 
execution/taking of this/these measure(s) be governed by the same regime as has 
been accepted for the measure(s) falling under the scope of the European 
Evidence Warrant Framework Decision (meaning that there is no need to reply 
to the distinct questions listed under heading 2.1 again, as the answers to them 
would be identical)  
 yes     
 no 
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B.3. Investigative measures/measures of assistance (other than the 
aforementioned measures) which have been explicitly regulated in MLA legal 
instruments applicable between the EU member states and which currently 
would only be taken/executed in accordance with/in the manner provided for in 
the national law (and procedures) of the requested/executing member 
state/member state on the territory of which the measure is to be taken/executed 
or under the condition(s) which would have to be observed in a similar national 
case in the latter member state 
Domestic scope ratione materiae 
Can this/these measure(s) be taken/ordered in a national case, according to 
your national law? 
[mutually non-exclusive categories: please tick all applicable boxes] 
 For any offence 
 For any offence punishable under your national law by a custodial 
sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three 
years or less 
 For a number of (serious) offences only (enumerated), punishable 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period 
of at least three years 
 For less/a more limited series of offences only 
 For no offence 
 
Requesting formalities & procedures or providing deadlines 
• Can a request/order/warrant to take/execute/allow for this/these 
measure(s) in another member state be made? 
 yes     
 no 
[if yes 
would the requested/executing authority/member state be 
requested/ordered to comply with certain formalities and procedures 
expressly indicated in executing the measure(s) requested/ordered (in 
respect of legal or administrative processes which might assist in 
making the evidence sought admissible in your member state, e.g. the 
official stamping of a document, the presence of a representative from 
your member state, or the recording of times and dates to create a chain 
of evidence) 
 yes     
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 no 
[if yes: is it your experience that the requested/executing 
authority/member state often refuses to comply with formalities or 
procedures expressly indicated because they are considered contrary to 
the fundamental principles of its national law] 
 yes     
 no 
 
 
 
Eurojust 
Is it Eurojust’s experience that requested/executing 
authority/member state often refuses to comply with formalities or 
procedures expressly indicated because they are considered contrary to 
the fundamental principles of its national law? 
 yes     
 no 
 
• Would the requested/executing authority/member state be 
requested/ordered to comply with (strict) deadlines provided for the 
execution of the measure(s) requested/ordered 
 yes    
 no 
 
[if not: is it your experience that, even without providing (strict) 
deadlines, the measure(s) requested/ordered are usually sufficiently 
rapidly taken/executed] 
 yes    
 no 
[if yes:  
• specify? (closed list: asap, within specified deadline) 
• is it your experience that the deadlines provided are often not 
respected by the requested/executing authority/member state] 
 yes     
 no 
ANNEX: ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
188 
 
 
 
Eurojust 
Is it Eurojust’s experience that even without providing (strict) deadlines, the 
measure(s) requested/ordered are usually sufficiently rapidly taken/executed? 
 yes     
 no 
 
 
Requirement domestic order/warrant requesting/issuing member state 
required  
Would/could a request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent 
authority in) another member state to take/execute/allow for this/these 
measure(s) be executed in your member state: 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 without an order/warrant for the measure(s) concerned having been 
formally issued by the competent authority in the 
requesting/issuing member state in accordance with its national law 
and procedures in connection with a criminal investigation 
 only where an order/warrant for the measure(s) concerned has been 
formally issued by the competent authority in the 
requesting/issuing member state in accordance with its national law 
and procedures in connection with a criminal investigation 
 
Incompatibility request/order/warrant with domestic scope ratione materiae 
• Would/could a request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent 
authority in) another member state to take/execute/allow for this/these 
measure(s) be executed in your member state: 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 if it relates to acts which do not constitute an offence under your 
national law 
 if it relates to acts which do not constitute an offence under your 
national law, whereas these acts, as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state, do constitute any of the 
32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ and are punishable 
there by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum 
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period of at least three years 
[if not: do you consider this an acceptable EU future policy option?]  
 yes     
 no 
 
• Would/could a request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent 
authority in) another member state to take/execute/allow for this/these 
measure(s) be executed in your member state: 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 if it relates to acts/offences for which this/these measure(s) cannot 
be taken/ordered in national case, according to your national law 
 if it relates to acts/offences for which this/these measure(s) cannot 
be taken/ordered in national case, according to your national law, 
whereas these acts/offences, as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state, do constitute any of the 
32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ and are punishable 
there by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum 
period of at least three years 
[if not: do you consider this an acceptable EU future policy option?] 
 yes     
 no 
 
 
Eurojust 
Would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to allow a 
request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent authority in) one member 
state to take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) be executed in another 
member state, in any of the following cases:  
 
• if it relates to acts which do not constitute an offence under 
the national law, whereas these acts, as defined by the law 
of the requesting/issuing authority/member state, do 
constitute any of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual 
recognition list’ and are punishable there by a custodial 
sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years 
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 yes 
 no 
 
• if it relates to acts/offences for which this/these measure(s) 
cannot be taken/ordered in national case, according to the 
member states’national law, whereas these acts/offences, as 
defined by the law of the requesting/issuing 
authority/member state, do constitute any of the 32 offences 
from the ‘mutual recognition list’ and are punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum 
period of at least three years 
 yes 
 no 
 
 
 
Incompatibility request/order/warrant with domestic scope ratione personae, 
ratione temporis, ratione loci or ratione auctoritatis or conditions of subsidiairity, 
necessity or proportionality  
Would/could a request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent 
authority in) another member state to take/execute/allow for this/these 
measure(s) be executed in your member state if execution thereof would be 
otherwise inconsistent with your national law, in that the measure(s) to be 
taken/executed/allowed for: 
[mutually non-exclusive categories: please tick all applicable boxes] 
- surpass(ses) the scope ratione personae for which this/these 
measure(s) could be taken/ordered in a similar national case, the 
scope being limited in such case to  
[yes meaning: would/could be executed] 
• criminal investigations into offences committed by natural 
persons only  
 yes     
 no 
• a more limited category of natural persons (e.g. in terms of age, 
procedural status, definition, etc) 
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 yes     
 no 
 
[if not: do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to 
require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed for 
notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned where the acts/offences 
the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 offences 
from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years] 
 yes     
 no 
- surpass(ses) the scope ratione temporis for which this/these 
measure(s) could be taken/ordered in a similar national case, the 
duration of the measure(s) being more limited in such case either in 
absolute terms or in relative terms, i.e. the measure(s) being subject 
to intermediate renewal were it to last for the duration 
requested/ordered 
[yes meaning: would/could be executed] 
 yes     
 no 
[if not: do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to 
require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed for 
notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned where the acts/offences 
the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 offences 
from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years] 
 yes     
 no 
 
- surpass(ses) the scope ratione loci for which this/these measure(s) 
could be taken/ordered in a similar national case, the 
location(s)/place(s) where the measure(s) can be taken/ordered 
being more limited in such case  
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[yes meaning: would/could be executed] 
 yes     
 no 
[if not: do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to 
require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed for 
notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned where the acts/offences 
the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 offences 
from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years] 
 yes     
 no 
 
- surpass(ses) the scope ratione auctoritatis for which this/these 
measure(s) can be taken/ordered in a similar national case, for the 
requesting/issuing authority (or the authority having validated the 
request/order/warrant) is not a judge, a court, an investigating 
magistrate or a public prosecutor, whereas in a similar national case 
the measure(s) would need to be ordered or supervised by such 
authority  
[yes meaning: would/could be executed] 
 yes     
 no 
[if not: do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to 
require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed for 
notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned where the acts/offences 
the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 offences 
from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years] 
 yes     
 no 
 
- could not be taken in a similar national case because the conditions 
of subsidiarity, necessity or proportionality would not be met 
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[yes meaning: would/could be executed] 
 yes     
 no 
 
[if not: do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to 
require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed for 
notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned where the acts/offences 
the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 offences 
from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years] 
 yes     
 no 
 
Eurojust 
Would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to require a 
request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent authority in) one member 
state to take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) be executed in another 
member state if execution thereof would be otherwise inconsistent with the 
national law of the latter member state, in that the measure(s) to be 
taken/executed/allowed for  
 
- surpass(ses) the scope ratione personae for which this/these 
measure(s) could be taken/ordered in a similar national case, 
the scope being limited in such case to: 
 
 criminal investigations into offences committed by 
natural persons only, notwithstanding the 
inconsistency concerned where the acts/offences the 
request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 
offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by 
the law of the requesting/issuing authority member state 
and being punishable there by a custodial sentence or a 
detention order for a maximum period of at least three 
years 
 yes 
 no 
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 a more limited category of natural persons (e.g. in 
terms of age, procedural status, definition, etc), 
notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned where the 
acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to 
constitute any of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual 
recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being 
punishable there by a custodial sentence or a detention 
order for a maximum period of at least three years 
 yes 
 no 
 
- surpass(ses) the scope ratione temporis for which this/these 
measure(s) could be taken/ordered in a similar national case, 
the duration of the measure(s) being more limited in such 
case either in absolute terms or in relative terms, i.e. the 
measure(s) being subject to intermediate renewal were it to 
last for the duration requested/ordered, notwithstanding the 
inconsistency concerned where the acts/offences the 
request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 offences 
from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable 
there by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum 
period of at least three years 
 yes 
 no 
 
- surpass(ses) the scope ratione loci for which this/these 
measure(s) could be taken/ordered in a similar national case, 
the location(s)/place(s) where the measure(s) can be 
taken/ordered being more limited in such case, notwithstanding 
the inconsistency concerned where the acts/offences the 
request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 offences from 
the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of 
at least three years 
 yes 
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 no 
 
- surpass(ses) the scope ratione auctoritatis for which this/these 
measure(s) can be taken/ordered in a similar national case, for the 
requesting/issuing authority (or the authority having validated the 
request/order/warrant) is not a judge, a court, an investigating 
magistrate or a public prosecutor, whereas in a similar national case 
the measure(s) would need to be ordered or supervised by such 
authority, notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned where the 
acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 
offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 
three years 
 yes 
 no 
 
- could not be taken in a similar national case because the 
conditions of subsidiarity, necessity or proportionality would 
not be met, notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned where the 
acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 
32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of 
the requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable 
there by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum 
period of at least three years  
 yes 
 no 
 
 
Compatibility requirements for executing request/order/warrant   
Would/could a request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent 
authority in) another member state to take/execute/allow for this/these 
measure(s) be executed in your member state (regardless of possible non-
execution relating to the scope ratione materiae of the measure(s) 
requested/ordered, other inconsistencies with your national law in executing 
it/them, specific grounds for refusal/non-execution that could be invoked, 
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implications of its/their execution in terms of operational or financial 
capacity/resources): 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 only where fully in accordance with/in the manner provided for in your 
national law (and procedures) 
 only under specific condition(s) which would have to be observed in a 
similar national case (e.g. compliance with certain formalities and 
procedures, purpose or use limitations etc) 
[specify which conditions?] 
 in compliance with the formalities and procedures expressly indicated 
by the requesting/issuing authority/member state provided that these 
are not contrary to the fundamental principles of your national law 
o [specify the fundamental principles concerned of your national 
law?] 
 under the condition that the person(s) concerned by the execution of the 
measure(s) must be granted/may claim the specific procedural 
guarantees or rights that would accrue to him/her/them in the execution 
of the measure(s) in a similar case under either your national law or that 
of the requesting/issuing member state 
[if not: do you consider this an acceptable EU future policy option?]  
 yes     
 no 
 under the condition that the person(s) concerned by the execution of the 
measure(s) must be granted/may claim the specific procedural 
guarantees or rights that would accrue to him/her/them in the 
execution of the measure(s) in a similar case under your national law  
[if not: do you consider this an acceptable EU future policy option?]  
 yes     
 no 
 if, in executing the measure(s) concerned, you would need to comply 
with certain (specific) minimum procedural standards for gathering 
information/evidence (other than merely technical or forensic) with a 
view to ensuring the admissibility of evidence obtained in the 
requesting/issuing member state, commonly agreed to at EU level  
• if yes 
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[specify: the minimum standards to be agreed to should 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 be based on/derived from the ECHR/other 
common fundamental rights texts and the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to the extent 
available] 
 be of a higher standard 
 be of a lower standard] 
• if not: do you consider this an acceptable EU future policy 
option?  
 yes     
 no 
[if yes, specify: the minimum standards to be agreed to should 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 be based on/derived from the ECHR/other 
common fundamental rights texts and the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to the extent 
available] 
 be of a higher standard 
 be of a lower standard] 
 
Eurojust 
Would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to require a 
request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent authority in) one member 
state to take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) be executed in another 
member state (regardless of possible non-execution relating to the scope ratione 
materiae of the measure(s) requested/ordered, other inconsistencies with the 
national law of the second member state in executing it/them, specific grounds 
for refusal/non-execution that could be invoked, implications of its/their 
execution in terms of operational or financial capacity/resources): 
 
- under the condition that the person(s) concerned by the 
execution of the measure(s) must be granted/may claim the 
specific procedural guarantees or rights that would accrue 
to him/her/them in the execution of the measure(s) in a 
similar case under the national law of either of the member 
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states 
 Yes 
 No 
- under the condition that the person(s) concerned by the 
execution of the measure(s) must be granted/may claim the 
specific procedural guarantees or rights that would accrue 
to him/her/them in the execution of the measure(s) in a 
similar case under the national law of the executing member 
state 
 Yes 
 No 
- if, in executing the measure(s) concerned, you would need 
to comply with certain (specific) minimum procedural 
standards for gathering information/evidence (other than 
merely technical or forensic) with a view to ensuring the 
admissibility of evidence obtained in the requesting/issuing 
member state, commonly agreed to at EU level  
 Yes 
 No 
 [if yes, specify: the minimum standards to be agreed to should 
                           [mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 be based on/derived from the 
ECHR/other common fundamental rights texts 
and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to the extent 
available] 
 be of a higher standard 
 be of a lower standard 
 
Refusal or postponement execution for operational or financial 
capacity/resources reasons 
Would execution in your member state of a request/order/warrant 
made/issued by (the competent authority in) another member state to 
take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) (regardless of possible non-
execution or postponement of execution for any other reason):  
[mutually non-exclusive categories: tick all applicable boxes] 
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- be refused, or should it be possible to refuse execution 
• where it is felt that the implications of its/their execution in 
terms of operational capacity/resources (e.g. impact on routine 
domestic workload, other domestic priorities) would be too 
heavy (and thus hamper the proper functioning of your own 
criminal justice system)  
 yes     
 no 
[if yes: do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option 
to require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed 
anyway where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to 
constitute any of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ 
as defined by the law of the requesting/issuing authority member 
state and being punishable there by a custodial sentence or a 
detention order for a maximum period of at least three years] 
 yes     
 no 
• where it is felt that the implications of its/their execution in 
terms of financial capacity/resources would substantial or 
extraordinary 
 yes     
 no 
[if yes:  
• would you execute the request/order/warrant only if 
the costs/expenses involved would be fully 
borne/refunded by the requesting/issuing 
authority/member state 
 yes     
 no 
• would you be willing to execute the 
request/order/warrant provided that a fair share (e.g. 
50/50 or otherwise agreed after negotiation) of the 
cost/expenses would be borne/refunded by the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state 
 yes     
 no 
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• do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy 
option to require this/these measure(s) to be 
taken/executed/allowed for anyway where the 
acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to 
constitute any of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual 
recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being 
punishable there by a custodial sentence or a detention 
order for a maximum period of at least three years 
 yes     
 no 
 
• do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy 
option to require this/these measure(s) to be 
taken/executed/allowed for anyway where the 
acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to 
constitute any of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual 
recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being 
punishable there by a custodial sentence or a detention 
order for a maximum period of at least three years, 
and provided that a fair share (e.g. 50/50 or otherwise 
agreed after negotiation) of the cost/expenses would be 
borne/refunded by the requesting/issuing 
authority/member state] be postponed, or should it be 
possible to postpone execution where it is felt that the 
implications of its/their immediate execution in terms 
of operational capacity/resources (e.g. impact on 
routine domestic workload, other domestic priorities) 
would be too heavy (and thus hamper the proper 
functioning of your own criminal justice system) 
 yes     
 no 
 
- be postponed, or should it be possible to postpone execution where it is 
felt that the implications of its/their immediate execution in terms of 
operational capacity/resources (e.g. impact on routine domestic 
workload, other domestic priorities) would be too heavy (and thus 
hamper the proper functioning of your own criminal justice system) 
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 yes     
 no 
[if yes: 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
• would you be willing to execute the request/order/warrant or, 
where the measure(s) is enduring in nature, to start the 
execution thereof before a reasonable deadline provided by the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state 
 yes     
 no 
[if yes: what deadline do you consider reasonable: enter [number] of 
days] 
 
• do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to 
require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed for, 
or, where the measure(s) is enduring in nature, to start 
taking/executing/allowing for it before a reasonable deadline 
provided by the requesting/issuing authority/member state 
only where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates 
to constitute any of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual 
recognition list’ as defined by the law of the requesting/issuing 
authority member state and being punishable there by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period 
of at least three years]  
 yes     
 no 
[if yes: what deadline do you consider reasonable: enter 
[number] of days] 
Eurojust 
Where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of 
the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three 
years, would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to deny 
member states the possibility to invoke a ground for refusal with regard to the 
execution in their member state of a request/order/warrant made/issued by (the 
competent authority in) another member state to take/execute/allow for 
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this/these measure(s) (regardless of possible non-execution or postponement of 
execution for any other reason)  
 
a. where it is felt that the implications of its/their 
execution in terms of operational capacity/resources 
(e.g. impact on routine domestic workload, other 
domestic priorities) would be too heavy (and thus 
hamper the proper functioning of its own criminal 
justice system) 
 yes  
 no 
b. where it is felt that the implications of its/their 
execution in terms of financial capacity/resources 
would substantial or extraordinary 
 yes 
 only provided that a fair share (e.g. 50/50 or 
otherwise agreed after negotiation) of the 
cost/expenses would be borne/refunded by the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state 
 no 
 
Where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of 
the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three 
years, would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to deny 
member states the possibility to postpone execution where it is felt that the 
implications of its/their immediate execution in terms of operational 
capacity/resources (e.g. impact on routine domestic workload, other domestic 
priorities) would be too heavy (and thus hamper the proper functioning of its 
own criminal justice system) 
 
 yes 
 no 
 
Where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of 
the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
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requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three 
years, would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to 
require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed for, or, where the 
measure(s) is enduring in nature, to start taking/executing/allowing for it before 
a reasonable deadline provided by the requesting/issuing authority/member 
state only 
 
 yes 
 no 
What deadline would Eurojust consider reasonable where the measure is 
enduring in nature? enter [number] of days 
 
 
 
Grounds for refusal/non-execution 
Would execution in your member state of a request/order/warrant 
made/issued by (the competent authority in) another member state to 
take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) (regardless of possible non-
execution for any other reason) be refused, or should it be possible to refuse 
execution: 
[mutually non-exclusive categories: tick all applicable boxes] 
 if execution of the request/order/warrant would infringe the ne bis in 
idem principle 
 If the person(s) concerned has been given immunity from prosecution in 
your member state for the same acts s given in the country itself for the 
same acts the request/order/warrant relates to  
 if there is an immunity or privilege under your law which makes it 
impossible to execute the request/order/warrant 
 if the request/order/warrant relates to criminal offences which under the 
law of the requested/executing member state are regarded as having 
been committed wholly or for a major or essential part within its 
territory, or in a place equivalent to its territory, or were committed 
outside the territory of the requesting/issuing member state and your 
law does not permit legal proceedings to be taken in respect of such 
offences where they are committed outside your territory 
 if, in a specific case, execution of the request/order/warrant would harm 
essential national security interests, jeopardise the source of the 
information or involve the use of classified information relating to 
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specific intelligence activities (be it only to the extent that the 
information obtained would not be used for those reasons as evidence 
in a similar domestic case)  
 if, execution of the request/order/warrant is likely to prejudice the 
sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests of your 
state 
 if the request/order/warrant concerns a (n offence connected with a) 
political offence, unless the act(s) concerned, as defined by the law of 
the requesting/issuing authority/member state, do constitute any of the 
32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ and are punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years 
 if, to the extent that you would only execute a request/order/warrant 
where it relates to acts which do also constitute an offence under your 
national law, you consider the acts concerned a fiscal offence and they 
do not constitute an offence of the same nature under your national law 
(a refusal, however, not being allowed in relation to offences in 
connection with taxes or duties, customs and exchange, recognition or 
execution on the ground that your national law does not impose the 
same kind of tax or duty or does not contain a tax, duty, customs and 
exchange regulation of the same kind as the law of requesting/issuing 
authority/member state) 
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B.4. Investigative measures/measures of assistance (other than the 
aforementioned measures) which have been explicitly regulated in MLA legal 
instruments applicable between the EU member states and the taking/execution 
of which the requested/executing member state/member state on the territory of 
which the measure is to be taken/executed may currently not make dependent 
on any condition of dual criminality, (dual) minimum threshold or consistency 
with its national law 
Requesting formalities & procedures or providing deadlines 
Can a request/order/warrant to take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) 
in another member state be made? 
 yes    
 no 
[if yes 
- would the requested/executing authority/member state be 
requested/ordered to comply with certain formalities and 
procedures expressly indicated in executing the measure(s) 
requested/ordered (in respect of legal or administrative processes 
which might assist in making the evidence sought admissible in 
your member state, e.g. the official stamping of a document, the 
presence of a representative from your member state, or the 
recording of times and dates to create a chain of evidence) 
 yes     
 no 
[if yes: is it your experience that the requested/executing 
authority/member state often refuses to comply with formalities or 
procedures expressly indicated because they are considered contrary to 
the fundamental principles of its national law] 
 yes     
 no 
 
- would the requested/executing authority/member state be 
requested/ordered to comply with (strict) deadlines provided for 
the execution of the measure(s) requested/ordered 
 yes     
 no 
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[if not: is it your experience that, even without providing (strict) 
deadlines, the measure(s) requested/ordered are usually sufficiently 
rapidly taken/executed] 
 yes    
 no 
[if yes:  
• specify? (closed list: asap, within specified deadline) 
• is it your experience that the deadlines provided are often not 
respected by the requested/executing authority/member state] 
 yes     
 no 
Eurojust 
Is it Eurojust’s experience that the requested/executing authority/member 
state often refuses to comply with formalities or procedures expressly indicated 
because they are considered contrary to the fundamental principles of its 
national law? 
 yes 
 no 
Is it Eurojust’s experience that, even without providing (strict) deadlines, the 
measure(s) requested/ordered are usually sufficiently rapidly taken/executed 
 yes 
 no 
Is it Eurojust’s experience that the deadlines provided are often not respected 
by the requested/executing authority/member state 
 yes 
 no 
 
 
Grounds for refusal/non-execution 
Would execution in your member state of a request/order/warrant 
made/issued by (the competent authority in) another member state to 
take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) (regardless of possible non-
execution for any other reason) be refused, or should it be possible to refuse 
execution: 
[mutually non-exclusive categories: tick all applicable boxes] 
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 If the person(s) concerned has been given immunity from prosecution in 
your member state for the same acts s given in the country itself for the 
same acts the request/order/warrant relates to 
 if, in a specific case, execution of the request/order/warrant would harm 
essential national security interests, jeopardise the source of the 
information or involve the use of classified information relating to 
specific intelligence activities (be it only to the extent that the 
information obtained would not be used for those reasons as evidence 
in a similar domestic case)  
 if, execution of the request/order/warrant is likely to prejudice the 
sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests of your 
state  
 if the request/order/warrant concerns a (n offence connected with a) 
political offence, unless the act(s) concerned, as defined by the law of 
the requesting/issuing authority/member state, do constitute any of the 
32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ and are punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years  
 If, to the extent that you would only execute a request/order/warrant 
where it relates to acts which do also constitute an offence under your 
national law, you consider the acts concerned a fiscal offence and they 
do not constitute an offence of the same nature under your national law 
(a refusal, however, not being allowed in relation to offences in 
connection with taxes or duties, customs and exchange, recognition or 
execution on the ground that your national law does not impose the 
same kind of tax or duty or does not contain a tax, duty, customs and 
exchange regulation of the same kind as the law of requesting/issuing 
authority/member state)  
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B.5. Investigative measures/measures of assistance (other than the 
aforementioned measures), which have not been explicitly regulated in MLA 
legal instruments applicable between the EU member states and could therefore 
fall under the scope of ‘widest measure of mutual assistance’, but for which 
(because of their coercive, covert or intrusive nature or their potential/likeliness 
to negatively impact upon/affect the reliability/evidential value of the 
information they seek to bring about) it is unlikely that the requested/executing 
member state/member state on the territory of which the measure is to be 
taken/executed will be willing to take/execute/allow for them unless in 
accordance with/in the manner provided for in its national law (and 
procedures), under the condition(s) which would have to be observed in a 
similar national case, or on the condition(s) of dual criminality, (dual) minimum 
threshold or consistency with its national law 
Domestic scope ratione materiae 
Can this/these measure(s) be taken/ordered in a national case, according to 
your national law? 
[mutually non-exclusive categories: please tick all applicable boxes] 
 For any offence 
 For any offence punishable under your national law by a custodial 
sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three 
years or less 
 For a number of (serious) offences only (enumerated), punishable 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period 
of at least three years 
 For less/a more limited series of offences only 
 For no offence 
 
Requesting formalities & procedures or providing deadlines 
Can a request/order/warrant to take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) 
in another member state be made? 
 yes     
 no 
[if yes 
• would the requested/executing authority/member state be 
requested/ordered to comply with certain formalities and procedures 
expressly indicated in executing the measure(s) requested/ordered (in 
respect of legal or administrative processes which might assist in 
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making the evidence sought admissible in your member state, e.g. the 
official stamping of a document, the presence of a representative from 
your member state, or the recording of times and dates to create a chain 
of evidence) 
 yes     
 no 
 
[if yes: is it your experience that the requested/executing 
authority/member state often refuses to comply with formalities or 
procedures expressly indicated because they are considered contrary to 
the fundamental principles of its national law] 
 yes     
 no 
 
• would the requested/executing authority/member state be 
requested/ordered to comply with (strict) deadlines provided for the 
execution of the measure(s) requested/ordered 
 yes     
 no 
 
[if not: is it your experience that, even without providing (strict) 
deadlines, the measure(s) requested/ordered are usually sufficiently 
rapidly taken/executed] 
 yes     
 no 
[if yes:  
• specify? (closed list: asap, within specified deadline) 
• is it your experience that the deadlines provided are often not 
respected by the requested/executing authority/member state] 
 yes     
 no 
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Eurojust 
Is it Eurojust’s experience that the requested/executing authority/member 
state often refuses to comply with formalities or procedures expressly indicated 
because they are considered contrary to the fundamental principles of its 
national law? 
 Yes 
 No 
Is it Eurojust’s experience that, even without providing (strict) deadlines, the 
measure(s) requested/ordered are usually sufficiently rapidly taken/executed 
 Yes 
 No 
Is it Eurojust’s experience that the deadlines provided are often not respected 
by the requested/executing authority/member state 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Requirement domestic order/warrant requesting/issuing member state 
required  
Would/could a request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent 
authority in) another member state to take/execute/allow for this/these 
measure(s) be executed in your member state: 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 without an order/warrant for the measure(s) concerned having been 
formally issued by the competent authority in the 
requesting/issuing member state in accordance with its national law 
and procedures in connection with a criminal investigation 
 only where an order/warrant for the measure(s) concerned has been 
formally issued by the competent authority in the 
requesting/issuing member state in accordance with its national law 
and procedures in connection with a criminal investigation 
 
Incompatibility request/order/warrant with domestic scope ratione materiae 
• Would/could a request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent 
authority in) another member state to take/execute/allow for this/these 
measure(s) be executed in your member state: 
ANNEX: ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
211 
 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 if it relates to acts which do not constitute an offence under your national 
law 
 if it relates to acts which do not constitute an offence under your national 
law, whereas these acts, as defined by the law of the requesting/issuing 
authority/member state, do constitute any of the 32 offences from the 
‘mutual recognition list’ and are punishable there by a custodial sentence 
or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years 
[if not: do you consider this an acceptable EU future policy option?]  
 yes 
 no 
• Would/could a request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent 
authority in) another member state to take/execute/allow for this/these 
measure(s) be executed in your member state: 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 if it relates to acts/offences for which this/these measure(s) cannot 
be taken/ordered in national case, according to your national law 
 if it relates to acts/offences for which this/these measure(s) cannot 
be taken/ordered in national case, according to your national law, 
whereas these acts/offences, as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state, do constitute any of the 
32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ and are punishable 
there by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum 
period of at least three years 
[if not: do you consider this an acceptable EU future policy option?] 
 yes 
 no 
 
Eurojust 
Would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option, to require 
member states to take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) to be executed in 
its member state?  
 
- if it relates to acts which do not constitute an offence under 
the national law of the executing member state, whereas 
these acts, as defined by the law of the requesting/issuing 
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authority/member state, do constitute any of the 32 
offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ and are 
punishable there by a custodial sentence or a detention 
order for a maximum period of at least three years 
 yes 
 no 
- if it relates to acts/offences for which this/these measure(s) 
cannot be taken/ordered in national case, according to the 
national law of the executing member state, whereas these 
acts/offences, as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state, do constitute 
any of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ 
and are punishable there by a custodial sentence or a 
detention order for a maximum period of at least three 
years 
 yes 
 no 
 
Incompatibility request/order/warrant with domestic scope ratione personae, 
ratione temporis, ratione loci or ratione auctoritatis or conditions of subsidiairity, 
necessity or proportionality  
Would/could a request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent 
authority in) another member state to take/execute/allow for this/these 
measure(s) be executed in your member state if execution thereof would be 
otherwise inconsistent with your national law, in that the measure(s) to be 
taken/executed/allowed for: 
[mutually non-exclusive categories: please tick all applicable boxes] 
- surpass(ses) the scope ratione personae for which this/these 
measure(s) could be taken/ordered in a similar national case, the 
scope being limited in such case to 
[yes meaning: would/could be executed] 
• criminal investigations into offences committed by natural 
persons only  
 yes 
 no 
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• a more limited category of natural persons (e.g. in terms of age, 
procedural status, definition, etc) 
 yes 
 no 
if not: do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to 
require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed for 
notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned where the acts/offences 
the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 offences 
from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years] 
 yes 
 no 
- surpass(ses) the scope ratione temporis for which this/these 
measure(s) could be taken/ordered in a similar national case, the 
duration of the measure(s) being more limited in such case either in 
absolute terms or in relative terms, i.e. the measure(s) being subject 
to intermediate renewal were it to last for the duration 
requested/ordered 
[yes meaning: would/could be executed] 
 yes 
 no 
 
[if not: do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to 
require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed for 
notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned where the acts/offences 
the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 offences 
from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years] 
 yes     
 no 
 
- surpass(ses) the scope ratione loci for which this/these measure(s) 
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could be taken/ordered in a similar national case, the 
location(s)/place(s) where the measure(s) can be taken/ordered 
being more limited in such case 
[yes meaning: would/could be executed] 
 yes 
 no 
[if not: do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to 
require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed for 
notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned where the acts/offences 
the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 offences 
from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years] 
 yes     
 no 
 
- surpass(ses) the scope ratione auctoritatis for which this/these 
measure(s) can be taken/ordered in a similar national case, for the 
requesting/issuing authority (or the authority having validated the 
request/order/warrant) is not a judge, a court, an investigating 
magistrate or a public prosecutor, whereas in a similar national case 
the measure(s) would need to be ordered or supervised by such 
authority 
[yes meaning: would/could be executed] 
 yes 
 no 
 
[if not: do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to 
require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed for 
notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned where the acts/offences 
the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 offences 
from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years] 
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 yes     
 no 
 
- could not be taken in a similar national case because the conditions 
of subsidiarity, necessity or proportionality would not be met 
[yes meaning: would/could be executed] 
 yes 
 no 
[if not: do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to 
require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed for 
notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned where the acts/offences 
the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 offences 
from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years] 
 yes     
 no 
 
 
Eurojust 
Would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to require a 
request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent authority in) one member 
state to take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) be executed in another 
member state if execution thereof would be otherwise inconsistent with the 
national law of the latter member state, in that the measure(s) to be 
taken/executed/allowed for  
 
- surpass(ses) the scope ratione personae for which this/these 
measure(s) could be taken/ordered in a similar national case, the 
scope being limited in such case to: 
 criminal investigations into offences 
committed by natural persons only, 
notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned 
where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant 
relates to constitute any of the 32 offences from the 
‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of 
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the requesting/issuing authority member state and 
being punishable there by a custodial sentence or a 
detention order for a maximum period of at least 
three years 
 yes 
 no 
 a more limited category of natural persons 
(e.g. in terms of age, procedural status, 
definition, etc), notwithstanding the 
inconsistency concerned where the acts/offences 
the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any 
of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition 
list’ as defined by the law of the requesting/issuing 
authority member state and being punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a 
maximum period of at least three years 
 yes 
 no 
- surpass(ses) the scope ratione temporis for which this/these 
measure(s) could be taken/ordered in a similar national case, the 
duration of the measure(s) being more limited in such case either in 
absolute terms or in relative terms, i.e. the measure(s) being subject 
to intermediate renewal were it to last for the duration 
requested/ordered, notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned where 
the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 
32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 
three years 
 yes 
 no 
 
- surpass(ses) the scope ratione loci for which this/these measure(s) 
could be taken/ordered in a similar national case, the 
location(s)/place(s) where the measure(s) can be taken/ordered 
being more limited in such case, notwithstanding the inconsistency 
concerned where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to 
constitute any of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as 
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defined by the law of the requesting/issuing authority member state and 
being punishable there by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a 
maximum period of at least three years 
 yes 
 no 
- surpass(ses) the scope ratione auctoritatis for which this/these 
measure(s) can be taken/ordered in a similar national case, for the 
requesting/issuing authority (or the authority having validated the 
request/order/warrant) is not a judge, a court, an investigating 
magistrate or a public prosecutor, whereas in a similar national case 
the measure(s) would need to be ordered or supervised by such 
authority, notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned where the 
acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 
offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 
three years 
 yes 
 no 
- could not be taken in a similar national case because the conditions 
of subsidiarity, necessity or proportionality would not be met, 
notwithstanding the inconsistency concerned where the acts/offences the 
request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 offences from the 
‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the requesting/issuing 
authority member state and being punishable there by a custodial sentence 
or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years  
 yes 
 no 
 
 
 
Compatibility requirements for executing request/order/warrant 
 
Would/could a request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent 
authority in) another member state to take/execute/allow for this/these 
measure(s) be executed in your member state (regardless of possible non-
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execution relating to the scope ratione materiae of the measure(s) 
requested/ordered, other inconsistencies with your national law in executing 
it/them, specific grounds for refusal/non-execution that could be invoked, 
implications of its/their execution in terms of operational or financial 
capacity/resources): 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 only where fully in accordance with/in the manner provided for in your 
national law (and procedures) 
 only under specific condition(s) which would have to be observed in a 
similar national case (e.g. compliance with certain formalities and 
procedures, purpose or use limitations etc) 
o [specify which conditions?] 
 in compliance with the formalities and procedures expressly indicated 
by the requesting/issuing authority/member state provided that these 
are not contrary to the fundamental principles of your national law 
o [specify the fundamental principles concerned of your national 
law?] 
 under the condition that the person(s) concerned by the execution of the 
measure(s) must be granted/may claim the specific procedural 
guarantees or rights that would accrue to him/her/them in the execution 
of the measure(s) in a similar case under either your national law or that 
of the requesting/issuing member state 
[if not: do you consider this an acceptable EU future policy option?]  
 yes 
 no 
 under the condition that the person(s) concerned by the execution 
of the measure(s) must be granted/may claim the specific 
procedural guarantees or rights that would accrue to him/her/them 
in the execution of the measure(s) in a similar case under your 
national law  
 
[if not: do you consider this an acceptable EU future policy option?]  
 yes 
 no 
 if, in executing the measure(s) concerned, you would need to 
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comply with certain (specific) minimum procedural standards for 
gathering information/evidence (other than merely technical or 
forensic) with a view to ensuring the admissibility of evidence 
obtained in the requesting/issuing member state, commonly agreed 
to at EU level  
• if yes 
[specify: the minimum standards to be agreed to should 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 be based on/derived from the ECHR/other 
common fundamental rights texts and the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to the extent 
available] 
 be of a higher standard 
 be of a lower standard] 
• if not: do you consider this an acceptable EU future policy 
option?  
 yes 
 no 
[if yes, specify: the minimum standards to be agreed to should 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 be based on/derived from the ECHR/other 
common fundamental rights texts and the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to the extent 
available] 
 be of a higher standard 
 be of a lower standard] 
 
 
 
Eurojust 
Would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to require a 
request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent authority in) one member 
state to take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) be executed in another 
member state (regardless of possible non-execution relating to the scope ratione 
materiae of the measure(s) requested/ordered, other inconsistencies with the 
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national law of the second member state in executing it/them, specific grounds 
for refusal/non-execution that could be invoked, implications of its/their 
execution in terms of operational or financial capacity/resources): 
 
- under the condition that the person(s) concerned by the 
execution of the measure(s) must be granted/may claim the 
specific procedural guarantees or rights that would accrue 
to him/her/them in the execution of the measure(s) in a 
similar case under the national law of either of the member 
states 
 Yes 
 No 
- under the condition that the person(s) concerned by the 
execution of the measure(s) must be granted/may claim the 
specific procedural guarantees or rights that would accrue 
to him/her/them in the execution of the measure(s) in a 
similar case under the national law of the executing member 
state 
 Yes 
 No 
 
- if, in executing the measure(s) concerned, you would need 
to comply with certain (specific) minimum procedural 
standards for gathering information/evidence (other than 
merely technical or forensic) with a view to ensuring the 
admissibility of evidence obtained in the requesting/issuing 
member state, commonly agreed to at EU level  
 Yes 
 No 
 
[if yes, specify: the minimum standards to be agreed to 
should 
 [mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 be based on/derived from the 
ECHR/other common fundamental rights 
texts and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to the 
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extent available] 
 be of a higher standard 
 be of a lower standard 
 
 
Refusal or postponement execution for operational or financial 
capacity/resources reasons 
Would execution in your member state of a request/order/warrant 
made/issued by (the competent authority in) another member state to 
take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) (regardless of possible non-
execution or postponement of execution for any other reason):  
[mutually non-exclusive categories: tick all applicable boxes] 
- be refused, or should it be possible to refuse execution 
• where it is felt that the implications of its/their execution in 
terms of operational capacity/resources (e.g. impact on routine 
domestic workload, other domestic priorities) would be too 
heavy (and thus hamper the proper functioning of your own 
criminal justice system)  
 yes 
 no 
[if yes: do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy 
option to require this/these measure(s) to be 
taken/executed/allowed anyway where the acts/offences the 
request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 
offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law 
of the requesting/issuing authority member state and being 
punishable there by a custodial sentence or a detention order 
for a maximum period of at least three years] 
 yes 
 no 
• where it is felt that the implications of its/their execution in 
terms of financial capacity/resources would be substantial or 
extraordinary 
 yes 
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 no 
[if yes:  
• would you execute the request/order/warrant 
only if the costs/expenses involved would be 
fully borne/refunded by the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state 
 yes 
 no 
• would you be willing to execute the 
request/order/warrant provided that a fair 
share (e.g. 50/50 or otherwise agreed after 
negotiation) of the cost/expenses would be 
borne/refunded by the requesting/issuing 
authority/member state 
 yes 
 no 
• do you consider it an acceptable EU future 
policy option to require this/these measure(s) 
to be taken/executed/allowed for anyway 
where the acts/offences the 
request/order/warrant relates to constitute 
any of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual 
recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state 
and being punishable there by a custodial 
sentence or a detention order for a maximum 
period of at least three years 
 yes 
 no 
• do you consider it an acceptable EU future 
policy option to require this/these measure(s) 
to be taken/executed/allowed for anyway 
where the acts/offences the 
request/order/warrant relates to constitute 
any of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual 
recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state 
ANNEX: ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
223 
 
and being punishable there by a custodial 
sentence or a detention order for a maximum 
period of at least three years, and provided 
that a fair share (e.g. 50/50 or otherwise 
agreed after negotiation) of the cost/expenses 
would be borne/refunded by the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state 
 yes 
 no 
- be postponed, or should it be possible to postpone execution where 
it is felt that the implications of its/their immediate execution in 
terms of operational capacity/resources (e.g. impact on routine 
domestic workload, other domestic priorities) would be too heavy 
(and thus hamper the proper functioning of your own criminal 
justice system) 
 yes 
 no 
[if yes: 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
• would you be willing to execute the request/order/warrant or, 
where the measure(s) is enduring in nature, to start the 
execution thereof before a reasonable deadline provided by the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state 
 yes 
 no 
 
[if yes: what deadline do you consider reasonable: enter 
[number] of days] 
 
• do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to 
require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed for, 
or, where the measure(s) is enduring in nature, to start 
taking/executing/allowing for it before a reasonable deadline 
provided by the requesting/issuing authority/member state 
only where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates 
to constitute any of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition 
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list’ as defined by the law of the requesting/issuing authority 
member state and being punishable there by a custodial 
sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 
three years]  
 yes 
 no 
 
[if yes: what deadline do you consider reasonable: enter 
[number] of days] 
 
Eurojust 
Where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of 
the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three 
years, would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to deny 
member states the possibility to invoke a ground for refusal with regard to the 
execution in their member state of a request/order/warrant made/issued by (the 
competent authority in) another member state to take/execute/allow for 
this/these measure(s) (regardless of possible non-execution or postponement of 
execution for any other reason)  
 
• where it is felt that the implications of its/their execution in 
terms of operational capacity/resources (e.g. impact on 
routine domestic workload, other domestic priorities) would 
be too heavy (and thus hamper the proper functioning of its 
own criminal justice system) 
 yes  
 no 
• where it is felt that the implications of its/their execution in 
terms of financial capacity/resources would substantial or 
extraordinary 
 yes 
 only provided that a fair share (e.g. 50/50 or 
otherwise agreed after negotiation) of the 
cost/expenses would be borne/refunded by the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state 
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 no 
 
Where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of 
the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three 
years, would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to deny 
member states the possibility to postpone execution where it is felt that the 
implications of its/their immediate execution in terms of operational 
capacity/resources (e.g. impact on routine domestic workload, other domestic 
priorities) would be too heavy (and thus hamper the proper functioning of its 
own criminal justice system) 
 yes 
 no 
Where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of 
the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three 
years, would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to 
require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed for, or, where the 
measure(s) is enduring in nature, to start taking/executing/allowing for it before 
a reasonable deadline provided by the requesting/issuing authority/member 
state only 
 yes 
 no 
What deadline would Eurojust consider reasonable where the measure is 
enduring in nature? enter [number] of days 
 
 
 
 
 
Grounds for refusal/non-execution 
Would execution in your member state of a request/order/warrant 
made/issued by (the competent authority in) another member state to 
take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) (regardless of possible non-
execution for any other reason) be refused, or should it be possible to refuse 
execution: 
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[mutually non-exclusive categories: tick all applicable boxes] 
 if execution of the request/order/warrant would infringe the ne bis in 
idem principle 
 If the person(s) concerned has been given immunity from prosecution in 
your member state for the same acts s given in the country itself for the 
same acts the request/order/warrant relates to  
 if there is an immunity or privilege under your law which makes it 
impossible to execute the request/order/warrant 
 if the request/order/warrant relates to criminal offences which under the 
law of the requested/executing member state are regarded as having 
been committed wholly or for a major or essential part within its 
territory, or in a place equivalent to its territory, or were committed 
outside the territory of the requesting/issuing member state and your 
law does not permit legal proceedings to be taken in respect of such 
offences where they are committed outside your territory 
 if, in a specific case, execution of the request/order/warrant would harm 
essential national security interests, jeopardise the source of the 
information or involve the use of classified information relating to 
specific intelligence activities (be it only to the extent that the 
information obtained would not be used for those reasons as evidence 
in a similar domestic case) 
 if, execution of the request/order/warrant is likely to prejudice the 
sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests of your 
state 
 if the request/order/warrant concerns a (n offence connected with a) 
political offence, unless the act(s) concerned, as defined by the law of 
the requesting/issuing authority/member state, do constitute any of the 
32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ and are punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years 
 If, to the extent that you would only execute a request/order/warrant 
where it relates to acts which do also constitute an offence under your 
national law, you consider the acts concerned a fiscal offence and they 
do not constitute an offence of the same nature under your national law 
(a refusal, however, not being allowed in relation to offences in 
connection with taxes or duties, customs and exchange, recognition or 
execution on the ground that your national law does not impose the 
same kind of tax or duty or does not contain a tax, duty, customs and 
exchange regulation of the same kind as the law of requesting/issuing 
authority/member state) 
  
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B.6. Investigative measures/measures of assistance (other than the 
aforementioned measures) which have not been explicitly regulated in MLA 
legal instruments applicable between the EU member states and could therefore 
fall under the scope of ‘widest measure of mutual assistance’, and for which it is 
likely that the requested/executing member state/member state on the territory 
of which the measure is to be taken/executed will be willing to 
take/execute/allow for them in compliance with the formalities and procedures 
expressly indicated by the requesting/issuing authority/member state provided 
that these are not contrary to the fundamental principles of its own law (i.e. 
lowest requirements regime)  
Requesting formalities & procedures or providing deadlines 
Can a request/order/warrant to take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) 
in another member state be made? 
 yes 
 no 
[if yes 
• would the requested/executing authority/member state be 
requested/ordered to comply with certain formalities and 
procedures expressly indicated in executing the measure(s) 
requested/ordered (in respect of legal or administrative processes 
which might assist in making the evidence sought admissible in 
your member state, e.g. the official stamping of a document, the 
presence of a representative from your member state, or the 
recording of times and dates to create a chain of evidence) 
 yes 
 no 
 
[if yes: is it your experience that the requested/executing 
authority/member state often refuses to comply with formalities or 
procedures expressly indicated because they are considered contrary to 
the fundamental principles of its national law] 
 yes 
 no 
 
• would the requested/executing authority/member state be 
requested/ordered to comply with (strict) deadlines provided for 
ANNEX: ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
228 
 
the execution of the measure(s) requested/ordered 
 yes 
 no 
 
[if not: is it your experience that, even without providing (strict) 
deadlines, the measure(s) requested/ordered are usually sufficiently 
rapidly taken/executed] 
 yes 
 no 
 
[if yes:  
• specify? (closed list: asap, within specified deadline) 
• is it your experience that the deadlines provided are often not 
respected by the requested/executing authority/member state] 
 yes 
 no 
 
 
Eurojust 
Is it Eurojust’s experience that the requested/executing authority/member 
state often refuses to comply with formalities or procedures expressly indicated 
because they are considered contrary to the fundamental principles of its 
national law? 
 Yes 
 No 
Is it Eurojust’s experience that, even without providing (strict) deadlines, the 
measure(s) requested/ordered are usually sufficiently rapidly taken/executed 
 Yes 
 No 
Is it Eurojust’s experience that the deadlines provided are often not respected 
by the requested/executing authority/member state 
 Yes 
 No 
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Compatibility requirements for executing request/order/warrant 
Would/could a request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent 
authority in) another member state to take/execute/allow for this/these 
measure(s) be executed in your member state (regardless of possible non-
execution relating to the scope ratione materiae of the measure(s) 
requested/ordered, other inconsistencies with your national law in executing 
it/them, specific grounds for refusal/non-execution that could be invoked, 
implications of its/their execution in terms of operational or financial 
capacity/resources): 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 only where fully in accordance with/in the manner provided for in your 
national law (and procedures) 
 only under specific condition(s) which would have to be observed in a 
similar national case (e.g. compliance with certain formalities and 
procedures, purpose or use limitations etc) 
o [specify which conditions?] 
 in compliance with the formalities and procedures expressly indicated 
by the requesting/issuing authority/member state provided that these 
are not contrary to the fundamental principles of your national law 
o [specify the fundamental principles concerned of your national 
law?] 
 under the condition that the person(s) concerned by the execution of the 
measure(s) must be granted/may claim the specific procedural 
guarantees or rights that would accrue to him/her/them in the execution 
of the measure(s) in a similar case under either your national law or that 
of the requesting/issuing member state 
[if not: do you consider this an acceptable EU future policy option?]  
 yes 
 no 
 under the condition that the person(s) concerned by the execution 
of the measure(s) must be granted/may claim the specific 
procedural guarantees or rights that would accrue to him/her/them 
in the execution of the measure(s) in a similar case under your 
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national law  
[if not: do you consider this an acceptable EU future policy option?]  
 yes 
 no 
 if, in executing the measure(s) concerned, you would need to 
comply with certain (specific) minimum procedural standards for 
gathering information/evidence (other than merely technical or 
forensic) with a view to ensuring the admissibility of evidence 
obtained in the requesting/issuing member state, commonly agreed 
to at EU level  
• if yes 
[specify: the minimum standards to be agreed to should 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 be based on/derived from the ECHR/other 
common fundamental rights texts and the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to the extent 
available] 
 be of a higher standard 
 be of a lower standard] 
• if not: do you consider this an acceptable EU future policy 
option?  
 yes 
 no 
[if yes, specify: the minimum standards to be agreed to 
should 
[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 be based on/derived from the ECHR/other 
common fundamental rights texts and the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to the extent 
available] 
 be of a higher standard 
 be of a lower standard] 
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Eurojust 
Would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to require a 
request/order/warrant made/issued by (the competent authority in) one member 
state to take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) be executed in another 
member state (regardless of possible non-execution relating to the scope ratione 
materiae of the measure(s) requested/ordered, other inconsistencies with the 
national law of the second member state in executing it/them, specific grounds 
for refusal/non-execution that could be invoked, implications of its/their 
execution in terms of operational or financial capacity/resources): 
 
- under the condition that the person(s) concerned by the 
execution of the measure(s) must be granted/may claim the 
specific procedural guarantees or rights that would accrue 
to him/her/them in the execution of the measure(s) in a 
similar case under the national law of either of the member 
states 
 Yes 
 No 
- under the condition that the person(s) concerned by the 
execution of the measure(s) must be granted/may claim the 
specific procedural guarantees or rights that would accrue 
to him/her/them in the execution of the measure(s) in a 
similar case under the national law of the executing member 
state 
 Yes 
 No 
- if, in executing the measure(s) concerned, you would need 
to comply with certain (specific) minimum procedural 
standards for gathering information/evidence (other than 
merely technical or forensic) with a view to ensuring the 
admissibility of evidence obtained in the requesting/issuing 
member state, commonly agreed to at EU level  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 [if yes, specify: the minimum standards to be 
agreed to should 
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[mutually exclusive categories: tick only one box] 
 be based on/derived from the 
ECHR/other common fundamental rights 
texts and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, to 
the extent available] 
 be of a higher standard 
 be of a lower standard 
Refusal or postponement execution for operational or financial 
capacity/resources reasons 
Would execution in your member state of a request/order/warrant 
made/issued by (the competent authority in) another member state to 
take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) (regardless of possible non-
execution or postponement of execution for any other reason):  
[mutually non-exclusive categories: tick all applicable boxes] 
- be refused, or should it be possible to refuse execution 
• where it is felt that the implications of its/their execution in 
terms of operational capacity/resources (e.g. impact on routine 
domestic workload, other domestic priorities) would be too 
heavy (and thus hamper the proper functioning of your own 
criminal justice system)  
 yes 
 no 
[if yes: do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy 
option to require this/these measure(s) to be 
taken/executed/allowed anyway where the acts/offences the 
request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of the 32 
offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law 
of the requesting/issuing authority member state and being 
punishable there by a custodial sentence or a detention order 
for a maximum period of at least three years] 
 yes 
 no 
• where it is felt that the implications of its/their execution in 
terms of financial capacity/resources would substantial or 
extraordinary 
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 yes 
 no 
[if yes:  
• would you execute the request/order/warrant 
only if the costs/expenses involved would be 
fully borne/refunded by the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state 
 yes 
 no 
• would you be willing to execute the 
request/order/warrant provided that a fair 
share (e.g. 50/50 or otherwise agreed after 
negotiation) of the cost/expenses would be 
borne/refunded by the requesting/issuing 
authority/member state 
 yes 
 no 
• do you consider it an acceptable EU future 
policy option to require this/these measure(s) 
to be taken/executed/allowed for anyway 
where the acts/offences the 
request/order/warrant relates to constitute 
any of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual 
recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state 
and being punishable there by a custodial 
sentence or a detention order for a maximum 
period of at least three years] 
 yes 
 no 
• do you consider it an acceptable EU future 
policy option to require this/these measure(s) 
to be taken/executed/allowed for anyway 
where the acts/offences the 
request/order/warrant relates to constitute 
any of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual 
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recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state 
and being punishable there by a custodial 
sentence or a detention order for a maximum 
period of at least three years, and provided 
that a fair share (e.g. 50/50 or otherwise 
agreed after negotiation) of the cost/expenses 
would be borne/refunded by the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state] 
 yes 
 no 
 
 
- be postponed, or should it be possible to postpone execution where 
it is felt that the implications of its/their immediate execution in 
terms of operational capacity/resources (e.g. impact on routine 
domestic workload, other domestic priorities) would be too heavy 
(and thus hamper the proper functioning of your own criminal 
justice system) 
 yes 
 no 
[if yes: 
• would you be willing to execute the request/order/warrant or, 
where the measure(s) is enduring in nature, to start the 
execution thereof before a reasonable deadline provided by the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state 
 yes 
 no 
[if yes: what deadline do you consider reasonable: enter 
[number] of days] 
 
• do you consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to 
require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed for, 
or, where the measure(s) is enduring in nature, to start 
taking/executing/allowing for it before a reasonable deadline 
provided by the requesting/issuing authority/member state 
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only where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates 
to constitute any of the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition 
list’ as defined by the law of the requesting/issuing authority 
member state and being punishable there by a custodial 
sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 
three years]  
 yes 
 no 
 
[if yes: what deadline do you consider reasonable: enter 
[number] of days] 
 
 
 
Eurojust 
Where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of 
the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three 
years, would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to deny 
member states the possibility to invoke a ground for refusal with regard to the 
execution in their member state of a request/order/warrant made/issued by (the 
competent authority in) another member state to take/execute/allow for 
this/these measure(s) (regardless of possible non-execution or postponement of 
execution for any other reason)  
 
• where it is felt that the implications of its/their execution in 
terms of operational capacity/resources (e.g. impact on 
routine domestic workload, other domestic priorities) would 
be too heavy (and thus hamper the proper functioning of its 
own criminal justice system) 
 yes  
 no 
• where it is felt that the implications of its/their execution in 
terms of financial capacity/resources would substantial or 
extraordinary 
 yes 
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 only provided that a fair share (e.g. 50/50 or 
otherwise agreed after negotiation) of the 
cost/expenses would be borne/refunded by the 
requesting/issuing authority/member state 
 no 
 
Where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of 
the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three 
years, would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to deny 
member states the possibility to postpone execution where it is felt that the 
implications of its/their immediate execution in terms of operational 
capacity/resources (e.g. impact on routine domestic workload, other domestic 
priorities) would be too heavy (and thus hamper the proper functioning of its 
own criminal justice system) 
 yes 
 no 
Where the acts/offences the request/order/warrant relates to constitute any of 
the 32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ as defined by the law of the 
requesting/issuing authority member state and being punishable there by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three 
years, would Eurojust consider it an acceptable EU future policy option to 
require this/these measure(s) to be taken/executed/allowed for, or, where the 
measure(s) is enduring in nature, to start taking/executing/allowing for it before 
a reasonable deadline provided by the requesting/issuing authority/member 
state only 
 yes 
 no 
What deadline would Eurojust consider reasonable where the measure is 
enduring in nature? enter [number] of days 
 
 
 
Grounds for refusal/non-execution 
Would execution in your member state of a request/order/warrant 
made/issued by (the competent authority in) another member state to 
take/execute/allow for this/these measure(s) (regardless of possible non-
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execution for any other reason) be refused, or should it be possible to refuse 
execution: 
[mutually non-exclusive categories: tick all applicable boxes] 
 If the person(s) concerned has been given immunity from prosecution in 
your member state for the same acts s given in the country itself for the 
same acts the request/order/warrant relates to 
 
 if, in a specific case, execution of the request/order/warrant would harm 
essential national security interests, jeopardise the source of the 
information or involve the use of classified information relating to 
specific intelligence activities (be it only to the extent that the 
information obtained would not be used for those reasons as evidence 
in a similar domestic case)  
 
 if, execution of the request/order/warrant is likely to prejudice the 
sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests of your 
state 
 
  if the request/order/warrant concerns a (n offence connected with a) 
political offence, unless the act(s) concerned, as defined by the law of 
the requesting/issuing authority/member state, do constitute any of the 
32 offences from the ‘mutual recognition list’ and are punishable there 
by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least three years 
 
  If, to the extent that you would only execute a request/order/warrant 
where it relates to acts which do also constitute an offence under your 
national law, you consider the acts concerned a fiscal offence and they 
do not constitute an offence of the same nature under your national law 
(a refusal, however, not being allowed in relation to offences in 
connection with taxes or duties, customs and exchange, recognition or 
execution on the ground that your national law does not impose the 
same kind of tax or duty or does not contain a tax, duty, customs and 
exchange regulation of the same kind as the law of requesting/issuing 
authority/member state)  
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7.3 Questions relating to institutional capacity (in order 
to assess the potential need for/added value of  more 
practical tools, best practice exchange, training, 
monitoring etc) 
 
1. Availability of translation of criminal code/code of criminal 
procedure/(other) MLA and mutual recognition legislation 
a. in English 
 yes 
 partially 
 no 
b. in French 
 yes 
 partially 
 no 
c. in German 
 yes 
 partially 
 no 
 
 
2. availability of technically and linguistically (including foreign languages) 
qualified staff 
a. in English 
 yes 
 partially 
 no 
b. in French 
 yes 
 partially 
 no 
c. in German 
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 yes 
 partially 
 no 
 
3. availability of both specialised and basic technical/legal and foreign 
language training 
a. in English 
 yes 
 partially 
 no 
b. in French 
 yes 
 partially 
 no 
c. in German 
 yes 
 partially 
 no 
 
4. willingness to accept incoming requests/orders in 
a. in English 
 yes 
 no 
 
b. in French 
 yes 
 no 
c. in German 
 yes 
 no 
 
5. availability of proper translation and interpretation facilities 
a. into/from English 
 yes 
 partially 
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 no 
b. into/from French 
 yes 
 partially 
 no 
c. into/from German 
 yes 
 partially 
 no 
 
6. availability of proper ICT equipment (fixed telephone/fax/modem lines 
with authorisation for international dialling, hard/software, e-mail, fast 
internet connectivity, adequate security levels, mobile/cellular 
telecommunication means, …) 
 high 
 medium 
 low 
 
7. availability of technical means required for video/telephone conference, 
including for taking measures of protection in such context (such as 
audio/video distortion)  
 high 
 medium 
 low 
8. availability and quality of technical means required for special 
investigative measures (interception, audio/video monitoring, electronic 
monitoring, satellite monitoring, …) 
 high 
 medium 
 low 
9. availability of and access to travel budgets (for competent (judicial) 
authorities willing to assist in the execution of requests abroad, in joint 
investigation teams, …) 
 high 
 medium 
 low 
 
10. availability and quality of off-line (paper and electronic) relevant legal 
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documentation 
 high 
 medium 
 low 
11. availability and quality of circulars, practical guidelines, best practice 
manuals, model forms, technical/legal and practical support 
 high 
 medium 
 low 
12. monitoring quality and speed in executing requests 
 yes 
 moderate 
 no 
 
